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Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that allows the identification of 
objects from a distance even without line-of-sight. RFID systems hold the potential for 
significant improvements in the speed and data sharing in a number of different types of 
systems. But they also present a number of performance issues and significant security 
risks. This is especially true in very large scale networked systems used by multiple 
independent partners: mainly due to some of the specific features of those types of 
systems. The main performance issues associated with RFID use in these types of 
systems are (1) The lack of a system architecture optimised for the specific 
requirements of large scale networked RFID systems and (2) The amount of 
computational power available on low cost RFID tags. Security-wise the lack of a 
comprehensive security framework targeted at networked RFID systems is a big 
concern as there are a large number of different types of RFID systems with different 
security needs. Additionally most of the currently existing RFID protocols are either 
unsecure or too resource intensive for use on low cost RFID tags. The possibility of 
RFID based malware, which can infect RFID tags and from there spread to backend 
databases and other tags, has also recently been identified by researchers.  
In this thesis we propose and present a number of methods with which the 
performance and security issues in networked RFID systems can be improved. First an 
RFID architecture optimised for large scale networked RFID systems is developed. The 
proposed architecture has a fully modularised middleware allowing for easy 
development and uses P2P techniques for both the data lookup and data sharing. In the 
comparative analysis carried out we show that the proposed architecture has a number 
of advantages over existing solutions when used in developing very large scale 
networked systems. Next we present a holistic and comprehensive security framework 
for networked RFID. The security framework takes into account the threats and attacks 
faced by networked RFID systems, the system components that can be affected by them 
and the security functionality required to secure the overall system. By applying the 
framework to any RFID system developers/users can easily identify potential threats 
and attacks to that system and identify how those threats and attacks can be mitigated.  
Next, we develop and then present a hybrid RFID authentication protocol developed 
vi 
using a mix of traditional cryptographic primitives and ultra-light-weight cryptographic 
techniques. The security and performance evaluations show that the proposed protocol 
is very secure and that it is lightweight enough to be implemented on low cost RFID 
tags. Finally we develop and present a policy-based RFID malware detection and 
prevention approach. The proposed approach uses both defensive coding techniques 
(data validation and sanitization) and active detection (SQL query structure matching). 
It is also a simple solution that is easily implementable at a single point in the 
middleware and allows the automated detection of tags that are infected with malware 
and prevents that malware from spreading to the backend databases. The security 
evaluation shows very high detection rates and low false positives. It is also capable of 
detecting second order injection attacks: an attack that most existing approaches are 
unable detect. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Radio Frequency Identification 
At its core Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology that consists of a 
electromagnetic tag or chip attached to an object and contains a unique identification 
number. A reader is used to read the contents of the tag from a distance without line-of-
sight [1]. Therefore RFID can be defined as a non-contact, proximity based, automatic 
identification and information generation technology that does not require manual 
scanning or line-of-sight [2]. Use of RFID over legacy tracking and identification 
technologies such as barcodes enable a number of advantages including automation, 
improved response times, much greater information generation and real-time sharing of 
that data [3].  
RFID technology as a concept is relatively old. It was first used during the Second 
World War as a method of differentiating between enemy and allied air craft. One of the 
earliest academic papers on RFID was [4] in which Stockholm, the author, presented the 
very first concept of a passive radio transmitter powered by the radio waves from 
another transmitting device. But the first “true ancestor” of RFID can be considered to 
be the device patented by Mario Cardullo in 1973 as it was the first passive radio 
transponder with on-board memory. Since then RFID technology and tags have 
advanced in leaps and bounds. In 2009 the typical cost of passive RFID tags had already 
dropped as low as 0.07-0.05 US dollars [5]. This sudden advance in RFID technology 
and the corresponding drop in prices have made RFID enabled systems appealing in a 
number of different environments and areas.  
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Therefore the potential applications of RFID technology are vast and currently 
RFID systems are used in a number of diverse application areas such as transportation, 
fleet management, payment systems and livestock identification [1]. Due to the diverse 
nature of potential RFID systems their features also greatly differ. Standalone payment 
systems such as toll payment systems are typically implemented in a very small 
geographic area while cattle tracking systems are used in large geographic areas. Some 
systems such as global supply chain management systems are distributed over 
extremely large networked RFID systems used by multiple partners spread over a very 
large geographic area [6]. Table 1.1 illustrates the features of some of these different 
RFID systems.  
Table 1.1: RFID system features 
 Geographic area Number of partners Number of tags 
Toll payment systems Very small Single Medium 
Cattle tracking systems Large Single Small 
RFID enabled hospitals Very small Few Medium 
RFID enabled passports Very large Medium Large 
Global supply-chain management Very large Very large Very large 
One application of RFID that has attracted a large amount of attention in recent years is 
its use in very large networked RFID systems [7]. One such example is the use of RFID 
in global supply chain management applications. In 2003-2005, Wal-Mart, the biggest 
retailer in the world, and the creator of many supply chain management innovations 
such as hub and spoke system and just-in-time inventory replacement, started using 
RFID to streamline its supply chains [8]. Lately a number of other organizations 
including Marks and Spencer of UK and Airbus have also started RFID projects. Airbus 
is claiming savings of millions of Euros each year by cutting process cycle times, 
eliminating paperwork, and reducing inventory through the use of RFID [9]. When 
deployed in this type of environment, RFID infrastructure can provide increased 
visibility throughout the network by enabling an efficient means to uniquely identify 
each container, pallet, case and item being manufactured, shipped and sold [10]. The 
automation possible with the RFID technology allows the automatic generation and 
sharing of large amounts of transaction data with partners along the network. It also 
allows a great number of business processes to be automated and made more efficient. 
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In addition, RFID allows the leveraging of more real time information to manage and 
streamline the physical goods network more efficiently [11]. Therefore Wal-Mart hoped 
to cut storage costs, reduce stock disappearances and minimize lost sales due stock 
outages in retail stores by moving from barcodes to RFID [12].  
With the newly generated interest in the use of global RFID systems there needed 
to be a centralized organization to set the standards for, and ensure the interoperability 
of, different RFID applications and systems. Therefore the EPCGlobal was founded in 
2003 by the Auto-ID Centre, an academic research project run by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Its main goal was “to try and facilitate the creation of RFID 
systems and to develop standards for those systems” [13]. Since then the main focus of 
this organization has been the development of worldwide standards for RFID and the 
use of the internet to share RFID data via the EPCGlobal network. To this purpose they 
created the EPCglobal architecture framework (here on referred to as EPCGAF). In 
2010 the adoption of RFID was greatly accelerated by three main factors: (1) the 
steadily decreasing price of RFID tags as well as the increase in their computational 
power and memory capacity expanded the number of possible profitable uses of RFID 
systems, (2) Increase in tag read reliability and read rates leading to much more reliable 
RFID systems [14] and (3) The global adoption of a stable international standard around 
UHF passive RFID [15]. All of these advances were mainly made possible by the work 
done by the EPCGlobal.
1.2 Current Issues and Research Motivation 
While the promise and possibilities of RFID-enabled supply chains were huge the 
benefits failed to actually materialize to quite the degree forecast in some types of 
systems. This was because RFID-enabled large scale global supply chains have a 
number of requirements and features that differentiate them from other, simpler, RFID 
enabled systems [16]. In addition, while the security and performance of RFID systems 
have greatly increased over the last few years there are still security and performance 
issues, especially in networked systems employing low cost passive tags, that create 
barriers to truly global adoption of networked RFID [11, 17].  
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1.2.1 Performance Issues in Networked RFID 
A main requirement in large-scale networked RFID systems is the need for high 
throughput of tag reads. This is because some points, such as large-scale warehouses 
and other storage facilities, can store millions of RFID-tagged items. Therefore to 
ensure timely reading and retrieval of the tagged information, the performance of RFID 
tag reads for supply chain applications are quoted at 100/sec. With multiple readers at 
each location this means that the overall data lookup and retrieval rate for that particular 
location and its middleware may well exceed 5000/sec for large RFID locations. 
Therefore one of the biggest barriers to networked RFID adoption is read and data 
retrieval performance [18].  
The current performance issues in large scale RFID systems also stem from the use 
of unoptimised system architecture when building the systems in question. The current 
standard for RFID systems architecture is the EPCGlobal Architecture Framework. To 
ensure that the framework can be used to develop many fundamentally different types 
of RFID systems the EPCGlobal has built the architecture framework around a highly 
generalized model of an RFID system. Therefore the resulting architecture contains 
some weaknesses when used in massively networked environments [2]. In addition, a 
majority of the other architectures found in literature also contain various weaknesses 
when building global supply chain management systems. Therefore identifying and then 
removing or minimizing the weaknesses of existing architectures when building large 
scale networked RFID systems will increase the performance of those systems and 
thereby increase the adoption rates. 
1.2.2 Security Issues in Networked RFID 
Another major barrier to the adoption of RFID is the current security and privacy issues 
associated with it. Because RFID tags use wireless communications with a max read 
distance of around 10 meters and typical read distance of around 3-5 meters it becomes 
very easy for potential attackers to eavesdrop or modify legitimate communications 
between tags and readers [15]. In extreme cases it is even possible for the attackers to 
masquerade as authorised tags or readers and gain access to valuable private 
information [19]. Additionally because RFID tags are attached to mobile physical 
objects attackers can invade the privacy of people and corporations using RFID tags 
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simply by tracking their movement over time [20]. Finally unlike other data storage 
components which are typically physically secured, RFID tags are much more 
physically accessible to attackers. This compounds the above security issues as 
attackers can potentially steal the tags and bypass any security functionality and directly 
access any data stored on the tag [17].  
In addition to the above mentioned issues networked RFID systems with multiple 
independent partners face a number of additional security and privacy issues. In this 
kind of system the RFID tag can be thought of as a communication device between 
partners. One partner writes/changes the data on the tag and another partner later on 
receives that data. Therefore non-repudiation becomes a requirement. Like-wise in this 
kind of system a partner may wish to store private data that only he should have access 
to on the tag. Therefore functionality such as access control and data ownership is 
required as well. 
Another major factor contributing to the lack of security in RFID systems is the low 
amount of computational power available on low cost tags. Due to price constraints 
most global supply chain management systems use low cost passive tags [21]. 
Unfortunately these tags only contain around 10000 gates. This means that the use of 
any complex computations or processes on the tag will dramatically increase the time 
required to carry out that process. Therefore another very interesting technical hurdle is 
implementing the above mentioned security functionality on low cost RFID tags while 
still ensuring that the time required to carry out those processes remain at an acceptable 
level [22]. 
1.3 Research Problems 
The overall goal of this thesis is on improving the performance and security of 
networked RFID systems. In particular we focus on large scale systems that are spread 
over a very large geographic area and are used and shared by a number of independent 
business entities e.g.:- Global supply chain management systems. To achieve this goal 
we tackle a number of different research challenges. The main challenges when 
conducting this research was ensuring that the complex nature of networked RFID 
systems are taken into account in any proposed solutions and that the trade-off between 
security and performance vs. the amount of resources available on low cost tags is 
6 
managed in the best possible manner. In particular we identify and investigate the 
following four research problems: 
• How can the architecture of a large scale networked RFID system be 
improved – Currently there are a number issues in the existing RFID 
architectures including lack of sufficient scalability, security issues, key and data 
management issues, data lookup and retrieval problems and concerns on overall 
system availability [23]. Here the focus should be on improving the overall 
architecture used for developing this type of system and improving the manner 
in which the data lookup, retrieval and formatting can be done between partners 
and ensuring strong scalability, availability and security of the overall system.  
• What are the security issues inherent in large scale networked RFID 
systems with multiple independent partners, and how can those security 
issues be mitigated/removed – The complex nature of networked RFID 
systems mean that they face a lot of different threats and attacks [24], and 
therefore have a large number of different security requirements [25]. Hence a 
comprehensive framework needs to be created that takes into account various 
different factors such as the threats and attacks possible on RFID systems and 
the core components that must be protected and the security concepts that must 
be maintained. The framework should allow methodical identification of each of 
these factors for any given RFID system. It must also be able to identify novel 
ways in which the security of that particular system can be improved. 
• How can the tags and readers of a system securely communicate – Because 
of the unsecure broadcast mechanism used for communication between tags and 
readers, RFID communications can be subject to a number of attacks including 
man-in-the-middle, DoS, eavesdropping, replay, forward and backward tag 
tracking, reader and tag spoofing, tag cloning and transmitted data corruption 
[24]. Hence, the protocol used for tag-reader communication must be secure 
against these attacks and must provide a large number of different security 
functionality. In particular the protocol must be able to first authenticate the tags 
and readers, communicate data between them in a secure manner. It should also 
carry out this functionality with the minimal resources available on low cost 
RFID tags. 
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• How can an RFID system be secured against tag based malware – Recently 
the possibility of tag based RFID malware infecting RFID systems was proven. 
These RFID malware, which are based on SQLIA, has the ability to spread 
extremely fast. And like typical malware, they also have range of detrimental 
effects on the infected systems ranging from loss of data and denial of service to 
compromise of private data and systems [26]. Therefore the defence mechanism 
must be able to detect the presence of tag based malware and prevent its 
propagation into the backend databases. In particular it must focus on carrying 
this task out at high throughput rates to ensure that the minimum read rates for 
large networked systems can be maintained and it must ensure infected tags are 
identified so they can be cleaned. 
1.4 Methodology 
The proposed research will be carried out based on the experimental computer science 
method. This method has two main requirements that must be met of any research 
project: proof-of-concept and proof-of-performance.
      To demonstrate the proof-of-concept a number of steps were carried out for each 
research contribution. We first reviewed the existing work in a number of RFID 
performance and security areas to identify weaknesses and gaps and formulate open 
problems. We then modelled the systems in question and designed systems/solutions 
that solved the open problems we identified. Because we had modelled the system in 
question beforehand we were then able to use a number of different methods such as 
case studies and comparative analysis to demonstrate the validity of our solutions in the 
context of the system we were trying to improve.   
The next step in this methodology is demonstrating proof-of-performance of these 
solutions. This was done by first designing the more technical details of each of the 
solutions such as the necessary algorithms, protocol descriptions and process maps. 
Then those technical details were used to carry out various evaluations in such areas as 
accuracy (for malware detection) and computational overhead (security protocol) and 
comparative performance evaluation (RFID architecture). Also in some cases other 
informal methods such as security and system analysis and case study evaluations were 
also used to further evaluate the accuracy and correctness of the proposed solutions 
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1.5 Major Contributions and Significance 
The major research contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1 Comprehensive review and critical analysis of current research literature in a 
number of different areas associated with networked RFID performance and 
security including:  
a. The currently existing architectures for developing networked RFID 
systems. 
b. Security frameworks and classifications that can be applied to networked 
RFID systems. 
c. Security protocols that have been proposed for use in networked RFID 
systems. 
d. Malware detection techniques (focusing on SQLIA detection and 
prevention) which can either be directly applied or modified and applied to 
protecting RFID systems from tag based malware. 
2 Proposal of a modular and extensible networked RFID architecture which uses 
P2P technology and is optimised for large scale networked RFID systems and 
their specific requirements. The comparative analysis carried out shows that the 
proposed architecture is better than existing architectures in a number of key areas 
when used for developing large scale networked RFID systems. 
3 Creation of a comprehensive networked RFID security framework composed 
of three main components: threat model, attack model and security model. The 
security framework enables the methodical identification of threats and attacks 
possible on RFID systems, the core components and security concepts that must be 
maintained and the full security functionality required to protect it. The evaluation 
of the framework was carried out by applying it to real-life system.  
4 Proposal of a secure RFID communication protocol that can be used for 
communication of tag data other than the tag identifier to readers. The security 
analysis proved that the proposed protocol provides most of the required security 
functionality and is secure against a number of common attacks on RFID systems. 
The performance comparison showed that its performance was comparable to other 
protocols proposed for RFID systems and that it can be implemented on resource-
constrained RFID tags. 
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5 Proposal of a policy based malware detection and prevention system for RFID 
systems. Based on existing methods developed for Web-based SQLIA defence our 
solution has been custom-tailored to work in an RFID system environment and 
secure it against tag-based malware. The security evaluation proved that it can 
provide security against all currently known types of tag based RFID malware. It 
was also shown that the proposed system is relatively simpler and less complex than 
other comparable security systems as it uses simple string comparisons rather than 
using more complex methods such as parse tree analysis on NDFA. 
Overall the research carried out and presented in this thesis is significant because it can 
be used to enhance the performance and security of large-scale networked RFID 
systems used by multiple independent partners while still ensuring that the system 
performance is not affected too negatively. 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
The thesis consists of seven chapters in total. These consist of 1 literature review 
chapter, 4 research contribution chapters and an introduction and a conclusion. The 
framework of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 1 – Presents a brief introduction of RFID technology and its improvement 
over time. We then present an overview of some of the current issues and open research 
questions in the area and discuss the motivation for addressing those issues and 
answering those open questions. We then present and discuss the major research 
contributions of this thesis and their significance. 
Chapter 2 – Introduces the background and system model for the research 
presented in this thesis. We first introduce global supply chains and how RFID can be 
employed in managing them. We then present the basic model for highly networked 
RFID systems with multiple independent partners. Next we present the literature review 
for the research carried out in this thesis. The literature review includes the following:  
(1) An in depth analysis of the weaknesses of a number of existing networked 
RFID architectures in context of the requirements of highly networked RFID 
systems. 
(2) A review of traditional security frameworks and RFID security frameworks 
and classifications identifying their weaknesses and omissions. 
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(3) A review of some of the main RFID security protocols proposed in the 
recent years. Here we focus on both protocols using traditional cryptographic 
techniques and ultra-light-weight techniques and identify the common 
weaknesses that led to their failure. 
(4) A review of traditional SQLIA detection and prevention methods and their 
weaknesses in context of securing RFID systems from tag based malware 
attacks 
Chapter 3 – In this chapter we propose an RFID architecture framework specially 
designed for developing and implementing networked RFID systems. The proposed 
architecture uses P2P technology for both data lookup and data sharing. In building the 
architecture we take into account the specific features of networked RFID systems and 
optimize it for them. We then carryout a comparative analysis of our architecture and 
existing architectures and demonstrate that our architecture has a number of advantages 
and improvements over existing solutions.  
Chapter 4 - In this chapter we develop and present a comprehensive networked 
RFID security framework. The proposed framework is aimed specifically at networked 
RFID systems and takes into account a number of key factors such as threats and their 
effect on the system, the attacks possible on the system and how they can be classified, 
and the key components that must be secured and the security concepts that must be 
preserved in each component. The developed framework presents a methodical manner 
in which to analyse a networked RFID application and identify its security 
vulnerabilities and requirements. We then evaluate the framework using a real life RFID 
system and identify some key vulnerabilities of that system and novel ways in which 
those vulnerabilities can be eliminated.
Chapter 5 – In chapter five we develop and present a hybrid RFID security 
protocol. The protocol allows the secure communication of tag data other than the tag 
identifiers which is a first to the best of our knowledge. We also present two 
modifications to the protocol: one that increases security at the cost of decreased 
performance and one that increases performance at the cost of decreased security. The 
security evaluation demonstrates that the proposed protocol is secure against a large 
number of common attacks as well as providing most of the required security 
functionality of networked RFID systems. The performance comparison shows that the 
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protocol is comparable with recently proposed ultra-light-weight protocols while being 
more secure. 
Chapter 6 - In chapter 6 we develop and present a policy based dual pronged tag 
malware detection and prevention system for RFID systems. The proposed approach 
consists of a tag data validation and sanitization method and a dynamic query 
verification system. The proposed technique provides security against all currently 
known SQLIA attacks possible on RFID systems and therefore against all currently 
known malware possible on RFID. Because we use a simple string comparison method 
for the dynamic query verification our system is a lot more efficient than other similar 
techniques while being similarly or more secure. 
Chapter 7 – Summarizes the major findings and contributions of the thesis and 
provides some suggestions for interesting future research directions in this area. 
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Out of all the different types of RFID systems the most complex ones are very large 
scale networked RFID systems spread over a large geographic area which are used by 
multiple different partners [2]. This type of RFID systems are widely utilized in RFID 
enabled global supply chain management systems. But, while the advantages of using 
RFID in such an environment are numerous there are also a large number of 
performance and security issues inherent in such RFID systems due to their complexity. 
In this chapter we will first explain what a global supply chain is and how they 
normally operate. We will then describe the basic conceptual model of a very large 
scale networked RFID system. We will also clearly differentiate it from standalone 
RFID systems by identifying the differences between these two types of systems. Next 
we will present some literature reviews that identify some of the open areas in the field 
of networked RFID security and performance. The first literature review is an analysis 
of the current RFID architectures which identifies their weaknesses when used to 
develop very large scale networked RFID systems. Next we will present an analysis of 
general security frameworks and RFID security taxonomies in context of using them for 
identifying and securing large scale networked RFID systems. Then we present a 
critical review of some of the recently proposed RFID security protocols. Finally we 
analyse and present the weaknesses of current SQLIA detection techniques when it 
comes to securing RFID systems from tag based malware attacks. 
2.1 RFID in Global Supply Chains 
A supply chain (Figure 2.1) is a system of organizations, people, technology, activities, 
information and resources involved in transforming raw materials into end products and 
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selling those products to the end consumer. Hence supply chain activities transform 
natural resources, raw materials and components into a finished product that is delivered 
to the end customer [27]. Global supply chains, which are spread over multiple 
continents and have billions of items flowing through them each year, can have as many 
as tens of thousands of storage locations and hundreds of independent partners. The 
geographic size and the number of partners, stores, products and storage location 
involved in global supply chains means that sharing information in real time and in 
detail is of paramount importance for the supply chain to be responsive to customer 
needs and demands [11]. By attaching RFID tags to the items and associating those tags 
with information stored in the backend databases, supply chain partners can  gain a 
number of advantages for supply chain management over traditional systems that 
employ bar codes [28]. 
Figure 2.1: A supply chain 
The best example for a truly large scale networked RFID system is the global supply 
chain management systems being deployed by large retailers such as Wal-Mart [8]. The 
RFID systems in this case spans all the way from the initial raw materials manufacturer 
to the final retailer and in some cases even continue past sales. When raw materials are 
first generated and packed those packages are attached with an RFID tag. The tags can 
be placed on containers, pallets, cases or even on individual products. Then the 
manufacturer stores static information such as date, batch number, price and expiry date 
on either the tag itself or the backend database. The manufacturer may also associate 
transaction data such as the buyer and delivery addresses with the specific RFID tag 
identifier as they become available and store them on the backend database [29].  
When the logistics get the tagged package they use that data to properly it. They 
also update the data in their backend database with details such as unit’s current location 
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and the shipment and transport truck it’s been attached to. This kind of ‘transactional 
data” is automatically generated and will be constantly updated in a large number of 
different RFID data repositories as new readers pick up that specific RFID tag and the 
middleware associates new business processes with that item [27]. By tagging the 
products as they travel along the supply chain the partners are able to track all the 
products in real time wherever they may be. In addition the automation possible with 
RFID tags due to their wireless communication and extended range means that a great 
number of business processes can be made more efficient by their use. The possibility 
of generating large numbers of “transaction data” automatically and sharing it with the 
partners along the supply chain dramatically increases the visibility of the full supply 
chain for all involved partners. It also allows the leveraging of more real time 
information to manage and streamline the supply chain better [28].  
When the final product producer receives that item he unpacks it and uses the raw 
materials contained inside to create products. These products each have new RFID tags 
but those tags are also linked with the tags of the raw materials packages they were 
developed from. Once again the producer stores static information on either the tag or 
the back end and then the final products starts moving along the supply chain moving 
from each partner to partner. At different points in this chain each partner generates 
more and more transactional data concerning the products attached to each tag and 
stores them in his personal RFID repository. Most of time each partner is only aware of 
the partner directly up and down chain from them [30]. But, while they may not know 
the other partners they still need to access all the transactional data that was generated 
by each partner if the full power of the RFID system is to be leveraged. Therefore they 
need to be able to locate all the data repositories that contain information about any 
given RFID tag. This is currently where the EPCGlobal comes in.  
The EPCGlobal provides services that allow partners to identify the data 
repositories anywhere in the world that contain information about any given tag [31].  
Different companies use different business applications and place more importance on 
different types of data. Therefore the data stored in each repository must not only 
contain as much information as possible but it must also be able to cater to the data 
format requirements of a large number of different business applications [2]. Because 
RFID tags and EPC numbering have been conceived with the idea of item-level tracking 
rather than product-level tr
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2.2.1 RFID Tags 
The most important component of a networked RFID system is the RFID tag. The items 
in the system are tagged with an RFID tag when they are first manufactured. RFID tags 
used in networked systems are typically low cost passive tags with update functionality. 
These RFID tags typically comprise an electronic memory module, a logic module, and 
a communication antenna. The memory module of the tag can consist of read only 
memory (manufactured with data which can never be changed), write once memory 
(manufactured blank and can be written on once) or read-write memory (manufactured 
blank and can be written on and updated many times). The logic module of typical 
RFID tags consists of between 3000 to 10000 gates. The tags can be powered with 
passive power (power is generated by the radio signal transmitted by the readers), or  a 
semi-passive power source (the power for broadcasting is supplied by the reader while 
the power for other functions is supplied by a dedicated battery), or an active power 
source (a dedicated battery supplies all the required power) [33].  
RFID tags are what links the electronic RFID data stored in the system to the 
physical object they are attached to. The tag will always hold a unique identifier which 
allows the system to associate data stored in the backend databases with the attached 
item. When a new RFID tag is entered in the system the manufacturer of the item 
allocates its identification number based on a global hierarchy. Because RFID tags use 
an insecure channel (radio waves over open air) to communicate the reader and tags 
need to provide the security functionality required to ensure the security of the 
communications. Additionally because the RFID tags are physically attached to objects 
they are relatively less secure than typical data storage devices in networked IT systems. 
In addition, most large networked RFID system need to use very low cost RFID tags. 
Therefore the amount of resources available on those tags (both performance and 
power-wise) is considerably low and it is nearly impossible to implement the standard 
cryptographic security measures employed in IT networks on those tags [22]. But, 
because RFID tags contain a memory module that contains sensitive data it’s still 
imperative that the data stored on the tag be secure from both logical and physical 
access. Therefore RFID tags must have enough resources on board to provide some 
security functionality. In some current systems they also need to hold additional data 
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such as brand, product, expiry date, price and ingredients of the object they are attached 
to [33]. 
2.2.2 RFID Readers 
RFID readers are used to read and write data to and from RFID tags. They are 
composed of three main parts: the receiver, transmitter and controller [33]. A RFID 
reader needs to manage the large number of simultaneous transmissions it may receive 
and respond to them [11]. In systems that employ passive RFID tags the readers must 
also provide power to the tags [34]. The readers also need to read the identifier and any 
additional data stored on any authenticated tags within reader distance and update the 
tag data when necessary [35]. The range of an RFID reader depends on the frequency of 
the radio wave used and the power used to generate its radio waves. There are four main 
reader frequency ranges for RFID systems: Low Frequency (9-135 KHz) with a reader 
range of only few centimetres, High Frequency (13.56 MHz) with a reader range of 1cm 
to 1.5 meter, Ultra High Frequency (0.3-1.2GHz) with reader range of up to 15 meters 
and Microwave (2.45-5.8GHz) with a reader range of up to 80 meters [33]. In systems 
employing passive or semi passive tags the tag to reader communication distance is 
typically much shorter than the reader to tag communication distance because the 
amount of power the tag can harvest from the reader’s signal is very small. When an 
authorized reader comes in contact with an RFID tag it first retrieves the identifier of 
the tag. That identifier and any other data stored on the tag is then passed on to the 
RFID middleware of the system [22].   
2.2.3 RFID Middleware 
The RFID middleware is the heart of the RFID system and is arguably the most 
complex component of the system. It needs to carry out a number of different tasks to 
ensure that the overall RFID system functions correctly [36]. The middleware cleans 
and collects the data received from RFID tags as low cost RFID tags are notorious for 
bad and false reads. The middleware also needs to carry out most of the security tasks to 
ensure the integrity and authenticity of the tags and the data received from them [21]. In 
systems employing the EPCGlobal architecture the middleware translates the EPC and 
data retrieved according to the tag data specification as data is stored in binary format 
on the tag [13]. In most RFID systems multiple readers are set in an overlapping 
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formation to ensure full coverage of the read area. Therefore the middleware needs to 
also aggregate, filter and format the data streams from multiple different RFID readers 
so they are in the format required by the enterprise applications. The middleware also 
generates transaction data based on business events as pre-defined by the system 
developers and end users [37]. Therefore, when it receives tag data from readers the 
middleware first filters it to ensure that they are not false or bad reads. Then any 
security functionality is carried out to ensure that the data is safe to be used. The 
middleware then locates any additional data locations using a lookup service and 
retrieves any required information from those partners’ data servers. It then uses pre-set 
business rules to generate transaction data, associates that data with the identifier and 
stores that data in the system database. The middleware also communicates with other 
applications that require RFID data and retrieves that data, either from the local 
database or from partners' databases, and forwards it to them. This architecture is very 
different from normal networked systems which typically do not have a dedicated 
middleware component, as different partner applications communicate directly with 
each other as required [2]. 
2.2.4 Lookup Service 
The lookup service is what allows different independent partners to locate and 
communicate with each other. In some very large networked RFID systems all the 
partners of the system may not even directly know each other or of each other’s 
existence [11]. Therefore networked RFID systems require a method with which the 
partners can locate all the data stored in the overall system concerning a specific tag. 
This service is normally run by an independent entity that is trusted by all partners. In 
EPCGlobal systems this service is provided by the EPCGlobal ONS service [13]. The 
lookup directory needs to have the identification numbers of all the RFID tags of the 
system. It also needs to know the location of all the data concerning each specific RFID 
tag and the details on how to contact that data server. 
2.2.5 Data Storage 
The RFID repository is where the data concerning the tagged objects are stored. In some 
cases this may be one physical server or database while in other systems this may be 
multiple dependent or independent databases or servers [2]. In some systems the data 
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servers are only accessible by the RFID middleware. Internal or external applications 
which need to access that data need to do so through the RFID middleware. In other 
systems these servers can be directly accessed by external partner applications [13]. 
Either way the RFID repository needs to allow more access to its data by external 
entities and programs than is typically allowed in IT systems. In addition the data stored 
in the RFID data servers must be stored in as granular a form as possible to preserve as 
much of the information as possible. This is because different partners need different 
information from the same set of data. Therefore it is up to the querying middleware or 
the business applications to extract the required information from the raw data retrieved 
and format it in a way that can be used by the business applications [2]. 
2.2.6 Business Applications 
The business applications use the data received from the RFID system to carryout 
existing business processes [38]. They may also update the data stored in the repository 
or the RFID tags. These applications are mostly pre-existing ones that have been 
modified to integrate with the RFID system and use the information supplied by the 
RFID middleware [39]. They retrieve information as required by either going through 
the middleware or by directly communicating with the external and internal RFID data 
repositories. Therefore, in networked RFID systems the business applications must be 
modified to directly communicate with either the middleware of the system or other 
partners RFID repositories. Unlike in typical networks where the different partners have 
data format and storage standards and agreements, the business applications using a 
networked RFID system may be required to use data stored in a number of different 
formats and granularities by different partners [2]. The retrieved data is then used to 
automate, improve and streamline existing business processes. 
2.2.7 Communication Network 
As in any networked system all these different components have to be connected by a 
communication network. The network used in RFID systems can be divided into two 
main parts: the internal network and the external network. The internal network (shown 
in the green lines above) connects the components of a single partner together. This part 
of the network typically consists of a LAN or WAN and is protected from outside 
intrusion by the partner’s firewall and intrusion detection and prevention software. The 
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external network on the other hand connects the components of different partners as 
well as connecting the middleware of the system with the centralized lookup service 
[40]. This part of the network is generally implemented over the internet.  
2.3 RFID Architectures 
For the purpose of this thesis we define “system architecture” as follow: architecture is a 
description of a system, organized so that it explains the rationale behind the overall 
system structure which compromises different components. It also explains the 
properties of those components and the relationships and interactions between them. 
Therefore the architecture of a system describes the different components and how they 
will work together to implement the overall system. Cohesive, well-developed and 
accepted system architecture is very important to not only ensure that the system works 
but also to ensure compatibility between systems that are developed separately. 
2.3.1The EPCGlobal Architecture Framework 
The EPCGAF is “a collection of hardware, software, and data standards, together with 
core services that are operated by EPCglobal, its delegates or third party providers in the 
marketplace, all in service of a common goal of enhancing business flows and computer 
applications through the use of Electronic Product Codes” [13]. The architectural 
framework designed by the EPCGlobal has on purpose been developed at a high level 
thereby ensuring that different vendors and organizations have as much freedom as 
possible when developing applications based on the framework.  It can be used in 
creating the architecture for a large number of different types of RFID applications 
while ensuring interoperability and the possibility of data sharing with other 
organizations that use the same framework when developing their RFID enabled 
applications [13]. Currently this is the accepted architecture standard when developing 
any RFID enabled systems. In the following section we will explain in summary some 
details of the EPCGAF. For full information on it and its use please refer to [13]. 
2.3.1.1 EPCGlobal Data Storage and Recovery 
The EPCGAF is built around the concept of a globally unique Electronic Product Code. 
This is a single identification number which allows the unique global identification of 
the object it’s associated with.  To handle the large number of possible EPCs, various 
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EPC manager organizations are allocated blocks of EPCs which they then allocate to 
various other organizations as needed. There can primarily be 2 types of data associated 
with an EPC: 
Static data – Static data is created at the birth of the object and it does not grow or 
change over the life of the object. This type of data is normally created and stored by the 
manufacturer of the object and is of limited size. E.g.:- product name, price, expiry data, 
manufacture data, etc.  
Transaction data – Transaction data is data created during various business processes 
by various organizations that handle that object. Over the lifetime of the object the 
amount of data created about it can grow immensely. E.G:- EPC A was seen at 
warehouse B of organization c at a specific time. 250 counts of EPC class d are 
available at warehouse C of organization d.  
Due to the immense amount of transactional data created, using a centralized approach 
to store the data is not viable. Storing the data at the organization it was generated at is 
possible, but there has to be a way to allow other organizations to locate that data. The 
Object Name Service (ONS) is a hierarchal look-up service, that’s based on the internet 
DNS service. It provides a means for looking up a reference to an EPCIS service or 
other service associated with an EPC. The typical lookup for EPC data retrieval is 
shown in Table 2.1:- 
Table 2.1: EPCglobal data lookup 
Lookup 
Step 
Lookup Service 
Employed 
Who Maintains the Service What Data is Retrieved 
1  Root ONS  EPCglobal  Address of Local ONS for given 
EPC Manager Number 
2  Local ONS for 
given EPC 
Manager Number  
Holder of EPC Manager 
Number  
Address of EPCIS Service for given 
EPC Class 
3  EPCIS 
(manufacturer) 
End user responsible for 
commissioning EPC  
Commissioning data about the EPC 
EPCIS (partner) Organizations that handled the 
object associated with the 
EPC and generated 
Transactional data 
Transactional Data about EPC 
The ONS takes an EPC as input, and produces as output the address of an EPCIS 
service designated by the EPC manager of the EPC in question. The root ONS service is 
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run by EPCglobal and contains information on how to locate and contact the ONS 
services run by EPC manager organizations and other organizations. The local ONS 
contains look-up information that allows an organization to locate and communicate 
with all the EPCIS of organizations that have data about any given EPC. The EPCGAF 
has number of weaknesses including scalability and availability issues, SPOF, 
unnecessary duplication of data retrieval and formatting and centralised data locations 
and lookup services. For a full discussion of these weaknesses refer to Section 2.3.3. 
2.3.2 Other Networked RFID Architectures 
Over the years a number of architectures have been proposed for networked RFID 
systems. In this section we will discuss some of them and identify their weaknesses. 
One of the first peer-to-peer based RFID architectures were proposed in [41]. This 
architecture uses hybrid method for peer resolution. The information discovery is done 
using the traditional EPC based ONS while service discovery is done using a DHT 
based system. The proposed architecture removes some of the bottlenecks and 
scalability and availability issues associated with the EPCGAF. Unfortunately this 
approach has one major weakness. The peers are networked by chain linking the address 
entries. If any participants are not available or their services fail the chain would break 
and no information from one side of the broken chain could be retrieved by peers on the 
other side of the break. This meant that the solution was not feasible for global supply 
chain management systems as the chain in that kind of system would be very long and a 
break would create major issues for all partners.     
In [23] the authors present a peer-to-peer based alternative to the EPCGAF. It is 
also based on the DHT model of data lookup used in a lot of modern peer-to-peer 
networks. This architecture allows for the use of any type of tag identifier to allow 
greater interoperability with other architectures. The hash values of the tag identifier, 
which is also used to identify information sources about that tag, are mapped to a 
distinct location in the network where the participants can retrieve the entry directly.  
The actual data lookup is carried out using either a direct search or indirect search. In 
direct search the object identifiers are used as keys and looked up in the DHT key space. 
For indirect searches indices have to be created and updated periodically. But all 
information associated with the tags remains in the participant’s local system and other 
partners all retrieve the required data from that one location. Once the data service is 
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located using the DHT, the required information can be retrieved via a SOAP or EPCIS 
service using the SOAP internet interface or the URI of the service. The proposed 
architecture has a number of improvements over the EPCGAF including greater 
scalability, because the data look-up is done in a distributed manner. It also has better 
interoperability as any identifier can be used rather than just the EPCIS. But the system 
still has issues. The main issue with this architecture is that the partner data sources 
which contain the data generated by that partner acts as a single server distributing all of 
that data to all other partners. This creates a single point of failure for that data service 
as well as scalability issues. In addition it still holds all the duplicate data lookup 
retrieval and formatting requirements that plague the EPCGAF which requires partners 
to unnecessarily carry out the same work multiple times. The system decentralizes the 
data lookup ensuring that the EPCGlobal cannot abuse its power, but it requires 
additional security measures to ensure the authenticity and access of partners accessing 
the data locations. 
In [42] the authors present another peer-to-peer based RFID resolution framework 
which is based on the original proposal presented in [41] but without chain links. In this 
approach instead of using hash values of the identifier as keys the system uses the EPC 
company prefix number (CPN), which is a unique identifier issued by a central 
authority, to map the keys to the nodes which contain data about it. Node IDs are used 
as follows: for companies with a CPN their CPN is used as the node ID followed by a 
random number, for companies without a CPN the three digit country code for the 
country they originate from are used followed by a random number. The nodes in the 
system are then arranged in a logical circle based on their node ID. Because the first 
part of the node ID is based on the country this ensures that the nodes in the logical 
network are arranged with physically closer peers that are logically closer to each other 
as well. The data resolution is done by going along the circle till a peer with the 
required information is found. To make the process more efficient another list 
containing the peer’s addresses logarithmically is also used. Due to its similarity to the 
previously discussed architecture this architecture also has very similar strengths and 
weaknesses. While its scalability and resistance to failure is higher than the EPCGAF 
due to the use of a peer-to-peer address resolution it still has scalability and availability 
issues at the actual data services. In addition, it also has issues with duplicate data look, 
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retrieval and formatting as retrieved data is discarded once it’s used and must be re-
retrieved when needed again. 
In addition to the architectures meant for large scale networked RFID systems there 
are also a number of other RFID architectures which are meant for other types of 
systems but have strengths that can apply for networked RFID systems. 
In [43] an interesting architecture is proposed which can be used for tracking the 
position and movement of RFID tags in small environments. It uses a tag identifier 
swapping mechanism to protect the location privacy of the tags. This kind of 
architecture is useless in large scale networks spread over a wide geographic area as it’s 
meant for use in small areas. But it still has its uses in global supply chain management 
systems in areas such as warehouse management. By implementing this kind of 
architecture in the confines of a warehouse the users will be able to track and locate the 
location of individual tags to a very small area enabling the easy and efficient access to 
that tag. It may also help identify inefficiencies in the physical layouts of the 
warehouses and in the business processes that are carried out therein by using the flow 
of the tags to identify potential bottlenecks in the physical goods flow. 
2.3.3 Weaknesses of the Current Solutions 
Because the EPCGlobal architecture (Figure 2.3) is highly generalised and not aimed 
specifically at large scale networked systems with multiple partners there are a number 
of issues and weaknesses it presents when building these types of systems. In addition, 
as discussed above, most of the other architectures that have been proposed also contain 
a number of weaknesses. By analysing the EPCGAF and the other architectures we 
identify the following common weakness in them, in the context of the environment and 
requirements of global supply chain management systems [27]. 
25 
Figure 2.3: EPCGlobal RFID architecture framework 
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2.3.3.1 Low Failure Tolerance 
System availability and security is a major concern for networked RFID systems. The 
structure of the EPCGlobal architecture framework introduces a number of Single 
Points of Failure (SPOF) to the system. The most critical point that could cause 
complete system failure is the ROOT ONS run by EPCglobal itself. The ROOT ONS is 
the starting point in which the lookup process for all data retrieval transactions is 
initiated, and its failure would affect all applications of all organizations that use this 
EPCglobal core service [13]. Because the local EPCIS of each partner is the only 
method in which external partners can retrieve transactional data generated by events 
happening at a partner’s reader location these also act as SPOFs [44]. The peer-to-peer 
architectures reviewed has improved fault tolerance by not relying on a single 
centralised service for address resolution. But they still have low fault tolerance at the 
data services as the data from a particular company is only available from a single 
service.  
2.3.3.2 Non Optimal Data Formatting and Aggregation
The manner in which data formatting and aggregation is done in the EPCGAF and most 
of the other architectures is sub optimal for large scale networked systems [2]. Because 
different partners use different applications the data that is required by those 
applications are also different in terms of format and aggregation level. Therefore most 
of time the data recovered from another partner's data service needs to be filtered, 
aggregated and formatted before being used by the business applications that use it [45]. 
As most of the  architectures require that data be retrieved from the partner's data 
service each time it’s needed (no local caching is specified for retrieved data) this 
requires the application using that data to filter, aggregate and format the same data 
multiple times whenever it’s required [13]. This unnecessary duplication of work 
needlessly increases the load placed on the local middleware and the network.   
2.3.3.3 Low Scalability  
The proposed architectures are susceptible to scalability issues due to the method in 
which the data is stored and retrieved [2]. All the transaction data collected by a single 
organization about all the RFID tags in the network are stored and distributed by a 
single data service belonging to that organization [13]. Therefore all the other 
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organizations need to contact and request that single service for any and all data 
generated by that organization about any and all the RFID tags in the network. As is 
obvious, when the network grows (it is common for large scale networked RFID 
applications to have millions of tags with hundreds of different locations requiring data) 
the amount of data requests received by the services of any given organization will grow 
radically [46]. This situation, known as “message explosion”, will eventually 
overwhelm the data service’s ability to receive and send messages and will cause the 
single data service to be overwhelmed with the amount of computational work needed 
to serve those data requests. The duplication of data retrieval that needs to be carried out 
by business applications needlessly exacerbates this problem. In addition the ONS 
service provided by the EPCGlobal is of very big concern when it comes to scalability. 
Because it’s the sole provider of all address resolution requests by all EPCGlobal users 
around the globe its scalability will become an issue very soon as RFID adoption 
continues at the current high rate. 
2.3.3.4 Difficult Integration with Existing Systems
Another weakness in the architectures (specially the EPCGAF) is the amount of 
redevelopment required for existing systems to work in conjunction with the new RFID 
system [2]. In the EPCGAF each individual business application is in charge of 
locating, retrieving and manipulating external data to gain the required information [13]. 
This means that all legacy applications must be redeveloped to do the data lookup as 
defined by the EPCGlobal using the core lookup services they provide. In addition those 
legacy applications must also be able to communicate with the EPCIS that has the 
required data, retrieve it and then use that data to extract the required information. This 
requires large scale redevelopment and modification of each and every existing business 
application and software that uses or generates RFID data [3]. Most other architectures 
also require extensive modification of existing applications and systems to properly 
work as the business applications are in charge of the data lookup and retrieval and 
formatting rather than a middleware. 
2.3.3.5 Security Concerns 
Another one of the main issues of the EPCGAF is that it does very little to address and 
supply the huge amount of security requirements for a truly secure networked RFID 
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application [17]. By its own admission the security features that are provided by the 
EPCGAF is use of pseudonyms to make unauthorized tag tracking more difficult, 
memory locking – which seriously  diminishes the power and functionality of the 
application employing those locked tags, and kill commands which are useless in a 
networked, multi-organization environment. Additionally the ONS used in the EPCGAF 
is based on the DNS services used on the world-wide-web. Therefore it has inherited all 
the security weaknesses inherent in the DNS service such as vulnerabilities to cache 
poisoning and DDoS attacks. The peer-to-peer based architectures remove the DNS 
weaknesses but bring with them their own security concerns such as proper distributed 
authentication and access control of partners due to a lack of a central authoritative 
partner [23].  
2.3.4 RFID Architecture Requirements  
Because of the above shortcomings in the currently existing RFID architectures they are 
not the best solution to be used for developing systems such as RFID enabled global 
supply chain management systems. The key requirements when developing a large scale 
networked RFID system is: (1) high scalability and expandability, (2) interoperability 
with a number of different systems, (3) easy integration with existing systems, (4) high 
failure tolerance and (5) increased data lookup, retrieval and formatting efficiency [2, 
23]. Therefore a new architecture framework needs to be developed that meets these 
requirements. Additionally, because the current standard for RFID systems 
developments is the EPCGAF it is imperative that any new architecture be fully 
compatible with systems developed using the EPCGAF to ensure global accessibility. In 
chapter 3 of this thesis we therefore present a “P2P RFID Architecture Framework” 
which has been specially developed for creating large scale systems with multiple 
independent partners with pre-existing business connections and are spread over a large 
geographic area. This architecture removes/minimises most of the weaknesses inherent 
in other networked RFID architectures when used to develop this type of RFID system. 
2.4 Current Security Frameworks 
A security framework can be thought of as a document that allows a person to 
methodically and comprehensively analyse a system and identify the threats and attacks 
it faces, the vulnerable security components and the security requirements that are 
29 
required to secure those vulnerable components against those threats and attacks. While 
all security frameworks have some common aspects a good security framework needs to 
be specifically tailored to the system requirements and features of the type of system it’s 
aimed at securing. 
A majority of the current existing security frameworks are aimed at general 
networked systems such as the one presented in [47, 48]. But the architecture of 
massively networked RFID applications is significantly different from typical IT 
networks and standalone RFID systems. These frameworks do not take into account 
these differences and therefore cannot be fully applied to networked RFID systems. 
Overall currently no complete security framework has been developed specifically for 
networked RFID systems with multiple independent partners [17]. But there exists a 
number of generic security and network security frameworks as well as some 
classifications of RFID attacks and defences that present some interesting insights in to 
this research area. In the following section we will examine some of those papers and 
analyse their weakness in context of the security of networked RFID systems. 
2.4.1 Typical Security Frameworks 
The ‘Framework for ensuring network security’ [48] has been built around a threat 
model developed using a modified version of the Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Authentication (C.I.A) threat model.  It uses a layering technique to ensure that all areas 
of the system’s security have been covered whether it’s at hardware level or at 
application level. It also contains a list of the security requirements needed to secure an 
IT network and a number of cross analysis tables mapping the security requirement, the 
threat model and the different layers of the network to identify what needs to be done at 
each layer to negate each threat identified in the threat model. The framework also 
compares the developed framework with some other popular security frameworks. The 
main weakness in this framework is that it’s developed for typical network systems and 
not networked RFID systems. Therefore this framework overlooks some threats specific 
to networked Multi-entity RFID systems such as tag data ownership, and tag access 
control as well as some threats that all RFID systems face such as tag privacy. Also 
some of the preventive measures discussed are not possible in an RFID system due to 
the differences in its architecture compared to a normal wired IT network. 
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The ‘Integrated security framework’ presented in [49] is also of the same nature but 
even more generic framework than the one presented in [50]. This framework has been 
developed to apply to all types of wirelesses networks ranging from complex and high 
powered cellular networks to basic RFID networks employing low cost RFID tags. 
While the authors discuss the basic security concepts that apply to all wireless systems 
(Confidentiality, Authentication, Integrity, Availability and Non-repudiation) it does not 
mention any of the RFID specific attacks such as data leakage, cloning or tag tracking. 
While the author does discuss some potential security solutions such as public key 
cryptography they are not suitable for RFID systems due to the high overhead they 
require. The RFID security measures the authors present are three very high level 
generic approaches such as “Non-Cryptographic Schemes” and “Lightweight 
Cryptographic Schemes” with no further details or explanations and are therefore not of 
much use when it comes to deciding how a specific RFID system should be secured. 
2.4.2 RFID Security Frameworks and Classifications 
While there are some RFID security frameworks that are targeted at full RFID systems a 
majority of them only cover a specific area of the system, such as [51]. Some other 
frameworks focus on standalone RFID and not at networked RFID, such as [50]. 
Therefore most of these frameworks are either not applicable to networked RFID 
systems or they are insufficiently detailed to fully secure a networked RFID system. 
Table 2.2 shows the comparison of some security frameworks. 
In [52] the authors present a ‘Roadmap to solving security and privacy concerns in 
RFID systems’. This paper identifies a few of the potential threats and attacks possible 
on RFID systems. Unfortunately the only threats identified are data mining, tag tracking 
and unauthorised tag reading and therefore are in no way comprehensive. It also fails to 
mention some of the more dangerous threats such as RFID malware or RFID cloning. 
The paper then goes on to present some proposed technical solutions such as kill 
commands, faraday cages and blocker tags. But none of these solutions are new or 
novel. In addition the authors suggest some policy propositions that can be used to 
neutralize the identified threats and attacks but most of these are suggestions by other 
authors and do not contain any new ideas. Overall the list of proposed technical 
solutions presented is too short and do not afford sufficient protection for a networked 
RFID application. In some cases the proposed solutions are not viable due to practical 
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or performance issues (e.g.:- using kill commands in a networked RFID system is not 
viable as it will remove the ability of the partners to use the RFID tags).  
Table 2.2: Security framework comparison 
 Threats Attacks System components Customised for 
Identify Classify by 
weaknesses 
it exploits 
Identify Classify Identify Identify 
security 
needs 
RFID networked 
RFID
Roadmap to 
solving security 
and privacy 
concerns in RFID 
systems [52] 
Partially Partially Partially Partially NO NO YES NO 
A framework for 
assessing RFID 
System Security 
and Privacy Risks 
[50] 
Partially Partially YES YES YES Partially YES NO 
Framework for 
ensuring network 
security [48] 
YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Integrated 
security 
framework [47] 
Partially NO Partially NO Partially Partially NO NO 
Classification of 
RFID attacks [51] YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO 
A Security 
Framework in 
RFID Multi-
domain System 
[53] 
NO NO NO NO YES Partially YES Partially 
RFID Systems: A 
Survey on 
Security Threats 
and Proposed 
Solutions [54] 
NO NO Partially NO YES NO YES NO 
In [50] the authors present “A framework for assessing RFID System Security and 
Privacy Risks’. The work presented contains a lot of information about the potential 
security and privacy threats faced by a large number of different types of RFID systems. 
The paper also tabulates which threats attack which components of the RFID system 
and also describe the consequence of each threat. It is also novel in that it depicts the 
security demands of different types of RFID systems based on the metrics of system 
deployment type and link between tag and physical object data. Unfortunately it makes 
no mention of some of the threats and issues specific to networked RFID systems with 
multiple partners such as the need for data ownership, access control and non- 
repudiation which is a major gap in the work presented. The lack of these requirements 
means that some types of systems are erroneously shown as having less of a security 
demand than they actually do. This paper also contains no information about the 
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security functionality required to defend against the identified threats which means it 
can’t be used to actually identify the key security requirements of each of the different 
types of RFID. While the framework is suitable for identifying the threats against 
standalone RFID systems and the consequences of those threats it’s too simple to be 
applied to networked RFID systems and does not have enough information (namely the 
security requirements) to be used as a proper security framework for securing RFID 
systems. 
 ‘Classification of RFID attacks’ [51] classifies a majority of the currently possible 
attacks on RFID systems based on the layer at which the attack is targeted at. The 
taxonomy contains all the common RFID threats such as replay attacks, impersonation 
attacks and denial of service attacks. It also discusses some of the lesser known attacks 
such as malicious code injection and traffic analysis. While this classification is helpful 
in securing a majority of RFID systems it still does not look at some of the threats 
uniquely present in networked multi-entity RFID systems such as repudiation, 
unauthorized data modification by partners and corporate data theft. It is also taxonomy 
rather than a security framework and therefore focuses more on identifying and 
classifying threats rather than identifying how to secure the system against them. 
In [53] the authors present a ‘A Security Framework in RFID Multi-domain 
System’. In this paper the authors identify some of the security requirements of an inter 
domain (multi-entity) RFID system. Then they go on to present a security framework 
that can be used for authorization and authentication in this kind of system. This paper 
is novel in the sense that it not only looks at securing the communications between tags 
and readers but it also looks at how the communication between the back ends of two 
different entities can be secured.  Unfortunately this paper only looks at two of the key 
security requirements: namely authentication and authorization. All other security 
requirements such as data confidentiality and integrity, tag access and tag data 
ownership are ignored. Therefore the solution presented is severely limited in the 
protection it can offer. It also does not try to identify all the threats and attacks that 
RFID systems face or try and classify them in a meaningful manner.  
In [54] the authors present “RFID Systems: A Survey on Security Threats and 
Proposed Solutions”. Here the authors first identify some key attacks that can be 
mounted on RFID applications. But the list is not complete and they do not try to 
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classify the identified attacks in a meaningful manner. They then present a survey on a 
large range of possible technical solutions to the identified problems. The lack of 
identification of the general security requirements/functionality required by networked 
RFID systems means that it’s impossible for the reader to understand what needs to be 
done to fully secure one. Therefore while this paper is good in becoming familiar with 
the security solutions available this does not help the reader verify if implementing 
those solutions would actually fully secure any given RFID system. 
2.4.3 Networked RFID Security Framework Requirements 
Large scale networked RFID systems have the following unique features that set them 
apart from typical IT network systems [17]: (1) While most IT systems are accessible 
by a single authorized entity, the RFID tags of the system must be fully accessible by all 
partners in the network [55]. (2) The RFID tag is much more physically accessible by 
attackers than typical IT components. (3) Low security resulting from the lack of 
resources available on RFID tags makes the wireless communications of the system 
highly vulnerable to attackers [56]. (4) The mobile nature of RFID tags makes it 
possible to invade the privacy of the system without ever gaining access to the 
communications or the memory modules of the system [57].  
Additionally networked RFID systems also have a few main features that set them 
apart from standalone RFID systems [17]. (1) Networked RFID systems have a number 
of users while standalone RFID systems have only one user [2]. (2) The tags of 
networked RFID systems are comparatively a lot more mobile and physically accessible 
by attackers than the tags of a standalone RFID system. (3) Overall system structure for 
standalone RFID is considerably simpler than the system structure for a networked 
RFID system [13].  
Therefore when developing a security framework specifically for networked RFID 
systems both sets of above differences must be taken into consideration. But as the 
above literature review illustrates there is still no complete and cohesive security 
framework for large scale networked RFID systems with multiple partners. Therefore in 
chapter four of this thesis we develop and present a complete and cohesive “Networked 
RFID Security Framework” that takes into account all the features numbered above and 
fulfils all criteria in Table 2.2. 
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2.5 RFID Security Protocols 
Like with any networked IT system the different components of an RFID system must 
communicate with each other. In RFID systems the most vulnerable of these 
communications take place between the readers and tags of the system [20]. Therefore it 
is very important that this communication takes place using a secure security protocol. 
A communication protocol defines the format, the messages and the rules that two 
components use for communicating with each other. A security protocol is specifically 
built and designed to protect the communication that takes place from attack by 
malicious parties. Because a protocol normally defines the syntax and semantics of the 
communication it’s independent of the exact implementation method. Therefore a 
protocol can therefore be implemented as hardware or software or both. 
The number of security requirements and functionality to fully secure the tag-reader 
communications of networked RFID systems is very high. Therefore in the past few 
years, a very large number of RFID security protocols have been proposed for RFID 
systems. These range from ultra-light-weight protocols in [58-62] to the more 
computationally expensive protocols employing traditional cryptographic techniques 
presented in [63, 64]. 
2.5.1 Protocols Using Traditional Techniques 
Because traditional cryptographic methods require high computing resources most of 
the protocols employing them have proven to be too resource-intensive for use with low 
cost RFID tags.  The protocols proposed in [63, 64] both use tag side PRNG and 
cryptographic hashing while the two protocols presented in [65, 66] uses CRC and 
PRNG on tag side. Because most of these cryptographic primitives take well over 5K 
gates minimum to implement any protocol employing them cannot be used with low 
cost tags which normally have around 3-4K tags maximum dedicated for security. In 
addition to the high resource requirement the protocols presented in [63, 64] are also 
susceptible to tag cloning and confidentiality. While the protocols discussed above are 
all concerned with providing standard security functionality such as mutual 
authentication, confidentiality and availability there are some RFID protocols that 
provide other kinds of security functionality. The two protocols described in [67, 68] are 
concerned with providing tamper detection for data stored on the tag itself. Both 
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approaches rely on using watermarking techniques to embed patterns into the tag data 
allowing any possible unauthorised changes to be detected. Likewise [69, 70] also only 
provide tamper detection (using other techniques). But because the security 
requirements of RFID systems include a lot more than just tamper detection these 
protocols are not sufficient to secure a networked RFID application [17]. Therefore 
most of these protocols have failed to provide the full functionality required to secure 
networked RFID applications by either being too resource intensive or not being secure 
enough.  
2.5.2 Ultra-Light-Weight Protocols 
Because traditional techniques proved to be too resource intensive a new technique had 
to be developed to protect RFID applications employing low cost passive tags. As a 
result Ari Juels introduced the concept of minimalist cryptography which employs only 
simple bitwise operations in [56]. This protocol however was soon discovered to be 
fully susceptible to a number of attacks including full disclosure attacks. After this a 
large number of protocols based on this concept were proposed over the next few years. 
The EMAP family of protocols [59-61]  were specifically built using this concept to 
require low computing resources. These protocols are based on only using the bitwise 
XOR, bitwise OR, bitwise AND and addition mod 2m operations. A key divided in 
several sub-keys is shared between legitimate tags and readers. Both readers and tags 
use these sub-keys to build the messages exchanged in the mutual authentication phase. 
Only readers need to generate pseudorandom numbers. The communicated PRNG 
numbers are then used by the tags when creating fresh messages. These protocols also 
employed a novel method of updating pseudonyms to remove the traceability problem. 
But the weaknesses in this family include the use of triangular functions, which made 
the messages vulnerable to crypto attacks. The large number of different messages 
exchanged during the authentication phase further allowed the attackers to further 
exploit this vulnerability to crypto attacks. They also employed bitwise AND and OR 
operations, which have strongly biased outputs on public messages allowing attackers to 
use statistical methods to attack the protocol [62]. By exploiting these weaknesses other 
researchers were able to mount full disclosure attacks on these protocols fully 
compromising the data they transmitted [71].  
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The SASI [58] protocol had the same basic phases and used the same method for 
key and index pseudonym updating as the EMAP family. SASI was developed 
incorporating a non-triangular function (left rotation – ROT) so as to remove the 
vulnerability that the EMAP family showed towards crypto attacks. But it still 
exchanged a large number of messages during the key updating phase and it also 
employed bitwise OR and AND in public messages. By exploiting these weakness and 
some additionally vulnerabilities full disclosure attacks were mounted on the SASI 
protocol [72]. The Gossamer protocol [62] had the same basic structure and used the 
same method to update the keys and index pseudonyms as the previously discussed 
protocols. But it also included some new features. In particular they removed any public 
messages which included OR and AND operations which in turn increase security 
against crypto attacks. They also included a strong non-triangular function in the 
message generation and also developed a propitiatory iterative function named Mixbits 
to further increase security. But the protocol still had one weakness: it still had to send 3 
messages, all containing the same secret numbers and keys encrypted using only simple 
bitwise operations, during the mutual authentication phase. While the protocol has yet 
to be fully breached it has been shown to be susceptible to DoS, De-synch and replay 
attacks [73]. It also uses a very large number of simple bitwise operations (more than 50 
in total during operation) and employs a proprietary function and requires a large 
temporary memory area to hold the intermediate values of the messages while the 
computations are taking place. Therefore this protocol not only requires significantly 
more resources than the other ultra-light-weight protocols but it also needs additional 
memory for temporary storage of data [20]. 
2.5.3 Common Weaknesses in RFID Security Protocols 
Most of the protocols which have been proposed in the recent past have had a few key 
weaknesses which have made them unsuitable for securing networked low cost RFID 
systems. In developing our protocol we have ensured that those weaknesses do not 
impact it. 
A major weakness in most of the ultra-light-weight protocols [59-61] is the use of 
multiple messages during the authentication stage. This is necessary to provide integrity 
verification of those messages. The messages all include the secret keys and have been 
encrypted using low strength encryption techniques (simple bitwise operations). This 
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feature of these protocols allows potential attackers to intercept those multiple messages 
and mount crypto attacks on those protocols. In addition, it also allows the attacker to 
verify that the data he retrieved using the crypto attacks is correct. A majority of these 
ultra-light-weight protocols were attacked using this method and it led to the complete 
disclosure of the tag's contents as illustrated in [71, 73-76]. In our protocol, we use a 
one-way hash function to provide integrity verification. Therefore, only one message 
which holds the secret values is broadcast. Because hash functions are strictly one-way 
this means the only way for an attacker to gain access to the secret values is to carry out 
a brute force attacker.  
Another common weakness displayed in ultra-light-weight protocols is that they 
broadcast the EPC of the tag during the authentication phase [58-61]. Unlike the Index 
pseudonym or the keys which are constantly updated the EPC of the tag never changes. 
The constant nature of the EPC and the poor encryption strength of the bitwise 
operations allowed data leakage attacks on these protocols. In data leakage attacks 
potential attackers eavesdrop over a very large number of the tags communications and 
gradually build the EPC over time. In our protocol we avoid this weakness by always 
broadcasting the EPC of the tag only in one-way hashed form. And even when the hash 
of the EPC is broadcast it’s hashed together with another key or PRNG which 
constantly changes making data leakage attacks impossible.  
Some of the protocols also employ bitwise AND and OR in generating their public 
messages. Due to the nature of these operations they have poor statistical properties 
which leads to strongly biased results [62]. Therefore the use of these operations in 
public messages allows the attackers to exploit the statistical properties and mount 
crypto attacks on the protocol [58]. Our protocol only employs the XOR function which 
does not have strongly biased output eliminating this weakness. 
Most of the RFID protocols employing more traditional cryptographic techniques 
make the mistake of implementing resource intensive cryptographic primitives such as 
PRNG, public key encryption or cryptographic hash functions on the tag [65]. Due to 
resource constraints of low cost tags this makes these protocols unsuitable for securing 
systems using low cost tags. Crypto primitives that are too intensive for low cost tags 
include CRC algorithms, PRNG generators, keyed and cryptographic hashes and most 
encryption algorithms such as SHA-1 and RSA. In our protocol we only employ a 
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simple one-way hash and simple bitwise operations on the tag side. A simple one-way 
hash can be implemented with as little as 1.7K gates as shown in [77] and as the 
standard low cost tags as defined by EPCglobal class-1 generation-2 tags can have up to 
3K gates for security functionality [73] our protocol is suitable for these low-cost tags.  
2.5.4 RFID Protocol Requirements 
The above literature review illustrates a few things about the needs and requirements of 
security protocols built for networked RFID systems. The use of standard cryptographic 
primitives such as PRNG, cryptographic and keyed hashes, CRC checks public key 
encryption makes the protocols too computationally expensive to be implemented on 
low cost tags. Therefore any proposed protocols, if they are to be practical, must use 
novel methods or employ low-cost primitives to provide the required security 
functionality while still requiring minimal resources. The easiest method of this is the 
use of low cost cryptographic techniques pioneered by Juels in [56]. But the over-use of 
low strength bitwise operators reduces security strength too much, especially in relation 
to brute force or crypto attacks. This is mainly because bitwise operations (due to the 
simplicity of the operation) make messages thusly encrypted susceptible to crypto 
attacks. This weakness is compounded if multiple messages, built by using bitwise 
operations on the same “hidden keys”, are sent because this allows the attacker to 
exploit those multiple messages and the weaknesses of the bitwise operations used on 
them to retrieve the data hidden in them. In addition  over use of bit wise operations 
also means that protocols gets more and more complex and requires more and more 
resources as the developers resort to using a larger number of bitwise operations as well 
as proprietary functions to provide additional resistance against crypto attacks. Finally 
the number of security requirements of RFID systems mean that any protocol proposed 
must implement a significant number of those security requirements such as mutual 
authentication, broadcast integrity and confidentiality and tag anonymity. In addition, 
they must also provide significant resistance to a number of attacks such as 
eavesdropping, replay, man-in-the-middle and de-synch attacks. 
In chapter five of this thesis we develop and present a “Hybrid RFID Security 
Protocol”. The approach we have taken in creating our security protocol has led to the 
development of a protocol that is markedly different from the above protocols. Unlike 
the above mentioned protocols which use only traditional methods or ultra-lightweight 
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methods we have used a mix of both. This hybrid method has allowed us to create a 
protocol that has significantly more security than an ultra-lightweight while at the same 
time requiring considerable less resource than a traditional security protocol. We have 
also addressed the problem of how to transmit data other than the tag identifier between 
tags and readers which has not been addressed before. Our protocol is also more 
complete as it implements a number of different security concepts and is secure against 
a large number of attacks compared to other protocols which only implement one or two 
security concepts or are secure against only a few attacks. 
2.6 RFID Malware Detection 
In IT and Computer Science malware typically refers to a class of programs that are 
specifically written to be disruptive to the system that executes it. These detrimental 
effects can range from disruption or denial of operations, gathering of information that 
leads to loss of privacy or exploitation, or the opening of unauthorized access to system 
resources to outside malicious parties. In RFID systems all currently known malware is 
based on the concept of SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIA) [78]. SQLIA is the process of 
changing the inputs that are used to build dynamic SQL queries in such a way as to have 
those queries carryout malicious actions on the database when they are executed.  With 
RFID systems properly built tag based SQLIA malware can even propagate from a tag 
to a backend database and then back to other tags acting like a typical computer virus 
[79]. 
Unfortunately due to their nature most general security tools such as firewalls, 
virus guards and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are ineffective against SQLIA and 
therefore SQLIA based RFID malware. This is because SQLIA normally travel through 
the ports used by regular web traffic (kept open in firewalls), work at application level 
(making IDS useless against them) and are non-executable malicious code which 
operate in the confines of the DBMS and carryout processes that are allowed to queries 
(making heuristic virus checks useless against them). Therefore SQLIA detection 
requires specialized security mechanisms [78]. There is a large amount of techniques in 
preventing and detecting SQLIA in web based systems but very little work in detecting 
SQLIA for RFID systems. The techniques for web systems range from simple methods 
such as type and length validation to automated systems which use a mix of static and 
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dynamic analysis to identify all possible input sources and the valid query structures and 
then match the dynamically generated queries from any of those sources against the 
identified valid query structures. Overall SQLIA defence techniques for web systems 
can be classified into two main types [80]: (1) defensive coding practices and (2) 
detection and prevention techniques.  
2.6.1 Defensive Coding Techniques 
Because SQLIA attacks depend on inputting invalid inputs ensuring the validity of input 
used in generating a dynamic query will mitigate a majority of the possible SQLIAs. 
Defensive coding practices are simple SQLIA prevention techniques that revolve 
around ensuring that all accepted inputs are validated before begin accepted [80]. Some 
of the best practices when it comes to defensive coding are input type checking and 
encoding of inputs. 
Input type checking consists of ensuring that the input data is type consistent with 
the expected data for that value [81]. For example fields defined as numbers will only 
allow digits while fields defined as text will only allow alpha characters. Because most 
SQLIA depends on inserting special characters or strings into inputs, these types of 
SQLIA can be blocked by this technique. In the same manner if a max and min length 
of specific inputs are known beforehand these lengths can ensure that the additional 
characters have not been entered into the input [81]. As most SQLIAs require that the 
input is significantly larger than the expected length of the input this can catch a 
majority of the more complex SQLIA attempts. Another defensive coding technique: 
Encoding of inputs consist of encoding the input in such a way as to ensure that the 
database does not mistake Meta characters in the input for keywords, tokens or 
operators. Injection is often accomplished by tricking the system into accepting special 
characters embedded string inputs as meta characters [80]. If the system can ensure that 
all string inputs are recognized as string and not Meta characters, attacks using these 
methods would fail.  
Overall defensive coding techniques still remain one of the simplest and best ways 
with which to prevent SQL injection attacks. Unfortunately, defensive coding in web 
systems is prone to human error, mainly due to the fact that most developers do not 
remember to put in the required validation at all possible input [80]. Therefore if the 
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human error aspect of defensive coding can be minimized it’s an extremely potent and 
simple method for preventing SQLIA attacks. 
2.6.2 SQLIA Detection and Prevention Techniques 
Because defensive coding techniques proved to be unreliable in practical web 
applications, researchers have proposed and developed a wide range of other techniques 
to detect and prevent SQLIA. Most of these techniques depend on detecting weaknesses 
in the code that generate the dynamic queries or identifying SQLIA after the queries 
have been generated. Unfortunately as most of these techniques have been developed 
specifically to protect web based systems they do not translate well into the architecture 
used in RFID systems. For example most of the methods below use automated scanning 
tools such as the ones analysed in [82] to locate and identify possible input sources in 
web sites. Because RFID do not use web based input scanning is not required nor is it 
possible for RFID systems.  
Black box testing techniques such as the one proposed in [83] uses a web crawler 
to identify all possible attack points in the web application. Because there is only one 
possible attack point for SQLIA in RFID systems this type of technique is overkill and 
not necessary for RFID systems. The new query development paradigms proposed in 
SQL DOM [84] use encapsulation of database queries to provide a safe and reliable way 
to access the database. While this technique is secure they cannot be used for existing 
legacy systems without major redevelopment. They also require programmers to learn a 
completely new development process based on the query development paradigm which 
is time consuming. The intrusion detection system presented in [85] use a machine 
learning technique trained using a set of typical application queries to try and detect 
SQLIA. This system first build models of valid queries and then uses pattern matching 
during run time to ensure that all received queries match a valid query model. Because 
the success of this approach is directly based on the quality of the training set used and a 
bad training set can result in a system with a large number of false positives and 
negatives. Therefore in RFID systems it’s better to use manual techniques due to the 
much lower amount of possible queries.  
SQL rand [86] is an instruction set randomization technique which uses a proxy 
based method which allows developers to create SQL queries using randomized 
instructions. This technique is based on cryptographic integrity check systems and, 
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similar to those systems, not only places significant overhead on the system but is also 
fully dependent on the security of the secret key used in the randomization of the 
queries. Therefore the use of this type of system would negatively affect the 
performance of the RFID systems implementing it reducing the overall tag read 
throughput. Static code checking is a method by which the source code of the 
application is checked for various weaknesses that make it vulnerable to SQLIA. The 
main drawback of this approach is that because only static code is analysed it can only 
spot a limited number of weaknesses. For example the approach presented in [87] can 
only detect and prevent tautologies while the approach presented in [88] can only spot 
weakness to incorrectly types inputs. This means that these types of approaches do not 
provide sufficient security for RFID systems.  
Another suggested technique consists of a hybrid of static code analysis and 
dynamic run time monitoring. In this technique the code is analysed for weaknesses and 
all legal query patterns during the static analysis phase. Then the identified query 
patterns are used to validate the SQL queries generated and submitted during the 
runtime monitoring phase.  AMNESIA [89], SQLGuard [90] and SQL-Check [91] all 
use different query pattern matching techniques. AMNESIA uses a web crawler to 
identify possible input sources (Hotspots) for the system which makes this approach 
impossible for RFID systems as they don’t have web inputs. Once all possible hotspots 
have been identified it uses the Java String analysis library to analyse the string 
operations carried out in each string of interest and deduct a non-deterministic finite 
automaton that expresses all possible values the considered string can assume. Because 
the NDFA are an overestimate this may result in illegal queries being mistaken for legal 
queries. Additionally the comparison of the NDFA is a complex task. Both SQLGuard 
and SQL-Check take a different approach. They generate a parse tree to represent legal 
queries and compare them to the parse tree of the dynamically generated query. The 
difference is that SQLGuard the model is deduced automatically while the model for 
SQL-Check is developed by the programmer. Unfortunately both approaches use 
generated secret keys which must be kept secret and they both require the developer to 
use special intermediary libraries or to manually insert special markers in the code [92]. 
Additionally, parse trees, especially for more advanced SQL queries, can be extremely 
complicated and therefore properly comparing two parse trees is generally a very 
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complex task. Hence these approaches use considerably more resources than can be 
justified for use in RFID systems.  
In general all current query pattern checking techniques have the following 
weaknesses in common in the context of their use in RFID systems. (1) un-needed 
complexity and computational overhead both in generating the legal query patterns and 
when comparing them with the patterns of dynamically generated queries (2) weakness 
in the query models due to the automated manner in which they are built resulting in 
possible false positives and negatives. As the above review shows the techniques 
developed for web based SQLIA detection and prevention do not work very well in the 
simpler environment of RFID tag based SQLIA. A majority of the proposed approaches 
are unnecessarily complex and resource intensive while some others are simply not 
compatible with RFID systems due the differences in the architecture of the two 
systems. Finally and most significantly none of these systems are capable of detecting 
or preventing second order SQLIA attacks. 
2.6.3 SQLIA Prevention in RFID Systems 
While there has been a lot of work done in detecting and preventing web based SQLIA 
attacks very little work has been done on the same research for RFID systems. The 
papers [93, 94] discuss in detail how RFID systems can be subject to SQLIA attacks but 
present very little work in actually how to detect or prevent them. In [94] the authors 
mention the possibility of using input validation or attribute code technology to detect 
RFID based SQLIA but does not elaborate any further. In [93] the authors list some 
areas the database server administration must take into consideration when setting up 
the system but no further elaboration is done. In [79] the authors discuss the possibility 
of infection databases with traditional viruses using RFID SQLIA. But as the bases for 
infection is still SQLIA prevention of SQLIA will stop this type of attacks. Once again 
in this paper the authors list some rudimentary steps that can be taken to prevent this 
type of attack but no further elaboration is done on how or the exact mechanism behind 
these suggestions. Finally in [95] the authors present a digital forensic system for 
tracking and identify SQLIA attacks on RFID. This approach is only useful after the 
fact and cannot be used to either detect possible SQLIA before they are executed or to 
actually prevent their execution.  
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2.6.4 RFID Malware Detection Requirements  
Overall the key differences in RFID systems and web based systems mean that the 
solutions developed for web based systems do not translate too well to RFID systems. 
Additionally, very little work has been done in actually protecting RFID systems from 
SQLIA or SQLIA based malware. Most worryingly the architecture of RFID systems 
makes it possible to create and deploy RFID malware based on SQLIA [26, 79]. 
Therefore it is imperative that a SQLIA detection and prevention method is developed 
for RFID systems taking into account the unique architecture features that differentiate 
them from web based systems. To fill this significant gap in the current literature in 
chapter six we present a “Policy based RFID malware detection and prevention 
technique”. In developing this system we have not only taken into consideration the 
unique features of RFID systems but we also ensure that the high throughput required of 
RFID tag reads can be met by using a simple string comparison rather than the more 
complex approaches used in the web systems. In addition we have developed and 
justified an RFID tag data validation and sanitization technique which has the 
possibility to detect and prevent even second order SQLIA based on the strength of the 
rules set by the developer. 
2.7 Summary 
RFID technology, while a relatively old concept, has risen to prominence in the last 
decade. Even though the worldwide adoption and the benefits associated with RFID has 
steadily increased there are yet a number of security and performance issues that still 
hold back both its acceptance and the benefits it offers. In this chapter we looked at four 
distinct areas of research in RFID performance and security research: (1) RFID system 
architectures, (2) Networked RFID security frameworks, (3) RFID communication, 
authentication and security protocols and (4) RFID malware detection techniques. For 
each of these areas we have identified some key literature and analysed the weaknesses 
in the solutions proposed therein. In the next four chapters we will present our own 
contributions to those above mentioned areas of research and discuss how the solutions 
proposed by us do not contain the weaknesses we identified in the solutions in the 
current literature. 
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Chapter 3  
P2P RFID Architecture 
Framework  
In this chapter, we first analyse the specific requirements of very large scale networked 
RFID systems such as global supply chain management systems. Then we develop and 
present a P2P RFID architecture that is optimized for developing that type of RFID 
system. The developed architecture is built around a modular middleware system that 
allows for easy system development and integration. We also employ P2P technologies 
to improve system scalability and availability. We explain each of the components in 
the architecture as well as the different middleware modules and the P2P approach we 
use in detail. Finally we carry out a comparative analysis of the proposed architecture 
compared to the EPCGlobal and other recent RFID architecture frameworks which 
shows that our architecture has a number of significant advantages over them. 
3.1 Introduction 
To realize the maximum benefits of RFID technology in large scale networked 
environments, the use of an architectural framework, when developing those systems, 
which fulfils the specific requirements of those systems is paramount. The EPCglobal 
Architecture Framework (EPCGAF) [2] is the main framework currently used in 
developing all RFID systems and applications. Unfortunately, the EPCGAF is designed 
at a high level to allow the development and deployment of a number of fundamentally 
different systems. Therefore, specialist systems (such as global supply chain 
applications) based on the EPCGAF will run into a number of issues due to the nature 
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of those applications and the environment they are deployed in [13]. Additionally, as the 
literature review shows even the other recently proposed RFID architectures have a 
number of weaknesses making them unsuitable for use in developing global supply 
chain management applications. Therefore, it is imperative that an RFID architecture 
framework be developed with the specific requirements of large networked RFID 
systems in mind. 
In this chapter, we present a P2P RFID architecture that can be used to develop 
very large scale RFID systems such as RFID enabled global supply chain management 
systems. The main contributions of our work are: (1) Extensive analysis and 
identification of RFID based supply chain management system requirements (2) The 
creation of a P2P RFID system architecture that fulfils those requirements and is 
specifically aimed at multi organizational networked RFID systems spread over a large 
physical area and (3) Comparative analysis of the proposed architecture with the 
EPCGlobal architecture framework (EPCGAF) and other RFID architecture frameworks 
identifying its advantages over them. The comparative analysis suggests that the 
proposed architecture has a number of advantages over systems developed using other 
architecture frameworks. These advantages include improved scalability, reliability and 
performance and easier integration with existing systems.  
3.2 Networked RFID Systems 
There are a number of key requirements and features of global supply chains that must 
be taken into consideration when creating an RFID enabled simply chain management 
system. If the underlying architecture and related infrastructure of the system being 
developed do not adhere to the requirements set by the features of a global supply chain 
the system will not be able to perform at full potential and therefore, will not produce all 
the forecast benefits at the level expected [3]. In Section 3.2.1, we will identify and 
discuss these requirements. In Section 3.2.2 we will discuss the possibility of using a 
peer-to-peer technology to meet these requirements and improve the performance of 
RFID systems. 
3.2.1 RFID System Requirements 
Depending on the size of the supply chain and the number of independent partners in it, 
the number of RFID tags in a global supply chain management system can grow to 
47 
billions. The system will also have a very large number of RFID reader installations 
required at various locations all generating a massive amount of data [1]. It is estimated 
that Wal-Mart generates around 7TB of data each day [6]. Therefore the RFID system 
implemented must be able to scale to match the needs of extremely large and complex 
networked supply chain applications [46]. In addition, the central look-up process needs 
to scale extremely well. Considering that the Wal-Mart supply chain has up to 4 billion 
tags passing through it a year with thousands of different readers, this central lookup 
needs to store all the data locations address for all those tags and reply to queries sent by 
hundreds of thousands of readers from all over the world. 
The use of RFID in supply chain management is centred on the need for improved, 
real-time information sharing between independent partners [11]. In a large networked 
RFID system the transaction data automatically generated by partners are stored at 
different partner locations while the static data is stored with the manufacturer of the 
product the tag is affixed to. Therefore when retrieving the RFID data, the system has to 
first locate that data wherever it may be situated in the world and then it must retrieve it. 
Consequently an RFID system that caters to global supply chains has to make the 
process of data location and retrieval as easy as possible. But RFID data can also be 
successfully used to automate and increase the efficiency of some of the organization’s 
internal processes as well [11]. Accordingly, partners in an RFID enabled supply chain 
may want to use RFID to generate private data to enhance, automate and carryout 
internal processes. In that event an RFID system that is created for a global supply chain 
has to store that private data so that it’s not accessible to external independent partners. 
It also needs to store that data in a manner which does not negatively affect the 
performance of the system [6].  
Global supply chains have a large number of independent partners all using 
different business applications. This means that the stored data must contain  a large 
amount of information with minimal loss and that information needs to be presented in 
different formats and at different levels of filtering and aggregation to different partners 
and different business applications [96]. Therefore to ensure that the maximum amount 
of information is retained the transaction data generated must be stored in a highly 
granular form. But storing data at an extremely granular level has two major drawbacks. 
First, it increases the computational load on the database server by increasing the 
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amount of data stored and shared. Second, it increases the computational load placed on 
the retrieving partner’s system since that system would be burdened with the task of 
filtering, aggregating and formatting the raw granular data that is retrieved. Because 
currently this data is stored by external partners and needs to be retrieved repeatedly 
each time its required, it leads to unnecessary duplication of data retrieval and 
manipulation and formatting process [13]. Therefore unless the system architecture 
takes explicit steps to avoid or minimize this, the system retrieving data will be forced 
to carry out large amount of unnecessary duplicate data manipulation. 
Possibility of easy integration with existing software and systems with minimum 
redevelopment is another significant advantage when creating an RFID enabled supply 
chain application [6]. Commonly an RFID system will be developed to replace an 
existing legacy system which integrates with a wide variety of software systems and 
business applications [97]. If the already existing software systems and business 
applications have to be significantly modified or redeveloped to integrate with the new 
system it would require a significant monetary and time investment from a company 
which is already developing the new RFID. In addition to easy integration with the 
current systems the architecture for newly developed RFID systems must also ensure 
interoperability with other partner systems, as data sharing is the key advantage of 
networked RFID [46].  
Networked RFID technology at its core is a data storage and communication 
mechanism. Therefore, the fundamental information security objectives such as 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, authorization and non-repudiation 
must be preserved [21]. But at the same time, RFID is the product of complex 
technology with the characteristics of a number of different types of IT systems.  This 
complex nature of networked RFID systems calls for a high level of data integrity and 
security [58]. Accordingly, an RFID system deployed in a networked global supply 
chain setting must be able to provide the data integrity and security requirements of a 
number of different types of IT systems. Typically, Modern IT systems are so tightly 
integrated into the day-to-day business processes of the owning organizations that the 
systems become critically important. This is especially true of RFID systems and 
therefore high availability of the RFID system becomes a key requirement. 
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3.2.2 P2P Technology in RFID 
Most current RFID systems use a distributed client server model. In essence, each 
partner has data stores, which act as the sole server for all data that is stored on that 
server. All other partners act as clients and retrieve the required information from the 
single server. However, the client server model poses many issues when used in this 
manner in a networked RFID system. The main problems are lack of scalability, 
unbalanced loads on systems, bandwidth bottlenecks and creation of SPOF at the 
servers. Nevertheless, most of these weaknesses are removed or reduced in P2P 
systems.  
Peer-to-peer networks are networks where each participating node acts as both a 
server and a client for all or a majority of the data contained in the overall system. The 
distributed and shared nature of  P2P networks has a number of advantages including 
resilience to DDoS attacks, removal of SPOF at server locations, enhanced bandwidth, 
very high scalability, independence on a centralized server and freedom of monitoring 
by a central authority, all of which are highly desirable to networked RFID systems 
such as global supply chain management systems [42].  
P2P technology for RFID systems can be divided into two main parts: P2P data 
sharing and P2P data lookup. In P2P data sharing, the RFID data generated by partners 
will be shared using P2P technology rather than client server technology. Here, when a 
partner retrieves P2P data from another partner, selected potions of that data (the parts 
that do not change) will be made available to other partners of the system via P2P data 
sharing. This will enable a number of improvements at the data servers including 
increased scalability and availability.  
P2P technology can be used to carry out the centralized data lookup (ONS) service 
offered by the EPCGlobal. The current ONS service has a number of weaknesses 
including bad scalability, weaknesses to DDoS and cache poisoning attacks, being 
controlled by a central authority and being a SPOF to the overall RFID networks used 
globally [23]. By using a P2P based data lookup system all of these weaknesses can 
easily be removed from the RFID data lookup process. 
However, like all technologies P2P has its own drawbacks. The two big issues for 
P2P networks are node churn and security and privacy concerns [42]. In normal public 
P2P networks, partners/nodes are constantly joining and leaving the network. In these 
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situations, the overall network topology and query routing must be reorganized each 
time this happens to ensure proper network structure. This creates additional overhead 
on the system, increases the difficulty of identifying the required data sources and 
sometimes makes the overall data routing paths non-optimal. Nevertheless, in supply 
chain systems the network partners and therefore the P2P nodes are very stable. In 
supply chain systems the nodes (the partner data services and middleware) are fixed. 
When one such node enters the system it is there permanently, except for occasional 
down time, till that partner leaves the supply chain. Therefore the issue of node churn 
does not apply to a P2P network in a supply chain management RFID system, and the 
need for constant rearranging of the network topology and routing paths is removed 
[42]. The other main drawback of P2P systems is security concerns. In public P2P 
networks, anyone can join the network and then share and retrieve data anonymously. 
Therefore, access control and privacy concerns come into play as well as trust concerns. 
However, partners in a supply-chain management system are not strangers. They are 
business entities with existing business partnerships and connections. Therefore the 
security and privacy concerns plaguing public P2P networks do not apply to supply 
chain RFID P2P networks as users know that people in their P2P RFID network are 
people with legitimate access to that data [23].  
3.3 P2P Networked RFID Architecture Framework 
The role of the RFID architecture outlined below is to organize and manage RFID 
infrastructure throughout the enterprise in order to capture data and generate RFID data 
in real time, store it with minimal loss of information and share that data in real time 
with other independent partners of the supply chain. Both the data lookup and data 
sharing in the proposed architecture will be done using P2P technology rather than 
client server systems. In Section 3.3 we will describe the overall architecture. Sections 
3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 will discuss in depth the modularized middleware, P2P data sharing and 
P2P data lookup in that order. 
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
Figure 3.2: RFID tag data storage
The RFID readers are used to read and write data to and from RFID tags. The readers 
used in our architecture will be standard RFID readers which can be used to update the 
tags. They can either be mobile/handheld readers or more powerful stationary readers 
and are composed of three main parts: the receiver, transmitter and controller [33]. The 
readers will read the EPC and any additional data on any authenticated tags within 
reader distance  and update the data on the tags as and when necessary [98]. Read RFID 
tag data will be forwarded to the middleware (specifically the reader interface) via the 
secure internal network.  Any updates the readers do to the tags will be based on data 
they receive from the middleware.  
3.3.2 Data Storage Layer 
The data storage layer contains the databases and house the data services that store 
RFID data that is used by the company and shared with other partners. In the proposed 
architecture we have two main databases for each location: they are the shared RFID 
repository and the private RFID repository. The shared RFID repository is the database 
where transaction data generated by the middleware and transaction data retrieved from 
external partners is stored. Only the data that the organization wants to share with its 
partners will be stored here. As this data has to cater to the information requirements of 
all the partners of the organization, it will be filtered and aggregated sufficiently to 
ensure that the database does not grow to an extreme size, but it will still be kept 
granular enough so that not too much information is lost. In contrast, private 
transactional data and external data that have been fully formatted as required by the 
internal software are stored in the private RFID repository. This data is only accessible 
by internal business applications. Further details of data storage and P2P sharing are 
given in Section 3.5. 
3.3.3 Middleware Layer 
The middleware acts as a hub that connects all other components and allows inter 
component communication. It also acts as the software link between RFID readers and 
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the business applications. It is the most important and complex component of the 
proposed architecture [96]. The middleware in our architecture is developed to be 
modular. This helps ensure that system is easily upgraded and those different modules 
can be upgraded and maintained separately if required. It also helps compartmentalize 
the different tasks carried out by the middleware as each module is in charge of one 
specific task, or a group of interrelated tasks. The middleware in our architecture will 
have a number of specific tasks to carry out including the following:  
• Filter and collect the data received from RFID tag reads from multiple readers 
[16]. 
• Carryout security tasks to ensure the integrity confidentiality and authenticity of 
data [21]. 
• Translate the tag identifier and data retrieved to information from their raw binary 
form according to the tag data specification and vice versa [13]. 
• Generate transaction data based on business events [99].  
• Retrieve, aggregate, filter and format RFID tag data as required by applications or 
by storage [100]. 
• Act as the communication hub for different components [36, 100] 
Full details on each module the tasks they carryout and the high level logic for carrying 
out those tasks are given in Section 3.4. 
3.3.4 Software Layer 
The software layer contains all the business applications that are used by the company 
and communicate with the RFID system [96]. These applications are typically pre-
existing applications that have been modified to integrate with the RFID system, and 
use the information supplied by it. They retrieve information as required by contacting 
the middleware and use that information to automate, improve and streamline existing 
business processes. They also generate business application data that is then combined 
with RFID tag reads and actual business processes to generate transaction data about 
particular RFID tags [39]. In our architecture, the business applications will only query 
for the information it requires from the middleware. The data lookup, data retrieval and 
formatting and consolidation of data from multiple sources are all done by the 
middleware. Therefore, the only changes that need to be done to the current applications 
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are that they must be changed to communicate with the middleware for any data from 
the RFID system. The application interface provides a method with which this 
communication can take place with the exact specifics of how that data they receive is 
obtained by the middleware remaining invisible to the business applications. 
3.3.5 Data Lookup Layer 
The data lookup layer typically contains the components that allow partners to locate 
data about any given RFID tag regardless of which partner is storing it. The current 
standard for RFID systems is the global ONS service offered by the EPCGlobal in [13]. 
Unfortunately, this centralized service has lead to a number of issues including lack of 
scalability, security issues, control of overall system by one entity and the creation of a 
SPOF at the EPCGlobal run ONS service. Therefore, in our architecture we propose a 
P2P data lookup approach, which removes or minimizes most of these concerns. Full 
details of the P2P data lookup functionality are given in Section 3.6. 
3.3.6 Communication Layer 
The communications layer contains the network hardware that allows different 
components to communicate with each other. The communications layer consists of the 
internal (red arrows) and external networks (blue arrows). The internal network is a 
secure communication and IT network that physically connects all the internal 
components of a single partners system [36]. Therefore, the internal network will 
connect the readers, middleware, private RFID repository, shared RFID repository and 
the business applications to each other. It is normally implemented as a LAN network. 
In contrast, the external network allows secure communication between the components 
of the system belonging to different partners and the EPCGlobal services. Therefore, the 
external network will connect the middleware of different partners. The external 
network is normally implemented via the internet. In addition, both the internal and 
external networks can and should be fully secured using tried and tested security 
methods such as IDS, firewalls and encryption technologies used in any other 
networked system.  
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3.4 Modularized Middleware 
The modularized middleware is the most important and complex component of the 
architecture. Not only does it do a majority of the data processing and collecting it also 
carries out the data lookup for external data sources. It also acts as the hub of the overall 
system and allows the different components effectively communicate with each other. 
The modularized middleware consists of five main modules, each of which carries out a 
distinct and self-contained task or set of tasks and five interfaces, which allows it to 
communicate with the other components of the architecture. The tasks of each module 
are explained in detail below1. 
3.4.1 Data Cleaning and Filtering Module  
In networked RFID systems, readers are simultaneously bombarded by the 
transmissions of a large number of different RFID tags and may only have a limited 
time in which to respond [46]. Another important factor is the relatively low read rates 
of RFID readers. Therefore, most RFID systems recommend that duplicate readers are 
deployed at important reader locations to increase the read speeds of tags and to 
minimize possible interference from environmental factors. But the use of multiple 
overlapping readers and the low read rates of typical RFID readers mean that the data 
streams must be cleaned and filtered before it can be used [45]. Figure 3.3 shows a 
system which has 3 readers physically (R1, R2, R3) located to try and cover the full tag 
area which contains 6 tags (T1,T2… T6). 
                                                
1 For the sake of simplicity, in the following subsections the diagrams only include the system 
components that are of concern to that particular modules task.
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from each stream for each tag. Once all bad reads have been eliminated unnecessary 
duplicate reads is filtered out to create a single stream, which is then forwarded to the 
security module.   
Please note that there are a number of different data filtering and collection 
mechanisms proposed in recent literature that the developer could implement. For 
further details on the different challenges in RFID data filtering and management and a 
comparison of the different approaches possible refer to [102]. 
3.4.2 Security Module 
There are a number of security requirements that must be met to fully ensure the 
complete security of a networked RFID application. The security module is in charge on 
managing and providing all those security, privacy and data integrity requirements 
[103]. Overall, the minimum security functionality that the security module needs to 
provide includes mutual authentication, transmissions confidentiality, transmission 
integrity and anonymity for the mobile tags. In addition, for networked systems with 
independent partners which use updatable tags, security requirements such as storage 
confidentiality and integrity, non-repudiation and tag malware protection and access 
control need to be implemented as well [17]. There are a number of security solutions 
and protocols that offer varying levels of protection and features in current literature as 
discussed in [104]. The developer should select and implement in the security module 
the security solutions he thinks are suitable for the specific system he is building. For 
detailed analysis of a number of different RFID security protocols and their weaknesses 
refer to [104]. Additionally, in chapters five and six of this thesis we present an RFID 
security protocol and an RFID malware detection technique, which can be implemented 
in this module. 
3.4.3 Data Translation Module 
In RFID systems, data stored on the RFID tags are saved in raw binary format. They are 
normally separated into fields for each data item. Therefore the binary data needs to be 
translated into an understandable form before it can be used [105]. The data translation 
module is in charge of translating the binary data stored in the RFID tag into text form 
usable by the data storage and business applications and text form data received from 
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data storage and business applications into binary form to be stored on the tag. Figure 
3.4 shows this process: 
Figure 3.4: RFID tag data translation 
The data translation module in our middleware needs to carry out two types of data 
translations. It needs to translate raw binary data from the tag into a format usable and 
understandable by the databases and business applications and it also needs to translate 
the information received from the databases and business applications into raw binary 
data to be stored on the tag.  
3.4.3.1 Tag Data Translation
For the first task the module receives the cleaned and collected data stream from the 
DCFM module and using the separators imbedded on the tag data splits it into different 
fields. Then for each field it retrieves the data translation rules and applies it to the field 
data. If the translation happened without any issues the data is forwarded onto the 
database and business applications (via the higher modules and interfaces). If there is an 
issue during translation, the data is discarded and the module requests a reread of the 
tag.  
3.4.3.2 Tag Update Translation
The other translation task that must be done by the data translation module is the 
process of translating the update data received from the database and the business 
applications into the raw binary data that will be stored on the tag. To do this the 
module first receives the required data from the higher modules and identifies which 
field each data should be stored to. Then for each field to be updated it retrieves the data 
translation rules and applies them to the received data to transform them into the binary 
data that will be stored on the tag. Once the translation is complete, the update is 
forwarded to readers. 
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3.4.4 Event Generation Module 
Because the main task of RFID systems is the creation of information, one of the most 
important functions of an RFID system is the automated generation of transaction data 
concerning the EPCs it identifies. This process is shown in Figure 3.5. Transaction data 
is created by associating EPCs with specific business events and transactions [99]. The 
event recognition module is responsible for recognizing such preset business events and 
transactions and using tag read events and business application data for generating 
transaction data for various EPCs. In RFID systems the middleware can also be tasked 
with controlling and coordinating certain actions in the physical environment in 
response to the automatically generated transaction data as well as generating certain 
electronic business processes in response to the actual RFID event generated [106]. The 
event generation module carries out this process in our architecture, 
Figure 3.5: RFID event generation 
For example, imagine that the middleware for a company receives the tag reads for ten 
thousand new tags at a specific warehouse. At the same time, the system recognizes that 
the physical process of receiving a goods shipment from logistics company X was 
initiated at that warehouse. Additionally it also receives information from the business 
applications that a logistics company X is delivering the goods for invoice I1 for that 
warehouse from seller Y. By combining this data the Event Generation Module (EGM) 
generates the invoice received event for that warehouse for invoice Y and associates all 
the newly picked up tags with that invoice. It may also initiate the opening of outbound 
logistics for sales for that specific good from that warehouse as well as initiating the 
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payment process for the invoice in question for the business applications. Table 3.2 
shows some examples of transaction data generated by the event generation module.  
Table 3.2: RFID transaction data 
 Actual business 
process 
Business 
application 
data 
Final data stored in 
shared RFID 
repository 
Business process 
trigger 
Tags T1 
picked up 
by readers 
at 
warehouse 
Receiving of new 
stock at 
warehouse from 
logistics supplier 
S1 delivered by 
truck TR2 
Goods for 
invoice I1
received at 
warehouse 
W1
Tag T1 is at warehouse 
W1 
Tag T1 was delivered by 
truck TR2 of company S1 
Tag T1 belongs to 
delivery invoice I1
Start shipping out 
goods for orders which 
can be fulfilled using 
the received goods 
Divert any more 
shipments if 
warehouse space is full 
Tag T1 
leaves 
warehouse 
Logistics supplier 
S2 picks up stock 
for delivery using 
truck TR1 
Goods for 
sale SL1 
shipped out 
from 
warehouse 
W1 
Tag T1 is no longer at 
warehouse W1 
Tag T1 was picked up by 
truck TR1 of company S2 
Tag T1 belongs to sale 
invoice I2
Request for more stock 
if extra space is 
available 
Transaction data generation is very strongly dependent on the businesses processes of 
the company developing the RFID system. Therefore, it is up to the developer to 
develop the actual transaction event generation logic for the various business processes 
used by that company. 
3.4.5 Data Management Module 
In networked RFID systems, different partners at different data storage locations store 
data about the tags used in the system. Additionally in our approach, the RFID data is 
shared using a P2P model rather than a client server model. Therefore, proper 
management and identification of this distributed data as it's being saved and retrieved 
is required if the system is to work efficiently. In the proposed architecture, this task is 
the responsibility of the Data Management Module (DMM). Therefore the DMM is 
tasked with the responsibility of locating, retrieving, aggregating and formatting data 
from multiple different sources in such a manner as to most effectively respond to any 
single data request [96]. It is also responsible for deciding how the data generated by the 
EGM and data retrieved from external partners should be saved between the private 
repository and shared repository. Full details of the P2P processes carried out by this 
module can be found in Sections 3.5 and 3.6.
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3.4.6 Communication Interfaces 
In the proposed architecture, the middleware acts as the hub between other components. 
Therefore, for each component the middleware communicates with there needs to be 
communication interface that enables that communication. Each communication 
interface defines a number of requests and responses that the interface will receive and 
respond. Table 3.3 describes each interface in more detail. 
Table 3.3: Middleware interfaces 
Middleware 
Side 
Other side Main messages 
Reader 
Interface 
Data Cleaning 
and Filtering 
(DCFM) 
RFID readers RFID tag data. 
RFID tag updates. 
Private DB 
Interface 
Data 
management 
Module (DMM) 
Private RFID repository Data requests for private DB. 
Data from private DB. 
Data updates for the private DB. 
Shared DB 
Interface 
Data 
management 
module (DMM) 
Shared RFID repository Data requests for shared DB.
Data from shared DB. 
Data updates for the Shared DB. 
Application 
Interface 
Data 
management 
module (DMM) 
Local business 
applications 
Data requests from business 
applications. 
Data for the business applications. 
Data Query 
Interface 
Data 
management 
module (DMM) 
EPCIS lookup services 
Root ONS of EPCIS 
External ONS of partners 
External EPCIS 
Data requests from external 
partners. 
Data for the external partners. 
All messages for the ONS lookup 
process The results of those 
requests. 
The reader interface serves as the communication channel between the middleware and 
the RFID readers and allows the middleware to command RFID readers to read the EPC 
of tags, read other data stored on tags, write to tags, and kill or lock tags.  It also allows 
middleware access to a variety of reader management features  and abstracts the actual 
hardware details of the readers from the next component [13]. When new readers or a 
new reader model is added to the system the reader side of the interface will change 
while the DCFM side will remain the same. Therefore, the reader interface allows for 
easy expansion of the system readers with minimal changes to core modules. 
The middleware also has four following additional interfaces, which allow it to 
interface with other components of the system. The private DB interface acts as the 
communication channel between the DMM and the private RFID repository. The shared 
DB interface acts as the intermediary of the DMM and the shared RFID repository. The 
application interface acts as the intermediary between the DMM and the internal 
62 
business applications of the organization. The data query interface is what enables the 
RFID system of external business partners to communicate with the middleware of the 
organization and vice versa by allowing it to receive and respond to data requests from 
external independent partners.  
3.5 P2P Data Storage and Identification 
The architecture we proposed in this chapter uses P2P technology to improve the data 
sharing enabled by RFID systems. In this section, we will explain the proposed RFID 
data identification and storage approach. 
3.5.1 RFID Data Types 
Because of differences in RFID data and typical files shared via P2P networks not all 
RFID data is suitable for sharing. Therefore, the first step is identification of the RFID 
data suitable for sharing in a P2P method.  
Table 3.4: RFID data types 
Generated at Generated by Is it updated Example 
Static data Birth of object Manufacturer No • Batch number of item is 3476 
• Item expires on 14/08/2012 
Constant 
Transaction 
data 
Over lifetime Supply chain 
partners 
No • Item was checked into 
warehouse x23 on 21/10/2010 
• Item was sold to supply 
partner Y as part of invoice 
21187 
Updatable  
Transaction 
data 
Over life time Supply chain 
partners 
Yes • The next destination for item 
is warehouse x56 
• There are currently 1863 lots 
of  model number Z at 
warehouse 34 
RFID data is currently categorized into two groups: Static data (data created at the birth 
of the object and which does not change over its lifetime) and Transaction data (data 
that is generated by different partners over the course of its lifetime and is subject to 
change). However, sharing data that is constantly changing over a P2P network creates 
data synchronization problems and should be avoided. However, sharing only static data 
would defeat the purpose of using P2P as it’s only a very small percentage of the total 
data concerning any given RFID tag. Therefore, to remove data synchronization 
requirements and ensure that the highest amount of data can be shared via P2P we 
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further split the transactional data into constant and updatable transaction data. Table 
3.4 highlights the differences of the three types. 
Only the static data and constant transaction data will be shared as P2P data while 
the updatable transaction data will only be available from the original partner who 
creates and maintains it.   
3.5.2 P2P RFID Data Identification 
The next challenge in sharing RFID data over a P2P network is the proper identification 
of the meta-data required to properly identify any given RFID transaction data. 
Unfortunately, unlike typical fixed data files that are shared over P2P networks the data 
that is generated and shared by RFID systems is granular information concerning 
specific RFID tags. Hence, normal techniques, such as the use of hashes to identify 
files, cannot be used as the lookup tables would grow too large relative to the actual 
data tables.  
Table 3.5: Identification data for transaction information 
Normal RFID 
System 
Proposed System Details 
Tag identifier Yes Yes Unique to the tag: must be given by a 
global authority 
Original partner 
identifier 
No Yes Unique to each partner for each supply 
chain 
Date generated on No Yes The date on which the information was 
generated or last updated 
Data class No Yes Number indicating the data class 
1: Static data 
2: Constant transaction data 
3: Updatable transaction data 
Transaction 
information 
Yes Yes The actual information that was 
generated concerning the tagged object 
In current RFID systems there are three main types of identifiers: tag identifiers, partner 
identifiers and data service (EPCIS) identifiers. In non P2P systems RFID data can be 
identified using just the unique identifier of the tag the information is about and 
therefore data is associated with only the tag identifier. Therefore, in a normal client 
server environment, this meta-data is sufficient, as data is only available from the 
partner who generated the data. In a P2P environment, this is not enough. In this 
environment, the data needs to be associated with the original partner who generated 
that data when it’s stored at a different location. Therefore, in our system in addition to 
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the tag identifier we also use the unique identifier of the partner who generated that data 
to identify transaction data. In addition, to allow for stronger and more granular 
identification and filtering we also store the date on which that information was actually 
generated. Table 3.5 compares the identification data stored for RFID data in current 
systems and the proposed system. 
3.5.3 P2P Data Retrieval and Storage 
In the proposed system when business events are generated and stored as transaction 
data, the partner will also record the other identifiers listed in the above table. When a 
partner requests specific data concerning an RFID tag all of the above information will 
be transmitted for each transaction event along with the actual transaction information.  
Data retrieval and formatting in the proposed architecture is quite a complex task as 
there are four main possible sources of data for any given company as shown in Figure 
3.6. Therefore, the DMM must retrieve the data from these four different sources 
aggregate it and format it as required by the business application. Data lookup and 
retrieval is carried out in response to data requests from internal business applications or 
from external partners.  
Figure 3.6: RFID data retrieval, aggregation and formatting  
When a business application requires data concerning a specific tagged object it will 
relay that request to the data management module. Based on the requirements of the 
application and its current knowledge it can also relay additional information such as 
who generated that data and around when it was generated. When the data management 
module receives a data request it will first identify which data services of which partners 
might contain the information required. This is done via a P2P data lookup using data 
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profiles, which is explained in Section 3.6. Once the proper locations of the required 
data have been located, the middleware of the system will request those partner data 
services for the required data.  
When retrieving data the DMM will need to query each possible data source for the 
required data in the most effective manner. The data retrieval order we propose for this 
architecture is tag, private database, shared repository and finally external P2P data 
sources. When requesting P2P data from external data services the additional 
information provided by the application can be used to retrieve only a subset of the data 
at the external service by using them as filters. So for example rather than requesting for 
data concerning Tag X the system can ask the P2P data service for data concerning tag 
X, which was generated by partner Y between two specific dates. The additional 
filtering possible with the additional identifiers stored with transaction data reduce both 
the workload and network bandwidth required for the overall system. Once the required 
data has been fully retrieved by the DMM the data will be aggregated and formatted as 
required. It will then be sent to the application that requested that data. If the data 
request is from an internal business application then the middleware will use external 
sources if required, if it is from an external partner’s middleware only internal data 
sources will be used and the data will be transmitted in raw format with no aggregation 
or formatting.  
Once data is retrieved from external partners it will be stored on the local servers 
and shared with other partners via the P2P network. However, before this can be done 
the system first needs to identify which data can be shared via P2P and which data is 
constantly updated by the original partner and therefore unsuitable for P2P distribution. 
This decision is made based on the data class the data belongs to. The potions of the 
retrieved data that has been classed as static data or constant transactional data 
(indicated by either 1 or 2 for data class) will be saved in raw form in the shared data 
repository. Any data classed as updatable transaction data (indicated by 3 in the data 
class) will be formatted and forwarded to the business applications but will not be 
stored and shared via the P2P network. The retrieving partner will never modify any 
external data shared by that partner. 
Additionally the DMM will also receive transaction data that has been locally 
generated by business applications. In addition to the actual transaction data, the system 
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must also store the additional identifiers required for P2P data identification. The tag 
identifier, original partner identifier, date generated on and data class will be generated 
by the business application and sent along with the transaction data to the middleware. 
This data can be split into two main classes: private data and shared data. All locally 
generated shared transaction data, regardless of data class, will be stored and shared via 
the P2P network. Locally generated transaction data classed as private will be stored in 
the private repository and will not be available to external partners. The private data will 
be stored after formatting to reduce the need for repeated formatting of the data. The 
shared data will be stored as is to ensure that the maximum amount of information is 
held in it. 
3.6 P2P Data Lookup 
By sharing RFID data using P2P technology, we increase the overall system scalability 
and remove a number of bottlenecks in the system. However, the traditional centralized 
ONS based data lookup service offered by the EPCGlobal still pose serious scalability 
issues and create a SPOF. Therefore, a P2P data lookup is required to remove the SPOF 
at the ONS lookup service and further improve system scalability. 
3.6.1 Creating Service and Data Profiles 
In P2P data lookup, each node must be able to let the other nodes know what data it is 
making available for retrieval. Therefore, in our system each data service will have a 
service profile, which contains Meta data about the service it offers. It also will generate 
a list known as its data profile, which contains information about the data it’s sharing, 
and share these two profiles with other partners.  
3.6.1.1 Service Profile 
The service profile for each data service will contain the following information: (1) The 
service identifier/address, (2) the type of service it offers (e.g.:- SOAP or EPCIS), (3) 
The partner identifier of the company that runs it (e.g.:- the company prefix allocated to 
it by the EPCGlobal), (4) The service profile time stamp (which indicates the particular 
time this service profile was created and distributed) and (5) a service profile expiration 
time which will indicate when the service profile should be discarded and a new one 
retrieved. 
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 Additionally each service profile will contain two extra data fields that are filled by 
the partners when they retrieve and locally store the service profiles of external services. 
These are the data profile time stamp and data profile expiry. These two fields allow the 
partner to track when he last downloaded the data profile for a particular external data 
service and when he should retrieve a newer data profile for that service. It is important 
to note that each partner can have multiple data services, and that each service will have 
its own service profile. In addition, we also recommend that each data service contain 
the service profiles for all of that partners data services. Table 3.6 shows an example 
service profile. 
Table 3.6: Example service profile 
Service Profile 
Service address 124.134.12.32 
Type of service EPCIS 
Partner identifier 778291 
Service profile time stamp 07:24:39 01/05/2012 
Service profile expiry 07:24:39 02/05/2012 
Data profile time stamp 16:32:12 12/05/2012 
Data profile expiry 20:32:12 12/05/2012 
3.6.1.1 Data Profile 
In RFID systems, the data that is shared is RFID event and transaction data concerning 
the tagged objects. Hence, the P2P nodes must have a method with which it can share 
the tag numbers it has data concerning and which partner originally generated that data. 
Therefore, in addition to the service profile each data service will also contain a data 
profile (shown in Table 3.7). This is a list of all the tags, which that particular service 
has data about. It also contains the original partner who generated that data and the last 
time data for that tag and partner combination was generated or updated. 
Table 3.7: Example data profile  
Data Profile 
Service Address: 124.134.12.32 
Tag identifier Partner identifier Last update 
265216762 387287 16:32:12 12/05/2012 
87162908 838933 11:26:57 19/07/2011 
445783754 320933 07:45:17 12/03/2011 
6546976967 407321 16:32:14 12/05/2012 
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Both these profiles as well as the profiles of other partner’s data services and the service 
profiles of other company service profiles will be stored and managed by the DMM of 
the middleware that runs the data service. These two profiles will then be shared with 
other partners of the system. External profiles will be regularly updated based on expiry 
dates specified in the service profile. Details of the sharing method are as follows:                          
3.6.2 Distributing Partner Service Data Profiles 
In typical P2P systems, one of the biggest challenges is locating the nodes and proper 
distribution of the file location details. This difficulty is mainly because of the high 
node churn and unstructured nature of typical P2P networks and also the fact that most 
nodes in the system have no prior connections or associations [42]. Fortunately for us, 
in networked RFID systems in supply chains both these problems are removed or 
greatly minimized as discussed in Section 3.2.2. Therefore, rather than using some of 
the more complex and resource intensive methods such as the flooding technique used 
in Gnutella or less scalable centralized data lookup systems used in Napster [107] we 
suggest a simpler and more scalable method which we have named “chain distribution”. 
The proposed technique is based on the fact that partner chains pre-exist in supply chain 
RFID systems. The proposed system leverages these existing partner chains to ensure 
full discovery of all possible data locations. Once the initial discovery is done, the 
partners use direct communication to retrieve data from partner data services. The 
partner data service profile distribution and lookup process is divided into two main 
parts: (1) partner data service discovery (2) partner data profile update. 
3.6.2.1 Partner Data Service Discovery.  
Partner data service discovery is the process of partners been informed about completely 
new data services for that RFID network. This needs to be done when a new partner 
joins the supply chain or an existing partner adds additional data services.  
When a completely new partner joins a supply chain, the data service discovery for 
that partner will be done via the chain distribution method mentioned before. Because a 
new partner can only join a supply chain with the knowledge and approval of at least 
one existing supply chain partner that existing partner will be able to directly get the 
service profiles of the new partner. That partner will then be tasked with distributing the 
new partners service profiles to their up or down stream partners. When the other 
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partners receive the new partners service profiles they will directly contact those 
services and retrieve their data profiles. The existing partner who initiated the new 
partner will also be in charge of forwarding all services profiles it has to the new 
partner. 
Figure 3.7: Discovering the data services of new partners 
In Figure 3.7 the new partner joins an already existing supply chain with the knowledge 
and approval of partner 3. When this happens partner 3 receives the service profiles of 
the new partner’s data services directly from the new partner. He also forwards all the 
service profiles he has of the networks data services to the new partner. Partner 3 then 
forwards the service profiles of the new partner to its direct partners (partner 2) and also 
makes it available via general sharing. When partner 2 receives the new service profiles, 
he realizes that this is a new data service for which he has no data profile. Then using 
the service address and service type Meta data included in the service profile he directly 
contacts the new partner’s data services and requests them for their data profiles. He 
also forwards the new service profiles to his direct upstream partner or partners (partner 
1). On receiving the service profiles of existing data services the new partner contacts 
them directly and retrieves the data profiles of those partners (messages 7 and 8). In this 
way the new partner’s service profiles are distributed to all the partners along the 
existing supply chain connections as all partners are connected by the supply chain. At 
the same time, the partner who invited him into the supply chain brings the new partner 
up to date on existing data services. 
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Service discovery is also required when an existing partner adds new data services. 
This is done slightly differently from new partner discovery. When a new data service is 
added that partner includes the service profile of the new service in all his existing data 
services. As all service-profiles have an expiry date partners need to regularly contact 
all the data services and refresh their service profiles. When this happens, any service 
profiles of new data services will be sent along with the current service profile for that 
particular data service. When the requesting partner receives the service-profiles, he 
realizes that this is a new data service for which he has no data profile. Then as before, 
he directly contacts the new data services and requests them for their data profiles. 
WĂƌƚŶĞƌ
ĂƚĂ^ĞǀŝĐĞ
ĂƚĂ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ
;ŶĞǁͿ
ǆƚĞƌŶĂů
WĂƌƚŶĞƌ
ϭ͗^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƉƌŽĨŝůĞƌĞĨƌĞƐŚƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ
Ϯ͗^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƉƌŽĨŝůĞƌĞĨƌĞƐŚ
ϯ͗^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƉƌŽĨŝůĞŽĨŶĞǁƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ϰ͗ĂƚĂWƌŽĨŝůĞƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ
ϱ͗ĂƚĂƉƌŽĨŝůĞ
Figure 3.8: Discovering new data services of existing partners 
The service discovery that happens when an existing partner adds a new data service is 
shown in Figure 3.8. Partner A adds a new data service B to the network. He then 
includes the service profile of B in existing data service A. Next time the service profile 
of service A expires the external partner B sends a service profile refresh request to data 
service A of partner A. Because data service A has the service profile of a new data 
service it sends that service profile along with its own current service profile in response 
to the service-profile refresh request of partner B. When partner B receives this new 
71 
service profile, he realizes that this is a new data service for which he has no data 
profile. Then using the service address and service type metadata included in the service 
profile he directly contacts the new partner’s data service (service B) and requests them 
for their data profile. 
3.6.2.2 Partner Data Service Update 
The other important task in data lookup is ensuring that the details that partners have 
about external data services are correct and up-to-date. This is carried out through 
updates for the data profile for each data service.
When a partner first discovers a new data service in its network, it directly contacts 
that data service and requests for its data profile. However, overtime the data shared by 
a data service will change and grow as more tags pass through that partner and the 
system generates more and more transaction data. Whenever new transaction data is 
generated, an existing data entry is updated or when it retrieves new data from external 
partners and makes it available for sharing the data service will update its data profile. 
To update its profile all it does is either change the last update field for existing 
tag/partner combination or to add a new tag identifier, partner identifier, and last update 
tuple for new tags to its data profile.  
To ensure that the data profiles are up to date external partners will use the data 
profile time stamp and the data profile expiry fields in the service profile for each data 
service. The data profile time stamp will store the time when the data profile for that 
data service was last updated and the data profile expiry will store the time when the 
data profile for that service needs to be updated. Please note that unlike the service 
profile time stamp and service profile expiry these two fields are generated and 
maintained by the external partner and not the actual data service. Therefore, partners 
are free to pick the update rate for different external data services based on personal 
preference and needs. When the data profile for a specific service expires the partners 
middleware will contact that data service and request a data profile update.  
Using these up-to-date data profiles partners can request the information they 
require from any number of data services rather than just the data service that originally 
generated it. For example, a partner wants to know when the RFID tag X left the 
premises of partner A and he already knows that the tag arrives at partner A on 
15/06/2012. Now it will check all the data profiles for data services that have data 
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generated by partner A about tag X and which were updated after 15/06/2012. When it 
identifies the possible data-services, it will then contact those in order and request for 
the required data till the correct data is received from one data service. 
3.8 Comparative Analysis  
The EPCGAF has done a very good job in creating a global standard for RFID systems 
and defining and supplying the core services required for intra organizational data 
lookup and sharing. However, the one size fits all approach it takes contains some 
weaknesses that limit organizations from harnessing the full power and functionality of 
their RFID system. In addition, while some of the newly proposed P2P architectures are 
promising they still have some weaknesses. Therefore, in the following section we will 
do a theoretical evaluation of the proposed architecture compared to other architectures 
using the basic RFID enabled supply-chain system requirements identified in Section 2 
as metrics (scalability, availability/reliability, system integration, security and 
performance). Table 3.8 shows a summary of this analysis. 
Scalability is the ability of a system to carry out its duties with minimal loss of 
performance when the number of active components and the interactions between them 
increase [108]. RFID applications in a global supply chains need to be able to scale 
effectively with the size of the supply chain. In the EPCGAF, there are a number of 
components in the system that scale badly. These are primarily the lookup services 
offered by the EPCGlobal itself and the EPCIS of the partners. Because these points are 
all centralized and based on client-server technology, the sheer number of data requests 
that can happen in a large-scale supply chain system can easily overwhelm them. In the 
more recently proposed P2P based architectures [23, 42] the bottleneck that is created 
by the EPCGlobal lookup services is removed as they use a more scalable decentralized 
P2P technique for the actual data lookup. However, the bottlenecks at the actual RFID 
data sources still exist because they are still a single server fulfilling the requests of 
numerous partner systems and business applications. In our architecture both the lookup 
process and the actual data distribution is done using modified P2P techniques. As P2P 
systems offer much more scalability [107], this means that the lookup and data services 
in the proposed architecture scale much better that than the client server based lookup 
and data services used in previously proposed architectures. 
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Availability of a system can be defined as  the degree to which the architecture is 
susceptible to failure at the system level in the presence of partial failures within 
components, connectors, or data [108]. The structure of the EPCGAF introduces a 
number of Single Points of Failure (SPOF), at the lookup process and the EPCIS of 
partners, which is extremely bad to have in large networked systems [13]. In the more 
recent P2P architectures the SPOF at the data lookup is removed but the system still 
retains a SPOF at the data service components. In contrast, the architecture proposed by 
us removes these SPOF and increase system availability and reliability in a number of 
ways. (1) By storing static data on the RFID tag in addition to the EPCIS of the 
manufacturer, we reduce the dependency on external data sources and services, (2) By 
storing filtered, aggregated and formatted data in a local DB, we further minimize the 
dependence on all external services and (3) By using P2P technology, which is proven 
to have much better availability and reliability than client-server technology, we 
increase the overall reliability and availability of the networked system as a whole. 
In IT, system integration is the process of combining different computing systems 
and software applications physically or logically to act as a coordinated whole. In the 
EPCGAF the business applications are in charge of carrying out the ONS lookup 
process, retrieving data from the partners EPCIS and then filtering, aggregating and 
formatting that data [96]. Therefore all business applications that use the EPC data will 
need to be significantly modified to carry out this additional functionality [46]. In the 
P2P architectures [23, 42] the authors discuss only the data lookup aspect of the system 
but do not discuss and other system components or how the proposed mechanism will 
be integrated into existing applications. In our framework, the modularized middleware 
does the ONS lookup, data retrieval and the filtering and aggregation of that data. 
Therefore, existing legacy applications only need to be modified to communicate with 
the middleware making system integration much easier. 
Ensuring the security and privacy of the EPC data stored in the system is of utmost 
importance in any RFID enabled application [2]. Unfortunately, by its own admission 
the security features that are provided by the EPCGAF are very basic [13]. In addition, 
The ONS service that it offers have a number of security issues such as vulnerabilities 
to DDoS attacks and cache poisoning [31]. The P2P architectures in [23, 42] remove the 
vulnerability to cache poisoning and partially removes the vulnerabilities to DDoS 
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attacks. However, they do not have any security features built into them; neither do they 
discuss the potential threats to the proposed system. Our architecture offers a number of 
advantages when it comes to system security. (1) The P2P technology that our 
architecture employs eliminates the vulnerability to cache poisoning and reduces 
vulnerability to DDoS attacks and (2) Our architecture explicitly identifies the need for 
high level of security and has a module in the middleware framework dedicated to 
providing the required security functionality in one centralized place. Moving the 
security to the middleware and away from the readers and RFID tags allow a much 
more robust and thorough security solutions to be implemented. E.G:- The security 
module of the proposed architecture can implement the security solutions presented in 
chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
System performance is the efficiency with which the system does any given task.  
The EPCGAF performs certain tasks quite inefficiently. For example the static data in 
the EPCglobal system comes from the EPCIS of the manufacturer while the 
transactional data concerning the objects are held by many different partners [13]. 
Therefore, most of the time, the system needs to at least access the manufacturer’s 
EPCIS as well as the EPCIS of the partner containing the transaction data required 
when retrieving data. In addition the data recovered from another partner’s EPCIS needs 
to be filtered, aggregated and formatted before it can be used by business applications 
[96]. As the EPCGAF requires that the data be retrieved from the partner’s EPCIS each 
time it is needed, the system must filter, aggregate and format the same data whenever it 
is retrieved from partner’s EPCIS. This creates unnecessary duplication of work, which 
affects system performance negatively. Because the EPCGlobal implements the ONS as 
a hierarchy, the system also has to complete a large number of processes to complete a 
data lookup. The P2P architectures improve the performance during data lookup. By 
using P2P techniques, they reduce the number of steps required for the data lookup. Our 
architecture improves performance in a number of different ways. Due to static data 
being stored on the tag, our architecture has a fewer number of situations requiring a 
data look-up. In our architecture, once data is retrieved and formatted its stored in the 
local private database. By doing this, our architecture significantly reduces the amount 
of duplicate filtering, aggregation and formatting done by the middleware component of 
the system compared to the EPCGAF. This significantly reduces the load on the 
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middleware and therefore improves the overall system performance. We also use the 
chain distribution method for locating new data services and partners. This approach is 
a lot more efficient than typical decentralized P2P node discovery methods such 
flooding, because partners directly query each other. In addition the P2P data sharing 
balances the loads more efficiently and reduces bottlenecks therefore improving overall 
system performance. 
Table 3.8: Comparison of EPCGAF and proposed architecture 
Proposed EPCGAF P2P 
Architecture 
Peer 
Resolution 
Framework 
Scalability Data lookup High (P2P) Low (Client-
Server) 
High (P2P) High (P2P) 
Data sharing High (Client-Server) Low (Client-
Server) 
Low(Client-
Server) 
Low (Client-
Server) 
Availability  Data lookup High (P2P) Low (Client-
Server) 
High (P2P) High (P2P) 
Data sharing High (Client-Server) Low (Client-
Server) 
Low (Client-
Server) 
Low (Client-
Server) 
Performance Partner/server 
discovery 
Uses chain 
distribution, Done 
one time for each 
data service 
Hierarchy 
based  ONS, Is 
repeated each 
time data is 
required 
Uses DHT 
tables 
Peers are 
arranged in 
a circle 
based on 
location   
Data lookup First time 
networked than 
local, based on 
simple list shared 
by partners 
Networked, 
based on 
hierarchy based 
ONS 
Networked, 
Based on DHT 
tables 
Networked, 
Based on 
profiles 
published 
by service 
Data sharing P2P Client-Server Client-Server Client-
Server 
Data retrieval 
and 
formatting 
Only done once 
for each data set 
Lots of 
duplicate work 
Not indicated Not 
indicated 
Security Data lookup High Low High High 
Data sharing High High High High 
System Ability to 
implement a 
strong and 
complete security 
solution 
Minimal 
security 
Not looked at Not look at 
System 
integration 
 Easy Difficult Not indicated Not 
indicated 
This analysis shows that the architecture developed and presented in this chapter has a 
number of advantages over the other available architectures when used to develop large 
networked RFID systems for supply chain management systems. 
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3.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we have first carried out an analysis of the nature of a networked global 
supply chains and from that derived the specific system requirements and features that 
is required of an RFID enabled global supply-chain management application. We have 
then developed a P2P RFID architecture that is optimized for global supply chain 
management applications. The main component of this architecture is a modularized 
middleware. We have explained the tasks carried out by each module in detail as well as 
described their functionality at a logical level. We have also discussed the interaction 
between the different modules. For our architecture, instead of using client-server 
technology, we propose a P2P approach for both the data service lookup and RFID data 
sharing. Finally, we have carried out an analysis of our proposed framework comparing 
it to the current RFID architecture standard: the EPCGAF and other recently proposed 
architectures. This analysis showed that our architecture has a number of advantages 
over other options specially in building large supply-chain management systems. 
Particularly our framework offers better scalability, performance, reliability and security 
as well as easier integration with existing systems compared to existing architectures. 
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Chapter 4  
A Security Framework for 
Networked RFID  
In this chapter, we develop and present a conceptual framework for analysing the 
threats, attacks and security requirements pertaining to networked RFID systems. The 
vulnerabilities of, and the threats to the system are identified using the threat model. 
The security framework itself consists of two main parts: (1) The attack model: which 
identifies and classifies the possible attacks and (2) The system model which identifies 
the security requirements. The framework gives readers a method with which to analyse 
the threats any given RFID system faces. Those threats can then be used to identify the 
attacks possible on that system and get a better understanding of those attacks. It also 
allows the reader to easily identify all the security requirements of that RFID system 
and identify how those requirements can be met. Therefore the main research 
contributions of this chapter are (1) Creation of a complete and holistic networked RFID 
security framework which does not contain any weaknesses identified in current 
security frameworks (2) Evaluation of that framework by applying it to a real world 
RFID system. 
4.1 Introduction 
Even though RFID technology has proven to be an asset for tracking objects in large 
networked systems such as global supply chain management systems there are a number 
of issues that prevent its widespread adoption [28]. In RFID the main current barrier to 
adoption is the large number of security concerns and the additional performance 
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overhead placed on the system when generating and sharing such a vast quantity of data 
[40]. 
Networked RFID systems are a relatively complex type of RFID system. This 
complexity arises from some of its features such as the use of wireless communications 
and mobile data containers (RFID tags), its highly distributed nature and the presence of 
multiple independent entities that are authorized to access the system. Due to its 
wireless communication method and distributed nature networked RFID systems are 
vulnerable to a great number of malicious attacks at the edge of the system (tags, 
readers and wireless communications). These attacks can range from simple ones such 
as passive jamming and eavesdropping to more sophisticated attacks such as physical 
cloning of tags, man-in-the-middle attacks and even RFID malware [109].  In RFID 
systems these threats can be mounted either through physical or logical access to system 
components. In addition, networked RFID systems can be attacked by internal partners 
as well as external attackers. Therefore the security threats and attacks that are faced by 
RFID networks are both numerous and extremely diverse. To successfully manage and 
eliminate all these different types of threats a large number of security requirements 
must be implemented [17].  
Due to the large number and different types of attacks and threats facing an RFID 
system, fully securing one is a very complex task. This task is made even more difficult 
by the number of different components that must be protected and the large number of 
security concepts that must be upheld. Currently one of the biggest barriers to the 
widespread adoption of networked RFID systems is the unresolved security issues 
inherent in them [21]. Without a proper security framework to reference most 
companies have no method with which to reliably assess the vulnerabilities of their 
proposed or developed system. Nor do they have a method with which to decide how 
best they can remove those vulnerabilities and fully secure their RFID systems. Due to 
this problem most companies are still reluctant to implement RFID based solutions, 
even though the benefits they pose are great. Therefore the need for a networked RFID 
security framework that will allow developers to successfully identify, manage and 
secure against the threats and attacks faced by RFID systems is currently very acute. 
But if such a framework is to be successfully developed a few challenges must first be 
overcome. Networked RFID systems, while seemingly similar to normal networked 
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systems, differ quite significantly from them [33]. Therefore the most important 
challenge is analysing how the security requirements of networked RFID differ from the 
security requirements of typical networked systems.  
If a security framework for networked RFID was successfully developed it would 
ensure that the companies that are implementing RFID solutions could easily analyse 
and verify the security of those systems leading to higher adoption rates for networked 
RFID. Therefore in this chapter we develop and present “A networked RFID security 
framework”. Before developing the security framework we develop a threat model 
which analyses the threats faced by networked RFID systems, the vulnerabilities they 
exploit and the attacks that result from those threats. The actual framework is composed 
of two main components (1) The attack model: which identifies and classifies all 
possible attacks on networked RFID systems, and (2) The system model which 
identifies all security requirements needed to protect a networked RFID system. The 
developed security framework will create a systematic path to identifying all the 
potential threats to any given RFID application, better understanding the attacks that can 
be mounted on the system and also identifying the security requirements for securing 
the system.  
4.2 Threat Model for Networked RFID 
The distributed and collaborative nature of networked RFID along with the use of low 
cost RFID tags which employ wireless communications mean that there are a large 
number of threats faced by these types of systems [17]. These threats exploit 
vulnerabilities in the system to become attacks. The threat model we develop (shown in 
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1) and present in this section will identify and discuss the 
common threats faced by networked RFID systems. It will then analyse how those 
threats exploit certain vulnerabilities that can exist in the system to become specific 
attacks that compromise the security of the system.

Figure 4.1: Threat model for networked RFID 
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Table 4.1: Networked RFID threat model 
Threat  Exploits weaknesses: And results in  
Interception or 
modification of 
system data and 
communications 
Lack of secure mutual authentication   Replay attacks 
Lack of secure mutual authentication  and 
confidentiality 
Eavesdropping attacks 
Data leakage 
Lack of secure mutual authentication, 
integrity verification and confidentiality 
Man-in-the- middle,  
Lack of sufficiently strong encryption  Crypto attacks,  
Lack of storage confidentiality 
Poor physical security of tags 
Physical reading of tags 
Lack of storage integrity 
Poor physical security of tags 
Physical writing to tags 
Introduction of 
false objects into 
system 
Lack of strong and secure mutual 
authentication 
Tag cloning  
Tag  spoofing  
Reader  masquerading 
Invasion of 
privacy 
Mobility of tags 
Lack of proper mutual authentication 
Tracking (Forward and 
Backward) 
Tag constellation tracking  
The mobility of the tags and the easily 
identifiable radio fingerprint on low cost tags 
Radio fingerprint tracking 
Denial of service Lack of physical security Physical destruction of 
components  
Low resources available on tags Active jamming 
Broadcast mechanism of communications Passive jamming, 
Use of pseudonyms of some security 
protocols 
De-synchronization of tags 
Built in lock and kill commands and lack of 
mutual authentication 
Unauthorised tag locking or 
killing 
RFID malware Lack of strong and secure mutual 
authentication lack of storage integrity.  
Weak anti- malware protection on backend 
servers 
RFID malware (worms, viruses, 
SQL and Script injection)  
Lack of strong and secure mutual 
authentication Lack of proper buffer control 
in readers 
Buffer overflow 
Attacks by 
internal partners 
Lack of  access control Elevation of privileges (reading) 
Lack of  data ownership Elevation of privileges (writing) 
Lack of  non-repudiation Repudiation of actions 
Lack of  access controls  
Lack of  non-repudiation 
Partner de-synch, killing or 
locking tags for partners 
The two most common threats faced by RFID systems are the possibility of an attacker 
intercepting or changing the wireless communications between tags and readers. 
Because low cost RFID tags do not contain sufficient resources for standard security 
functionality most networked RFID systems cannot implement strong authentication, 
confidentiality or integrity verification [56]. Therefore potential attackers can exploit 
the lack of these security mechanisms to mount a number of attacks on the system. 
These attacks allow them to either gain access to confidential information or allow them 
to exchange sensitive data so as to harm the system. In eavesdropping the attacker 
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exploits the lack of confidentially in the system to listen to a legitimate conversation 
between readers and tags. This allows the attacker to gain access to confidential 
information. Data leakage attacks: a more complex form of eavesdropping, are mounted 
by eavesdropping on a large number of authenticated communications between a tag 
and a reader and using that data to gain confidential information [51]. Another common 
attack, which exploits lack of proper mutual authentication in RFID communications, is 
the man-in-the-middle attack. This attack is a form of active eavesdropping in which the 
attacker makes independent connections with a reader and tag that is communicating 
while making them believe that they are talking directly to each other. The attacker then 
proceeds to change valuable data or steal confidential information as it’s transmitted 
through him between the reader and the tags [50]. Lack of strong mutual authentication 
is also exploited to mount replay attacks. Here the attacker uses previously used 
responses by a tag or a reader in a challenge-response protocol to initiate a new session 
with the tags or readers of the system. This allows the attacker to access either the 
reader or tags as a legitimate component and steal information or wrongly update data 
stored on the system. Attackers can also exploit the weak encryption techniques used in 
RFID systems using low cost tags to mount crypto attacks on those systems. Crypto 
attacks use various mathematical methods to break through the weak encryption in 
communications and gain access to the information that’s being communicated [72].  
Another major threat faced by networked RFID systems is the attacker introducing 
false objects into the system. These types of threats primarily exploit the lack of proper 
mutual authentication between tags and readers. Tag cloning, tag spoofing and reader 
impersonation are all attacks that result from this type of threat being successfully 
leveraged into an attack. In tag cloning the attacker replicates all the identification 
details of a legitimate tag on to a forged tag and introduces it in to the system [110]. In 
tag spoofing, rather than creating a new tag, the attacker just transmits the identification 
information of legitimate tags in the vicinity of readers using a transmitting device. In 
reader impersonation the attacker impersonates a reader of the system, rather than a tag, 
and tries to access tags by initiating a conversation with them [50]. All three of these 
attacks enable the attacker to either feed false data to the system or retrieve confidential 
data from the backend database while posing as a legitimate component of the system. 
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The threat of RFID malware has only been recently brought to the attention of 
RFID researchers [111]. These attacks are mounted by exploiting poor mutual 
authentication or storage integrity checks to store malicious code on the tags or to create 
cloned tags with malicious data and introduce them into the system. When these tags are 
read by readers the malware either corrupts the data in the backend databases or 
compromises the middleware of the system by infecting it. In buffer overflow attacks, 
which are a simpler version of malware attacks, the attacker makes a tag try and send 
the same block of data repeatedly till it overflows a memory buffer in either the readers 
or the middleware of the system thereby corrupting data or even crashing that 
component or even the whole system [112]. The threat of RFID malware is very severe 
because it not only corrupts data but it can also spread from tag to backend database to 
tag and affect a very large amount of tags and back end databases very quickly. More 
complex RFID malware can even infect the business applications or open breaches in 
the firewalls protecting the internal system allowing attackers access the internal 
components of the system directly [26]. 
Another type of threat to networked RFID systems is the invasion of privacy 
enabled by tracking tags. Here the attacker sets up a network of RFID readers and 
exploits the mobility of the tags and the fact that most tags reply with their unique 
identification number on being queried by any reader. By identifying the tag at regular 
intervals they can then build a map of their movement over time thereby tracking either 
the person or the object the tag is attached to [40]. Tag constellation tracking is a more 
complex form of tag tracking where the attacker tracks a combination of tags rather than 
a single tag [51]. Additionally most radio transmitting devices have what is known as a 
radio fingerprint which is created at manufacture and is unique to each tag. By 
exploiting this attackers can sometimes track individual tags even if they don’t have 
access to its identification number.  
Another threat faced by RFID systems is the attacker rendering components or 
even the whole system unavailable by various means. The successful completion of 
such an attack can cause part of or even the whole system to become unavailable. This 
in turn affects the performance of not only the RFID system but also that of the business 
applications of both the company in question and those of the external partners that rely 
on the RFID system for information. The easiest Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to 
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mount on RFID systems are signal jamming and physical destruction of system 
components. Signal jamming takes advantage of the fact that wireless communications 
use a broadcast medium and floods the channel with powerful signals using the same 
frequency. This makes it impossible for the relatively weak RFID signals to propagate 
through thereby effectively rendering the tags unavailable to be read by the readers [50]. 
The attacker can also exploit the limited amount of resources available on readers and 
tags and bombard a specific reader or tag of the system with data requests thereby 
overloading that tags or the reader’s capability to reply. Attackers can also exploit the 
relatively lower physical security available to RFID tags to just physically damage or 
destroy the tag thereby shutting down the system [51]. A more complex DoS threat that 
can be mounted on some RFID systems is the de-synchronization of tags with the 
backend components. Here the attacker takes advantage of the temporary pseudonyms 
used by certain RFID protocols to de-synchronize the tags next response from the 
response expected by the rest of the system. This makes it impossible for the tag and 
reader to communicate till they are manually re-synched [74]. Attackers can also exploit 
the built-in KILL or LOCK commands on certain RFID tags  to disable those RFID tags 
thereby rendering them useless till they are reactivated [21].  
In RFID systems with multiple partners the possibility of a partner compromising 
the overall system for his own profit is an ever-present threat.  The possibility of attacks 
by partners jeopardizes the trust the users have in the system thereby reducing the 
overall advantages that can be gained by implementing a networked RFID system. Here 
the partners take advantage of either their authorized access to the system or the lack of 
proper access controls to mount attacks which compromise the system for other users. 
Repudiation attacks happen when an entity sends a communication or changes system 
data but later denies doing so [2]. In RFID this can be in the form of changed tag data to 
forged tag broadcasts. Another threat in this environment is partner de-synchronization. 
This attack is a carried out by an authorized independent partner of the system and 
would typically de-synchronize the RFID tag with the backend databases and readers of 
the other partners in the network. In a multi-entity RFID network some companies may 
want to use the RFID tags to store data that is confidential or the capabilities of some 
companies may be limited (e.g.:- can read tag data but cannot update it or can read just 
some of the tag data and not all of it). By exploiting the lack of proper access controls a 
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partner can mount an elevation of privileges attack and increase the access he has to the 
tags of the system to gain confidential information on the partners business processes or 
to even update or delete RFID data without proper authorization [51]. 
4.3 Security Framework 
When developing a security framework for any system there are two main areas that 
have to be explored and analysed: (1) The possible attacks to the system and their 
features and (2) The important system components that must be protected. Therefore 
our security framework is composed of two main parts: the attack model and the system 
model. 
4.3.1 Attack Model 
The attack model analyses the possible attacks on the system and classifies them based 
on various different criteria. The attack model (Figure 4.2) allows readers to get a better 
understanding of all the attacks that can possibly be mounted on a networked RFID 
system. The attack model analyses the attacks in three ways. It looks at the source of the 
attack, the negative impact the attack will have on the system if successful and the 
method by which the attack access the system components it’s attacking. 
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Figure 4.2: Attack model for networked RFID 
4.3.1.1 Access Methods
One of the most important aspects of any attack is how that attack is actually mounted 
on the system. For networked RFID applications we identify two main access methods 
with which attackers can attack the system: logical access and physical access. 
The main method of communication between tags and readers in an RFID system 
is wireless communication. Therefore potential attackers can exploit this 
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communication method to gain logical access to either the memory modules of the 
system or even the information that is being remotely communicated between the tags 
and readers.  Unauthorized logical access to the system can be gained in a number of 
different ways [51]. The attacker can pretend to be an authorized tag or reader to gain 
access to the system. They can also intercept the wireless transmissions between the 
readers and tags and decrypt them to gain confidential information. Eavesdropping, tag 
tracking and replay attacks are some common types of logical access attacks. 
In normal IT systems the data is stored in a physically secure location such as a 
data server in a server room. Whereas RFID systems store some of its sensitive data on 
the RFID tag itself. These tags are affixed to physical objects that travel along the 
physical network [11]. In addition, the RFID readers may also be mounted in relatively 
unsecure locations such as warehouses and transport vehicles. Therefore some of the 
components in networked RFID systems have relatively low physical security compared 
to the components of a normal network. Physical access attacks are mounted by 
attackers who gain physical access to the tags or the readers of the system. Physical 
destruction of tags and physical reading and writing of tags are some common physical 
access attacks. (See Table 4.4 for details of access methods of all identified attacks) 
4.3.1.2 Attack Impact
Another important aspect of any attack is the impact it will have on the system. We 
categorize the attacks possible on networked RFID systems into 5 main groups based on 
the negative impact they will have on the system: (1) Modification, (2) Interception, (3) 
Interruption, (4) Fabrication and (5) Tracking. The impacts we have identified are 
slightly different from the STRIDE developed by Microsoft. Table 4.2 maps our 
impacts to the STRIDE model for comparison while Table 4.3 shows the impact each 
identified attack can have on the system. 
Table 4.2: Mapping of attack classification to Microsoft STRIDE model 
 Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information 
Disclosure 
Denial 
of 
Service 
Elevation 
of 
Privilege 
Modification  Y Y   Y 
Interception    Y Y 
Interruption     Y Y 
Fabrication Y Y Y    
Tracking    Y Y 
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Interception and modification attacks are the most common attacks possible on any IT 
system. In interception attacks the attacker intercepts data while it’s stored or being 
communicated and gains access to confidential information. In modification attacks the 
attacker changes, deletes or creates data in the system without authorization [22]. In 
RFID systems these attacks can be carried out with either remote or physical access. 
The wireless nature of RFID means communications can be easily intercepted as they 
are travelling between tags and readers allowing for remote modification and 
interception. The storage of sensitive data on a mobile RFID tags means the system can 
also be subject to modification and interception attacks via physical access to the tags 
[20]. Replay-attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, data leakage and crypto 
attacks are all common interception attacks on RFID systems. Modification attacks 
while harder to mount also have a much greater impact on the system if they are 
successful. If a modification attack is successful then critical data that’s not available 
elsewhere may be lost or corrupted in the process. If the system is to continue working 
there must be a way in which the system can identify and recover from these attacks. 
Successful modification attacks mounted via replay attacks or man-in-the-middle 
attacks can be further leveraged to carryout RFID malware or buffer overflow attacks 
[113]. Data integrity of the tag can also be compromised by natural causes such as 
electromagnetic fields and physical shocks [2]. 
Ensuring the availability of any IT system is of paramount importance. An 
interruption attack renders the system unusable by blocking access to some or all parts 
of the system or by ensuring that different parts of the system can’t properly identify or 
communicate with each other [2]. The availability of RFID systems are of vital 
importance to corporations using them as unavailability of the RFID systems leads to 
the unavailability of all the applications that rely on it. In RFID systems interruption 
attacks can vary from simple active radio jamming attacks to complex attacks that 
desynchronize tags with the central database in RFID systems using pseudonyms [109]. 
The availability of RFID systems can also be compromised by physical or logical 
destruction of tags or their data and the use on unauthorized kill/lock attacks to stop the 
functionality of the tags. 
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Table 4.3: RFID attacks by their possible impact on system 
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Replay attacks Y Y    
Eavesdropping attacks Y    
Data leakage Y    
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y    
Crypto attacks Y    
Physical reading of tags Y    
Physical writing to tags Y     
Tag cloning Y Y Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y Y Y Y
Tracking (Forward and Backward)     Y
Tag constellation tracking     Y
Radio fingerprint tracking     Y
Physical destruction of components   Y   
Active jamming   Y   
Passive jamming,   Y   
De-synchronization of tags Y Y   
Unauthorised tag locking or killing   Y   
RFID Malware (worms, viruses, SQL and Script 
injection) 
Y Y Y   
Buffer overflow Y Y   
Elevation of privileges (reading) Y    
Elevation of privileges (writing) Y     
Repudiation of actions Y     
Partner de-synch,    Y
Killing or locking tags for partners   Y   
In addition to the above common types of attacks RFID systems are subject to two more 
types of attacks: fabrication attacks and tracking attacks. Fabrication happens when the 
attacker inserts new messages or items into the system without the knowledge or 
authorization of the system owners [110]. In RFID systems these attacks mainly 
manifest as cloning or spoofing attacks where the attacker inserts fabricated tags into 
the system. The attacker may also try to carry out a fabrication attack by pretending to 
be an authorized reader and querying tags for their information as well. Like with 
modification attacks successful fabrication attacks can be further leveraged to mount 
malware attacks on the system or in some cases cloned tags can be used to authenticate 
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false object as their real counterparts (medicines and other designer consumer goods). 
Tracking attacks are possible on networked RFID systems due to the mobile nature of 
the tags. By tracking the movement of individual tags along the physical network the 
attacker can gain insight into the structure of the network as well other information such 
as location of specific vehicles or people and the efficiency of physical network and the 
business processes that support it. Tracking can also carried out my physically or 
logically compromising a tag and then using the information gained to identify the past 
or future transmissions of that tag (forward tracking and backward tracking) [51].  
4.3.1.3 Source of Attack
Another important part of any attack is the source of that attack. In networked RFID 
systems, unlike in standalone RFID systems, the attack can originate from one of two 
different sources: External attackers and internal attackers. See Table 4.4 for details. 
External attackers are persons or organizations that have no authorized access to 
the system but try and gain some or complete access to the system by various means. 
These attackers have a number of motivations for these attacks  including stealing 
restricted information, changing system data, stealing the goods the tags are affixed to, 
tracking the tags as they travel along the physical network, cloning the RFID tags for 
counterfeiting and spreading malicious malware into the system thereby disrupting its 
performance [50]. Internal attackers on the other hand are authorized users of the system 
who try and gain more access than they are entitled to (a partner who is only allowed to 
read tag data updates it) or try to disrupt the system in such a way as to harm other users 
of the system. Because networked RFID systems are typically used by a number of 
independent entities who are simultaneously partners and competitors, internal attacks 
are a major concern for these types of systems [6]. There are a number of attacks that 
internal attackers can carry out on networked RFID systems including creating data/ 
updating tags and then denying they made those changes (repudiation) and gaining 
access to private data stored on the tags by other partners in the supply chain (Elevation 
of privileges (reading)) as well as changing data they are not authorized to change 
(Elevation of privileges (writing)). 
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Table 4.4: RFID attacks by access method and attack source 
Access Method Attack Source
Logical Physical External Internal
Replay attacks Y Y
Eavesdropping attacks Y Y
Data leakage Y Y
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y
Crypto attacks Y Y Y
Physical reading of tags Y Y
Physical writing to tags Y Y
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y
Tracking (Forward and Backward) Y Y
Tag constellation tracking Y Y
Radio fingerprint tracking Y Y
Physical destruction of components Y Y
Active jamming Y Y
Passive jamming Y Y
De-synchronization of tags Y Y Y
Unauthorised tag locking or killing Y Y Y
RFID Malware (worms, viruses, SQL 
injection) 
Y Y Y
Buffer overflow Y Y Y
Elevation of privileges (reading) Y Y Y
Elevation of privileges (writing) Y Y Y
Repudiation of actions Y Y Y
Partner de-synch Y Y Y
Killing or locking tags for partners    Y
4.3.2 System Model 
In the previous section we discussed the attack model component of the security 
framework. In this section we will discuss the system model component of the security 
framework. The system model identifies the key system components that need to be 
protected and analyses the security concepts that must be preserved to fully secure the 
system and the security requirements that result. The final security framework is shown 
in Figure 4.3 while the development process behind will be explained in detail in the 
following sections. 
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Figure 4.3: Networked RFID security framework 
4.3.2.1 System Components
In a networked RFID system the system components include RFID tags, RFID 
communications, readers, middleware, and backend data storage and business 
applications. In RFID systems the edge components: namely the readers and tags are 
implemented on non-standard devices and they communicate using a non-secure 
channel. The other components on the other hand are all implemented and connected by 
standard IT infrastructure. Therefore in our framework we separate the components into 
three groups: The tags, the wireless communications and the back-end components as 
shown in Figure 4.4. 
Tags in standard large scale networked RFID applications typically comprise an 
electronic memory module, a logic module and a communication antenna. The memory 
module of the tag can consist of memory which can be read only, write once or 
updatable. The logic module of low cost RFID tags consists of between 500 to 10000 
gates. The tags can be powered with either passive a semi-passive power source or an 
active power source [33]. In any RFID system the tags hold the identifier of the object 
it’s attached to as well as additional data such as brand, product, expiry date and price of 
the object it’s attached to. U
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also provides an indication if the data has been compromised in this manner and in 
some cases allows for the retrieval of the correct data from the corrupted version [48]. 
For networked RFID this requires the integrity of the data stored on the RFID tag and 
the backend database as well as the data that’s being communicated between readers 
and tags. Complete implementation of integrity also ensures that once data has been 
created, modified or deleted by an authorized party those changes cannot be denied by 
that party.  
Confidentiality protects the data of the system from unauthorized disclosure to 
parties who are not entitled to access that data. In networked RFID systems 
confidentiality requires that both the data stored on the tag itself and the data that is 
being communicated between readers and tags is secure from unauthorized access by 
outside parties. It also requires that the authorized partners do not gain access to data 
that they are not allowed to access [17].  
In addition to the above mentioned requirements, full security of an RFID system 
requires that the concepts of privacy and availability be assured. Privacy provides for 
the protection of information that might be derived from observing system activities 
[50]. In networked RFID systems this protects against attacks such as tracking of tag 
movements and the use of traffic analysis to derive information about the data that’s 
being communicated. The final security concept, availability ensures that there is no 
denial of access or service by any component of the system to other authorized parties 
or components of the system [48]. For networked RFID applications this requires that 
all readers can access all the tags of the system and vice versa. It also requires that the 
overall RFID system be available when other business applications require data from it.  
For a networked RFID system to be fully secured all of the above mentioned 
security concepts must be fully assured for each group of components in the system. 
Therefore the five core security concepts of authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, 
privacy and availability must be separately assured for the tags, communications and 
backend components of the RFID system. 
4.3.2.3 Networked RFID Security Requirements
The security requirements are the security functionality that needs to be implemented to 
secure the system. As explained above, each security concept for each component must 
be separately secured before the overall system can be considered secure. Therefore we 
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identify that the all following security requirements must be implemented to ensure that 
all the security concepts for each component is fully secured. Table 4.5 maps the 
security requirements to the security concepts and system components that they protect. 
Table 4.5: Networked RFID security requirements 
 Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability 
Tags Mutual 
Authentication, 
Storage 
Integrity, 
Non-
repudiation, 
Data Ownership 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Mutual 
Authentication, 
Storage 
Confidentiality, 
Access Control 
Anonymity Physical 
Protection, 
Electronic 
Protection 
Communications Transmission 
Integrity 
Transmission 
Integrity 
Transmission 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Leakage 
Protection 
Electronic 
Protection 
Backend 
Components 
Mutual 
Authentication, 
Non-
repudiation, 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Mutual 
Authentication, 
N/A Electronic 
Protection 
Mutual authentication allows the two communicating entities to verify the identity of 
the entity they will be communicating with [20]. In RFID systems mutual authentication 
is required to ensure that the readers and tags that are communicating are of the same 
network and have access to that information and are authorized to do the data 
modifications they request. Proper mutual authentication not only ensures the 
authenticity of the components but also provides confidentiality and integrity for the 
data stored on the backend components by ensuring that only authorized entities can 
access that data. Secure mutual authentication is also required as a base to implement a 
majority of the remaining security requirements and is therefore the most important 
security requirement in networked RFID. Most RFID security protocols implement 
mutual authentication as part of its security features.  
Because RFID systems use wireless communications it is easy for potential 
attackers to intercept them. Transmission confidentially ensures the security of data 
while it’s broadcast by ensuring that it cannot be understood by an attacker who 
intercepts it [48]. Transmission confidentiality typically uses various encryption 
methods to ensure that attackers cannot understand data intercepted in this manner. The 
protocols in [58, 62, 114] all provide for transmission confidentiality. Storage 
confidentiality ensures the security of data while it’s stored on the tag or the backend 
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components. In networked RFID systems the tag is easily accessible by attackers. 
Hence it is important that tag data be secure in case of physical or logical compromise 
of the tag [17]. Unfortunately storage confidentially is an area that has received very 
little research attention till now.  
Complete data integrity requires the two security requirements of transmission 
integrity and storage integrity to be implemented. In RFID not only can potential 
attackers intercept wireless communications but they can also modify those 
communications compromising their integrity. Ensuring that communications that have 
been illegally modified can be identified and the original data recovered is done by 
transmission integrity. Transmission integrity in RFID typically employ various low 
cost encryption methods and message digests/hashes to enable the detection and 
recovery of RFID communications that have been externally modified [70]. The 
protocols presented in [58, 62, 114] all provide communication integrity but not data 
recovery. RFID broadcast data recovery still remains an area open for research. Storage 
integrity ensures the integrity of data while it’s stored on the tag. The relative physical 
and logical accessibility of RFID tags on which sensitive data is stored dictates that 
storage integrity is a high priority, especially in systems which store additional sensitive 
data on the tag. Both encryption methods and journaling systems such as the ones 
presented in [67, 69] can be used to ensure some storage integrity but currently they are 
not sufficiently strong or complete enough. Currently storage integrity of RFID tags is 
an area with very little research contributions. Because current applications store a 
majority of data on the backend database rather than the tag this is not currently an 
issue. But in the future as more and more systems store data on the tag itself this will 
become a high priority security requirement. 
In a multi-entity RFID system some partners may like to store data on the tags that 
is accessible only to them [17]. Therefore the security functionality of the system must 
protect that data from unauthorized access by internal partners. If other partners gain 
access to private data this can lead to confidentiality issues as well as create trust 
problems among them. The security requirement of access control ensures that partners 
can only gain access to data that they are authorized to do so. While the confidentiality 
of private partner data is assured by access control its integrity is assured by data 
ownership. Data ownership guarantees that entities can only modify data that they are 
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authorized to modify or delete. Both access control and data ownership require granular 
data storage based on the network partner who owns it. They also require that finely 
grained controls are implemented to ensure that data on the tags can only be accessed or 
modified by partners based on a predefined set of access and update rules. If done 
successfully multiple independent partners can have read and write access to the RFID 
tags while ensuring that access is limited to the data they are actually authorized to 
access or modify. RFID tag access control and data ownership are research areas with 
minimal current research.  
Non-repudiation is a security requirement that ensures the identification of the 
origin of data and the assurance of the genuineness of that data [115]. For example a 
partner, who is authorized to do so, may change the price stored on the RFID tag then 
deny doing so. Non-repudiation ensures that this cannot happen. By ensuring that a 
record of what data is modified by which entity is kept, non-repudiation guarantees 
accountability of those partners increasing overall trust in the system [69]. Non-
repudiation techniques for backend database exist but no non-repudiation techniques 
have been developed for securing the data stored on RFID tags.  
In networked RFID systems attackers are able to invade the privacy of the tag 
holder by tracking their movement. Anonymity ensures that tracking attacks cannot be 
mounted on the tag. There are a number of tracking attacks possible on RFID systems 
including tag tracking, forward and backward tracing, and radio fingerprint tracking as 
well as tag constellation tracking [21]. The protocols presented in [58, 62, 114] all use a 
system of pseudonyms to ensure the privacy of the tags. This system also provides a 
limited form of protection against forward and backward tracking as well. The privacy 
of RFID systems can also be compromised by data leakage. Data leakage happens when 
attackers intercept communications or other information about the system over a long 
period of time and gradually use that data to derive information about the system and 
the data being communicated by it [51]. Common data leakage attacks include traffic 
analysis as well as attacks on confidentiality of the system via a large number of 
eavesdropping attacks on weakly encrypted communications. Data leakage protection 
requires that the attacker is unable to derive any information about system data or 
system security over the course of multiple eavesdropping sessions. Data leakage 
protection can be implemented by using techniques such as implementation of more 
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advanced hardware configurations and ensuring that all communications are strongly 
encrypted. The protocols presented in [58, 62, 114] all also claim strong and secure 
encryption which makes data leakage attacks impossible. 
Networked RFID systems availability can be disrupted through physical or 
electronic means. The security requirements of physical protection and electronic 
protection secure the system against these types of attacks.  Physical protection will 
protect the system against attacks such as physical tag destruction, removal of tags from 
the tagged items or the use of items such as aluminium foil to mask tag signals. Physical 
protection is easily provided by ensuring that physical access to RFID tags is limited to 
authorized parties when possible and by having deterrents such as electronic 
surveillance present when unauthorized parties can access the tagged items. Electronic 
protection is required to protect the system from denial of service attacks mounted 
through electronic means. These attacks include overwriting/destroying tag data through 
strong electronic magnetic pulses, disruption of communications through radio 
frequency jamming, overloading of the system capability with repeated requests or by 
de-synching the tags with the authorized readers through message blocking. To combat 
these types of threats, functionality such as filtering of tags or readers which repeatedly 
send the same request and multiple frequency transmissions can be implemented.  Also 
the use of RFID tags that can simultaneously transmit in several different wireless 
frequencies or move between a few preset frequencies can make passive jamming 
attacks much more difficult. 
4.4 Application of the Framework 
In this section we will evaluate the developed framework by applying it to a real world 
networked RFID application. We will demonstrate that our framework allows for the 
methodical identification of the threats faced by the system in question and that it also 
allows the user to easily identify all the possible attacks on the system and analyse their 
impact, point of origin and access method. We will also demonstrate how the 
framework makes identifying the security requirements that need to be implemented to 
protect against those threats easy. 
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4.4.1 RFID in E-Passports 
An area in which the use of networked RFID is rapidly becoming more common is the 
use of RFID tags in passports.  Many countries—including USA, Australia and all 
European Union members—recently introduced e-passports containing RFID chips. The 
tags are normally embedded in the photo page of the passport and also contain all the 
information displayed on the photo page. When interrogated by authorized readers, the 
tags transmit personal and biometric data of the holder to the reader. For example the 
Australian e-passports contain all the data that’s displayed on the photo page of the 
passport: namely the digitized photograph, name, gender, date of birth, nationality, 
passport number, and the passport expiry date. The stored information is only broadcast 
when an authorized reader requests for that information, requests by unknown readers 
are ignored. One key feature of this system is that a majority of the static data of the 
object is stored on the tag itself and not on a back end database. Because the data stored 
on the RFID tag is unchanging the readers and tags are typically only read enabled and 
that data cannot be updated. In addition data is communicated in one-way with no data 
being broadcast from the reader to the tag other than its authentication info. The main 
differences between the RFID tags used in RFID enabled passports and other common 
RFID applications such as patient tracking and global supply chains is that the tags used 
are typically a lot more expensive [116]. Because personal and biometric data are 
particularly sensitive, attackers might be highly motivated to copy e-passports or use 
their data for identity theft. The consequences of an attack could be serious, including 
personal and biometric data theft, tracking of the e-passport’s owner, illegal border 
crossings or even detonating a bomb designed for a specific country of origin or for a 
specific individual, based on information emitted by the chip in his or her passport [48].  
4.4.2 Applying the Threat Model to Scenario 
Let’s consider the threat model for this type of system: Out of the 6 types of threats 
possible on networked RFID systems only 4 are of concern to this particular system. 
The threats (1) interception and modification of system data and communications (2) 
introduction of false objects into system (3) invasion of privacy and (4) denial of service 
still remain. But the threat of (5) RFID malware and (6) attacks by internal partners can 
be disregarded. The threat of RFID malware can be disregarded because these systems 
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use read-only RFID tags which make storing malware on them impossible. Even if an 
attacker managed to use a cloned or spoofed RFID tag to feed malware to a reader it 
would only affect that reader and terminal and would not be further propagated to other 
systems or tags as the tags used in the system are not updatable.  
Table 4.6: Threats, weaknesses and attacks applicable to E-Passport systems 
Threat Exploits weaknesses: And results in 
Interception or 
modification 
system data and 
communications
Lack of secure mutual authentication  Replay attacks
Lack of secure mutual authentication  
and confidentiality
Eavesdropping attacks
Data leakage
Lack of secure mutual authentication, 
integrity verification and confidentiality
Man-in-the- middle
Lack of sufficiently strong encryption Crypto attacks
Lack of storage confidentiality
Poor physical security of tags
Physical reading of tags
Lack of storage integrity
Poor physical security of tags
Physical writing to tags
Introduction of 
false objects into 
system
Lack of strong and secure mutual 
authentication
Tag cloning 
Tag  spoofing 
Reader masquerading
Invasion of 
privacy
Mobility of tags
 lack of proper mutual authentication
Tracking (Forward and 
Backward)
Tag constellation tracking 
The mobility of the tags and the easily 
identifiable radio fingerprint on low cost 
tags
Radio fingerprint tracking
Denial of service Lack of physical security Physical destruction of 
components 
Low resources available on tags Active jamming
Broadcast mechanism of 
communications
Passive jamming
Use of pseudonyms of some security 
protocols
De-synchronization of tags
Built in lock and kill commands Unauthorised tag locking or 
killing
The threat posed by internal partners can be disregarded for a number of reasons. All 
authorized partners are allowed to read all the data stored on the system and none of the 
partners can update the data stored on the tag making non-repudiation and elevation of 
privileges impossible. In addition only reliable and trustworthy government law 
enforcement agencies are authorized to read the tags and there is no competition 
between them like between certain supply chain partners. Therefore, this removes any 
trust issues between the partners. By applying the threat model to the system in question 
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we can determine the threats, exploits and the attacks applying to this particular system 
as shown in Table 4.6.  
4.4.3 Understanding Potential Attacks 
Now that we have identified all possible attacks on the system it’s time to understand 
how those attacks can affect this particular system. This is done by applying the attack 
model tables to the attacks that can affect this particular system. To do this we first 
disregard any attacks that were eliminated when we analysed the threats to the system. 
Then we look at the remaining attacks and identify which of their possible impacts are 
applicable for the system in question. This is shown in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7: Impact that the attacks can have on system in question 
M
od
ifi
ca
tio
n 
In
te
rc
ep
tio
n
In
te
rr
up
tio
n
Fa
br
ic
at
io
n
Tr
ac
ki
ng
Replay attacks Y    
Eavesdropping attacks Y    
Data leakage Y    
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y    
Crypto attacks Y    
Physical reading of tags Y    
Physical writing to tags      
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y Y
Tracking (Forward and Backward)     Y
Tag constellation tracking      
Radio fingerprint tracking     Y
Physical destruction of components   Y   
Active jamming   Y   
Passive jamming,   Y   
De-synchronization of tags   Y   
Unauthorised tag locking or killing   Y   
1 9 5 3 3
In the table above the Ys represent impacts that can affect the system. An impact that 
cannot affect the system in question has been removed. e.g.:- possibility of data 
modification from attacks other than man-in-the-middle can be disregarded for this 
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system as tags data cannot be updated. The final row of the table shows the total number 
of attacks that have each type of impact on the system. 
By comparing the possible attacks on the system to Table 4.4 we identify the number of 
attacks that use each access method and the number of attacks that originate from each 
source as depicted in Table 4.8. 
Table 4.8: Access methods and attack sources of attacks on system 
Access Method Attack Source
Logical Physical External Internal
Replay attacks Y Y
Eavesdropping attacks Y Y
Data leakage Y Y
Man-in-the- middle Y Y
Crypto attacks Y Y Y
Physical reading of tags Y Y
Physical writing to tags    
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y
Tracking (Forward and 
Backward)
Y Y
Tag constellation tracking    
Radio fingerprint tracking Y Y
Physical destruction of 
components 
Y Y
Active jamming Y Y
Passive jamming Y Y
De-synchronization of tags Y Y Y
Unauthorised tag locking or 
killing
Y Y Y
14 5 16 0
4.4.4 Identifying Security Requirements  
Finally we will use the system model of the security framework to identify the required 
security requirements and the possible methods with which to implement them based 
the systems architecture and use. As can be seen in Table 4.9 a number of the identified 
security requirements for networked RFID systems is not required for this system due to 
some of its architectural and system features. 
Next we decide how each of the security requirements identified above can be 
implemented for the system under review taking into consideration the system 
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architecture and the attacks that the system is vulnerable to. Therefore we first look at 
the system architecture and identify any important and unique features of the system 
that may affect how the security requirements may be implemented. In this system we 
notice a few important features: (1) the tags are only contacted by authorized readers at 
very specific points (airport immigration areas) and the owner of the tag is well aware 
of these areas. (2) The tags need only contain static non changing data (3) the data flow 
in the system is only from tags to readers and (4) the tags are embedded in expensive 
passports and therefore can be high cost tags with more resources available on them. 
Based on the vulnerabilities and the identified features of the application the steps 
shown in Table 4.10 can be taken to implement the required security requirements. 
Table 4.9: E-Passport security requirements 
 Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability 
Tags N/A – Tag 
data cannot be 
modified in a 
meaningful 
manner  
Mutual 
Authentication 
Mutual 
Authentication, 
Storage 
Confidentiality, 
Access Control 
(not required as 
all partners 
have access to 
all data) 
Anonymity Physical 
Protection, 
Electronic 
Protection 
Communications Transmission 
Integrity 
Transmission 
Integrity 
Transmission 
Confidentiality 
Data 
Leakage 
Protection 
Electronic 
Protection 
Backend 
Components 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Mutual 
Authentication 
N/A – Backend 
data is not 
transmitted to 
the tags and 
therefore cannot 
be requested by 
attackers 
N/A Electronic 
Protection 
The analysis done using the framework suggests that non electronic methods may allow 
for a much greater increase to security at a lower price. The use of a simple sleeve to 
ensure that the tag cannot communicate will easily eliminate most tracking, reader 
impersonation and replay attacks. The use of tags with very short transmission ranges 
will make attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle and replay much more 
difficult. The more expensive nature of the tags employed allow for the use of more 
traditional and power security primitives such as tag side PRNG and encryption 
algorithms that make the implementation of secure and strong mutual authentication and 
transmission confidentiality and integrity relatively straightforward. The use of write 
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only tags will ensure storage integrity and storing the data on the tag in encrypted form 
will ensure storage confidentiality. 
Table 4.10: Defences for RFID enabled passport systems 
Security 
requirement 
Recommendation on how to implement Removes or reduces  
vulnerability to 
Transmission 
Integrity 
Use data integrity verification techniques (simple one-
way hashing is a good recommendation) to verify the 
integrity of broadcasts. If any corruption is detected 
request a retransmission 
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Desynch Attacks, 
Mutual 
Authentication 
Requires a secure mutual authentication mechanism 
that allows readers and tags to reliably authenticate 
each other.  Can be implemented using mechanisms 
such as BAC (Basic Access Control) or EAC 
(Extended Access Control) which have been 
standardised for passport security. Lock commands 
using the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) is also a 
possibility but not recommended. The use of plastic 
sleeves to prevent unauthorised remote access is also 
possible 
Reader Masquerading, 
Cloning, 
Spoofing, 
Data Leakage, 
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Replay Attack, 
Eavesdropping, 
Kill/Lock Commands, 
Desynch Attacks, 
Active jamming 
Storage 
Confidentiality 
Because the owner of the passport may try and access 
the data stored on the tag to clone it or spoof the 
system storage confidentiality must be implemented - 
Storing the data in encrypted form on the tag and 
allowing only secured access to the keys required to 
decrypt that data is a option 
Physical reading of tags, 
Crypto attacks 
Transmission 
Confidentiality 
Extremely important – needs to implement some 
method of secure encryption. Can be implemented 
using traditional security primitives due to the high 
cost of the tags employed.  
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Data Leakage, 
Replay Attack, 
Eavesdropping, 
Crypto Attacks 
Anonymity Extremely important because passports allows the 
holder to be tracked. While strong mutual 
authentication and rotating pseudonyms can make 
tracking harder the nature of the system allows for a 
much simpler system. Using a plastic sleeve that 
blocks all communications to protect the passport till 
the owner arrives at an area where the tag needs to be 
read is possible. Lock commands using the MRZ 
(machine readable zone) is also a possibility 
Tag tracking, 
Forward tracing, 
Backward tracing, 
Radio finger print 
tracking 
Data Leakage 
Protection 
Not really required as nature of the application means 
tags are polled only very infrequently making data 
leakage a very low threat. Also the tags can be built to 
be pretty sophisticated making  radio fingerprint 
tracking harder  
Radio finger print 
tracking, 
Data leakage 
Physical 
Protection 
Already at an acceptable level due to readers being in 
secure areas and the tags being attached to important 
objects (passports) which are secured by the owner. 
Physical protection from owner cannot be 
implemented. 
Physical destruction of 
components 
Electronic 
Protection 
Use multi frequency RFID tags and short range 
transmissions to reduce the chance of jamming, Use 
lockout mechanisms to ensure active jamming is not 
possible 
Passive jamming, 
Active jamming 
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4.5 Summary 
Even though the deployment of networked RFID systems has greatly accelerated in the 
last few years there are still major concerns about the security available in systems using 
low cost tags. These concerns arise because of the inherent differences in various types 
of RFID systems and the large amount of security threats they are subject to. While 
there are a large number of security frameworks focused on how best to assess and 
secure IT systems implemented using typical infrastructure, next to no work has been 
done in developing a comprehensive security framework for networked RFID systems.  
In this chapter we develop and present a conceptual security framework that can be 
used for (1) assessing the vulnerabilities of RFID systems, (2) identifying the attacks 
possible on them and (3) identifying the security requirements to fully secure that 
system. Our framework is composed of two main parts: the attack model and system 
model. There is also a threat model which is used to identify the vulnerabilities of the 
RFID system. Overall the framework developed provides a methodical manner in which 
possible attacks and threats on a given RFID system can be analysed and allows the user 
to easily identify the manner in which those threats can be removed for that particular 
system. The presented framework is applied to real world networked RFID system. The 
application of the framework illustrates how the framework can be used to assess and 
improve the security of networked RFID systems. It also shows how using this 
framework allows users and developers to identify unique mechanisms by which the 
security of any given system can be improved based on characteristic that are unique to 
that system and its architecture. 
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Chapter 5
A Secure Tag Authentication 
Protocol for RFID  
As discussed in chapter four of this thesis RFID communications face a lot of threats 
and can be compromised by a large number of different attacks. The security of the 
overall RFID system, and also of all systems that depend on the data it supplies is 
therefore dependent on secure communications between readers and tags. Hence, in 
RFID systems, ensuring the security of tag-reader communications is of utmost 
importance. To this end, in this chapter, we develop and present an RFID security 
protocol that allows mutual authentication between the reader and tag as well as 
enabling the secure communication of tag data. The protocol presented uses a hybrid 
technique to provide strong security while also ensuring that the resource requirements 
are low. To do this it employs a mix of simple one-way hashing and low-cost bitwise 
operations. Out protocol ensures the confidentiality and integrity of all data being 
communicated and allows for reliable mutual authentication between tags and readers. 
The security analysis carried out also indicates that the presented protocol is also 
resistant to a large number of common attacks. Therefore the main research 
contributions of this chapter are (1) Development of a security protocol for RFID 
systems and (2) Analysis of the security and performance of the developed protocol to 
show its advantages compared to existing protocols.
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5.1 Introduction 
Even though the use of RFID can lead to increases in productivity and automation the 
nature of RFID technology dictates that this enhanced automation and productivity 
come at the price of an increase in security threats to that system. RFID systems use an 
unsecured channel to communicate between tags and readers. Consequently, RFID 
applications require a large number of security functionality including mutual 
authentication, transmission confidentiality and integrity, anonymity and availability 
[20]. Therefore, for RFID technology to be deployed in large scale supply chains the 
security issues arising from its use must be fully addressed and the required security 
functionality fully implemented [40]. If a provably secure RFID protocol is developed it 
would allow the use of RFID tags in global supply chain management leading to major 
advances in automation and supply chain visibility. As a result, research in developing 
RFID security protocols has received widespread attention in current research circles. 
Unfortunately most networked RFID applications use low cost passive RFID tags 
that are extremely constrained resource-wise. This lack of resources on the tags mean 
that most tried and tested security methods such as public key encryption, cryptographic 
hashing or PRNG cannot be deployed when developing security protocols for RFID 
systems. The combination of the large number of security functionality required by the 
system and low resources available on the tags means that securing an RFID enabled 
supply chain is extremely challenging problem. While a very large number of security 
solutions have been proposed over the last decade none have proven to be truly effective 
[117]. The early RFID security protocols were developed using tried and tested security 
techniques and could only be successfully implemented in systems using expensive 
active tags. The lack of resources on low cost tags dictate that these protocols were too 
resource intensive to be used in most networked RFID applications that employed such 
tags. Therefore a new method, known as ultra-light-weight cryptography was first 
suggested by Juels in [56]. The basic concept behind this method was the use of simple 
bitwise operations to enable secure communication between tags and readers. Because 
of the lightweight nature of these bitwise operations, protocols developed using this 
technique could be implemented even on the cheapest of tags, but it also meant the 
strength of the security afforded was also comparatively lower. Over the next few years 
large numbers of RFID security protocols were developed using ultra-light-weight 
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cryptography. But a majority of them were later shown to be susceptible to one or more 
attacks rendering them unsuitable for use in securing RFID systems. Therefore, the 
creation of secure RFID protocols that can be implemented on low cost RFID tags still 
remain an open problem.  
In this chapter, we develop and present a mutual authentication and tag data 
transmission protocol for networked RFID systems. The protocol presented uses a mix 
of traditional methods (simple one-way hash functions and reader-side PRNG) and 
ultra-light-weight methods (simple bitwise operations). Using this hybrid technique we 
develop a security protocol that not only supports a large number of security functions 
but also whose resource requirements are within the resources found on low cost 
passive tags. The protocol presented in this chapter enforces a number of core security 
concepts such as mutual authentication, communication integrity, communication 
confidentiality and anonymity. It is also resistant to a large number of common RFID 
attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, eavesdropping, tag tracing 
and de-synch attacks. Because we use one-way hashes for integrity verification 
purposes, rather than a number of weakly encrypted messages, our protocol shows a 
much larger resistance to crypto attacks. The contributions of this chapter include the 
development of new secure hybrid RFID security protocol and the primary steps in the 
creation of a data transmission protocol which allows the secure transmission of data 
other than the identification data associated with the tag. We also carry out an extensive 
security analysis of the proposed protocol identifying the security functionality it has 
and illustrating its security against a number of common attacks. The performance 
comparison shows that its resource requirements are equal or less than those of other 
RFID protocols. 
5.2 RFID Attack Environment 
In this section we analyse the specific threat model that applies to a networked RFID 
system and how that affects any security protocols that are developed for them. 
5.2.1 Threat Model  
The threat model for networked RFID applications is significantly different from the 
threat model for typical IT networks. The most significant attack vector for typical IT 
networks is the wired or unwired connection to the internet and therefore the external IT 
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infrastructure that is not controlled by the company in question. While this attack vector 
still exists for RFID systems, the biggest threat for networked RFID systems is posed by 
attacks that target the wireless communications between the readers and tags. This 
means that there are a number of security requirements that must be met for tag-reader 
communications to be considered secure. Because attackers can pretend to be authorised 
parties and try and communicate with tags or readers both the tag and the reader must be 
able to mutually authenticate each other so as to ensure that they are actually 
communicating with a trusted party [17]. In addition because attackers can intercept and 
change messages as they are travelling between readers and tags the system must be 
able to verify that the data received at either end has not been tampered with by 
unauthorised parties by providing integrity verification [31] . Finally the system must 
also be able to guarantee the security and privacy of the communications by ensuring 
data transmission confidentiality as it’s normally very easy to eavesdrop on unsecured 
wireless communications. Additionally the attackers can try and track tags as they travel 
and thereby invade the privacy of the person/company transporting that tag. To avoid 
this possibility the system must be able to provide tag anonymity [117]. Finally because 
the availability of the tags and readers are of paramount importance the security system 
in place must provide a guarantee of the availability of all tags and readers whenever 
they are required to function. 
While some features of RFID systems make them more vulnerable to attacks other 
features have the opposite effect. In traditional attack models it is assumed that the 
attackers have access to the system it's attacking at all times. But for RFID systems that 
are being attacked at the tag/reader transmissions this is not the case. Because the RFID 
transmission range is limited a rogue reader has to be in close physical proximity of the 
readers or tags it’s trying to attack [34]. Because close physical proximity is not always 
possible there will always be occasions on a regular and consistent basis where tag will 
be able to communicate with an authorised reader in a safe environment. Additionally in 
supply chains most RFID tags are also in close proximity to lots of other tagged objects 
and tag reading is normally done via a polling transmission broadcast by a reader. 
Hence a majority of the time RFID communications will take place simultaneously with 
hundreds if not thousands of other similar RFID conversations [27]. Therefore if the 
attacker cannot uniquely identify the communications of a specific tag while they take 
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place its extremely difficult if not impossible to identify them later. Trying to identify a 
communication later will require the storing of hundreds of thousands of individual 
transmissions for review at a later date which is not possible. It’s also almost impossible 
for an attacker to selectively block only certain communications of an ongoing 
transmission as there are thousand taking place simultaneously. Therefore DoS attacks 
that are mounted by blocking only select transmissions of a single tag are incredibly 
hard to mount on large scale networked RFID systems.  
5.3 A Hybrid RFID Security Protocol  
In this section we will describe in detail the Hybrid RFID Security Protocol (HRSP). 
We will first present a high level over view of the protocol explaining what data each 
component must store/remember, what functionality must be implemented on the 
readers and tags, the overall architecture of the system and the process carried out by 
each component during each phase. In Section 5.3 we will present the protocol itself 
including details of each computation done by each component and the messages 
exchanged.  
5.3.1 Overview of Protocol 
Each tag stores a static identifier (EPC), a temporary index-pseudonym (IDS) and two 
keys K1 and K2 all of which are of 96 bit length to ensure compatibility with EPCGlobal 
encoding schemes. The EPC is set and stored when the tag is created and never changes. 
The IDS and the two keys K1 and K2 will change and be updated each time the tag 
communicates with a valid reader. In addition, if required the developers can use to 
store additional information about the item the tag is attached to on the tag itself as well. 
The database needs to store the current IDS and K1 and K2 along with the associated 
EPC for each tag. The backend database will also store the last known valid IDS and K1
and K2, shown by IDSOld, K1Old and K2Old. These details need to be made available to all 
readers that belong to any business entity in the network. Table 5.1 shows the 
information that needs to be stored on each component. 
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Table 5.1: Data storage on key components 
 Data to be stored 
Readers  N/A 
Tags EPC – Static 96 bit identifier 
IDS – 96 bit temporary pseudonym  
K1, K2 – two 96 bit keys that constantly change 
Any additional information about the item its affixed to 
Database (for 
each tag in 
system) 
EPC - Static 96 bit identifier 
IDS – Current temporary pseudonym 
IDSold – last know valid IDS 
K1, K2 - Two 96 bit keys that constantly change 
K1Old, K2Old – The two last known valid 96 bit keys 
The proposed protocol employs a mix of standard security primitives (one-way hash, 
PRNG,) and simple bit-wise operations (XOR, bit string concatenation and splitting). 
Table 5.2 shows the functionality required by the three key components. 
Table 5.2: Functionality of key components 
 Required Functionality 
Readers 96 bit PRNG 
Bitwise XOR 
Simple one-way hash function  
Bit string concatenation 
Bit string splitting 
Mutual authentication with database using standard methods 
Tags Bitwise XOR 
Simple one-way hash function  
Bit string concatenation 
Bit string splitting 
Database Data storage 
Location and retrieving of data as required 
Mutual authentication with readers using standard methods 
Figure 5.1 shows the overall architecture of the system components to run the protocol. 
The tags are fixed on the actual physical item and that item along with the tag is passed 
from partner to partner and moves along the physical RFID network. Therefore, the 
central key repository needs to be available to all the partners and it needs to be able to 
authenticate each reader as an authorised entity to access that data. Because this mutual 
authentication is done between a standard database server and RFID readers over a 
normal wired connection tried and tested authentication techniques can be used for it. 
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Additionally, because the requested information must travel from the key repository to 
the requesting reader over a normal secured channel, and that information must be 
protected, standard confidentiality and integrity security mechanism can be employed. 
Figure 5.1: Protocol architecture 
5.3.2 Protocol Algorithm 
The protocol consists of four key stages: Initialization Phase, Mutual Authentication 
Phase, Data Transmission Phase and Pseudonym Update Phase which are described in 
further detail below. These four phases are shown in the four boxes in Figure 5.2. 
5.3.2.1 Initialization Phase  
The initialization phase is when the reader and tag make first contact and the reader 
retrieves the required data from the backend database. Therefore on coming into contact 
with the radio wave field of an RFID reader a tag responds with its current IDS. The 
reader contacts the backend data base with the received IDS (via the RFID middleware) 
and requests the key information associated with that IDS. The database locates the 
required key information (EPC, K1 and K2) based on the IDS and forwards it to the 
reader. If the received IDS is not recognised (i.e.:- does not exists in either of EPC 
details tables) the database sends a terminate message to the reader which then stops 
communicating with that tag. The following functions and notation will be used in the 
proposed algorithm 
H(x) – One-way hash function on input x 
PRNG(x) – Generation of 96 bit PRNG x 
X + Y – XOR Function on X and Y
X || Y – Concatenation of X and Y
X == Y - Comparison operation on X and Y 
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Figure 5.2:  Proposed RFID protocol 
5.3.2.2 Mutual Authentication Phase 
Once the reader receives the EPC, K1 and K2 of tag from the backend database the 
mutual authentication phase begins. Here the reader uses the data retrieved from the 
backend database to prove to the tag it is authorised to access the tags details. Then the 
tag uses the data stored on it to prove it is actually the tag that the current IDS 
correspond to. Hence, the mutual authentication phase is subdivided into two phases: 
reader authentication and tag authentication. First the tag needs to authenticate the 
reader as being a legitimate reader from the network. To enable this reader first 
generates the PRNG R. It then calculates M1 = H(EPC+K1).  It also calculates M2 = 
(K1+R). Finally, it concatenates M1 and M2 and transmits it to the tag. On receiving M1
and M2, the tag uses the K1 and EPC it has on its memory to calculate C1= H(EPC+K1) 
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and compares it to the received M1. If the two values match it means that the reader has 
authenticated access to the tags information (the tags EPC and K1) via the backend 
database. Therefore, the reader is authenticated by the tag and the protocol moves on the 
tag authentication sub phase. If the values don’t match the protocol terminates.  
During tag authentication, the tag uses the K1 saved on its memory and retrieves R 
from M2 as R = (M2 + K1). The tag then calculates M3 = H(EPC+K2+R) and transmits it 
to the reader. On receiving M3, the reader uses the EPC and K2 it received from the 
backend database to calculate C2 = H(EPC+K2+R) and compares it to M3. If they match 
it means that the tag has the EPC (M1 is a one-way hash and therefore the tag cannot 
retrieve the EPC from it) and K2 that matches the IDS it broadcast during the 
initialization phase. Therefore the reader authenticates the tag and the protocol moves 
on to the data transmission phase. If the M3 received by the reader does not match C2
then the protocol terminates.  
5.3.2.3 Tag Data Transmission Phase  
Once mutual authentication has been successfully concluded the protocol moves on to 
the data transmission phase. During this phase the tag splits the tag data into separate 
blocks and transmits them as 96 bit packets. Once all packets have been received and 
the reader receives the end indicator packet it will then concatenate the data back into 
one block and forward it to the middleware for decoding. We have proposed three 
different algorithms that can be used for this phase. One has low security and high 
performance, one has high security and low performance and one is balanced with 
medium security and medium performance. In this section we present the balanced one. 
The other two options are presented in the next section 
In this phase the reader generates PRNG r1 and calculates E1 = (K1+r1) and 
broadcasts it. Upon receiving E1 the tag breaks down the data (D) to be transmitted into 
n parts of 96 bit length (D = d1||d2||…||dn). Then the tag retrieves r1 from E1 as r1= 
(E1+K1). It then calculates D1 = (d1+r1) and H1 = H(EPC+d1+r1) and transmits them. On 
receiving D1 and H1 the reader retrieves d1 from D1 as d1 = (D1+r1) and using that d1 it 
calculates DH1 = H(EPC+d1+r1). If DH1 matches the received H1 the reader accepts the 
data if it doesn’t it requests a retransmit. If the data is accepted the protocol continues 
with the reader generating a PRNG (r2) and the functionality explained above repeats till 
all n data blocks are received by the reader. On receiving the data transmission end 
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signal from the tag the reader concatenates all the n data blocks it received and retrieves 
the complete data block. 
5.3.2.4 Pseudonym Update Phase  
When the reader receives the final data packet during the data transmission the protocol 
moves forward into the key updating phase. In this phase the keys and IDS on both the 
tag and the backend database is updated to ensure security against tracking attacks. First 
the reader generates PRNG R2. It then calculates M4 = (K1+R2) and M5 = H(EPC+R2). It 
then concatenates and broadcasts M4 and M5. On receiving M4 and M5, the tag retrieves 
R2 from M4 as R2 = (M4+K1), it then calculates C2= H(EPC+R2) and compares with M5
received from the reader. If C2 == M5 then the tag accepts the R2 else it discards and 
requests a new R2. Once a secure R2 is received the tag starts its key updating. To do 
this it updates its IDS as IDSnew = IDS + [(R2left || K1right) + (K2left||R2right)],   K1new = 
(K1Right||K2Left) + R2 and K2new = (K2Right||K1Left) + R2. Here the left and right sub texts 
indicate the left half and right half of K1 and K2.  It then overwrites IDS, K1 and K2 with 
IDSnew, K1new and K2new. Simultaneously the reader does the same calculations and 
transmits the IDSnew, K1new and K2new along with the EPC to the back end database. The 
backend database overwrites the entry for that EPC in the last approved details table 
with the values from the current table. It then overwrites the current table values with 
the values received by the reader. 
5.3.3 Data Packet Structure 
All individual message packets (d1…dn) are 96 bits each. Each packet is composed as 
follows: a header of total length 10 bits and a data for the remaining 86 bits. The first 9 
bits of the 10 bit header indicate the packet number. This allows a total of 511 packets 
or 44KB (511*86 bits) of data to be transmitted. If more data needs to be transmitted the 
header can be lengthened to accommodate a large number of packets and therefore a 
higher data size. The final bit of the header indicates if this is the last packet or not (with 
1 indicating the last packet). If the final packet has less than 86 bits of data the PRNG 
received will be truncated to match the length of the final packet (10+ remaining 
number of data bits) and then + with the dn to generate the final data packet of this 
phase. The data packet structure is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3:  Data packet structure 
5.3.4 Data Transmission Phase Modifications 
There are a number of modifications that can be applied during the data transmission 
phase which either increase performance or security. In this section we discuss two 
possible modifications. The first modification enhances security at the cost of 
performance while the second modification enhances performance at the cost of 
security. Please note that the following two sections only discuss the modified Data 
Transmission Phase for the algorithm. The other three phases remain exactly the same 
as shown in Figure 5.2 and discussed in the previous section.  
5.3.4.1 Security Enhancement 
One security issue present in the default data transmissions phase algorithm is that even 
if an attacker changes any of the messages E1…En the tag will still send a reply. While 
the attacker cannot use the reply D1…Dn to gain any information this still is not optimal 
from a security standpoint. Therefore to ensure that the tag does not reply if they receive 
a corrupted or modified E1…En we propose the following modified data transmission 
algorithm. Here for added security each E1 to EN transmitted during the data 
transmission phase will be accompanied by HR1 to HRN, and is calculated as 
H(EPC+rn). Now when the tag receives E1 and retrieves r1 it will first calculate 
H(EPC+r1) and match it with the HR1 received from the reader. If the received HR1
does not match the calculated H(EPC+r1) it means that E1 was changed during 
transmission and therefore nothing will be transmitted. This process is shown in Figure 
5.4. 
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using the XOR operator on data and secret keys or random numbers to ensure 
confidentiality and (4) temporary pseudonyms and keys to allow for secure mutual 
authentication of tags and readers while protecting against tracking attacks.  
5.5.2.1 Mutual Authentication 
Our protocol ensures the tag and readers can mutually and reliably authenticate each 
other. The tag is able to authenticate the reader based on M1. Because the tag never 
transmits its EPC and K1 only readers which really belong to the system will have 
access (via the backend database) to the EPC and current K1 of the tag. Therefore, if M1
matches the H(EPC+K1) calculated by the tag it can be sure that the reader retrieved the 
correct EPC and K1 from the backend database and that therefore it’s authorised to 
access the tag and its data. The reader is able to authenticate the tag using M3. If M3
matches the H(EPC+K2+R) it means the tag knows the EPC (it can’t retrieve the EPC 
using M1 as that’s a one-way hash) and K2 matching the IDS it transmitted earlier. It 
also ensures that M3 is not a replay of a previous transmission as R ensures the message 
is new. Therefore, both the tag and the reader can mutually authenticate each other. 
5.5.2.2 Data Confidentiality 
In the proposed protocol all public messages are either hashed using an one-way hash 
algorithm (such as the one proposed in [77]) or composed by using bitwise operations 
employing a random number (R1, R2, r1, r2, ...., rn) or bitwise operations employing a 
secret key known only by legitimate tags and readers (k1, k2). Therefore it’s nearly 
impossible to obtain the data that’s being transmitted (only 1 message is transmitted 
when communicating any given data making crypto attacks impossible and the chances 
of a brute force attack working on any of the messages where a bitwise operation has 
been employed using either a random number of an unknown key is 1/296). Also 
because the hashes that are used to verify the integrity of the data always contain the 
EPC as well the attacker cannot use the hash to verify that the data he retrieved using a 
brute force attack is valid. In addition, because the random numbers change after each 
block of data and the keys (k1 and k2) are updated after each communication session, the 
brute force attack will have to be carried out a large number of times before the attacker 
can gain any significant knowledge of the data.  
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5.5.2.3 Data Integrity 
Whenever a message containing data such as M2, D1 or D2 is transmitted another hashed 
message M1, H1 or H2 etc. is also transmitted. This hashed message allows the protocol 
to ensure the integrity of received data. In the data transmission phase the method in 
which PRNGs are used makes it impossible for an attacker to compromise the integrity 
of data without the reader realizing it. Imagine that an attacker changes the message E1
during the data transmission phase.  Then the random number retrieved by the tag is not 
the same as the random number that the reader generated and transmitted. Therefore, 
when the tag generates and sends back D1 the data the reader retrieves from D1 will be 
different from the data that the tag encrypted (as the r1 used by the tag is different from 
the r1 used by the reader). Therefore when the reader generates H(d1) it will not match 
the H(d1) transmitted by the tag and therefore the reader will discard that data and 
request a retransmission. 
5.5.2.4 Tag Anonymity 
Each tag updates its IDS, K1 and K2 after each authorised communication session. This 
update also involves the random number R2 generated by the reader and securely 
communicated to the tag. Therefore, the IDS that are transmitted by a tag are constantly 
changing making it impossible to track it for any significant length of time. Also as 
previously mentioned the only piece of tag data that never changed (the EPC) is never 
transmitted without being hashed first using either a random nonce or a constantly 
changing k1 making it impossible to use data leakage or any other types of repeated 
attacks to try and infer the EPC of the tag. Also any public messages are always 
encrypted by using bitwise operations and a random nonce which further makes 
impossible to track the tag using any other data that it transmits. Of course the attacker 
can track the tag between two successful authentication and update transmissions 
between the tag and authorised readers but this is a very limited form of tracking. 
5.5.2.5 Backward Security 
Backward security is a property that guarantees the security of future communications 
even when a tag is compromised. Imagine an attacker steals a tag manually reads its 
data (IDS, EPC, K1, K2) and then reintroduces it into the network. Because the attacker 
has access to the tags current (IDS, EPC, K1, K2) he will be able to track the tag from 
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there on and also understand the data that’s been communicated between tags and 
readers. But as stated in the attacker model it’s highly unlikely that a single attacker 
would have constant uninterrupted access to any given tag. Therefore when the tag is 
finally able to have a conversation with a reader where the attacker cannot access the 
communication (inside a large warehouse for example) the tag will update its current 
information and the attacker will lose access to the tag and its communications from 
there on. 
5.5.2.6 Forward Security 
Forward security is a property that guarantees the security of past communications even 
when a tag is compromised. Because the tags IDS, K1 and K2 are updated after each 
authenticated communication session using random numbers, even if an attacker 
manages to gain the current values of IDS, K1 and K2, there is no way he can derive the 
past values of IDS, K1 and K2 using the current values. And without those past values of 
IDS, K1 and K2 he cannot gain access to the data communicated in past sessions. The 
only non-changing value stored on the tag, the EPC, is never transmitted without being 
hashed with another random number or constantly changing key first which means it 
can never be identified based on tag reader communications. Also unlike some other 
protocols we only store the current value of the IDS on the tag therefore even if the tag 
is physically compromised the attacker gains access to only 1 set of values and keys not 
two. 
5.5.3 Protection from Common RFID Attacks 
The protocol also displays immunity to a large number of common attacks. In particular 
we claim that our scheme achieves the following security properties: 
5.5.3.1 Protection against Replay Attacks 
There are a number of points in the protocol where the attacker may try to use a replay 
attack. The attacker may try and store the IDS transmitted by the tag or the message M1
transmitted by the reader and replay them. But because the IDS, K1 and K2 are updated 
using a random number (R2) after each authenticated transmission sessions that would 
not work. The attacker may also try and block the updating phase and try and use the 
old IDS or recorded M1. If the attacker tries to block the update phase and replay the 
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IDS to a reader of the network, this is equivalent to the attacker transmitting a random 
IDS which happens to be part of the network: therefore because the attacker does not 
have the EPC or the K1 or K2 associated with that IDS they will not be able to make any 
sense of the received messages M1 and M2 and the attack would fail. If the attacker tries 
to block the update phase and replay M1 and M2 to a tag the tag would authenticate the 
reader and transmit M3 but as the attacker cannot gain again any information from this 
(M3 is a hashed message) and therefore, he cannot continue the attack to try and steal 
information during the data transmission phase (K1 and r1 are required to understand the 
data transmitted during this phase and attacker does not gain access to K1 at any point 
during the replay attack). Hence, the attacker gains nothing from this attack. Then 
because he is now authenticated by the tag the reader may try and mount a de-synch 
attack on the tag. To do this he will now replay M4 and M5. But keep in mind at this 
point the back end database has already been updated to the new values of IDS, K1 and 
K2 based on the random number value contained in M4 and M5. Therefore this attack 
will only serve to update the tag to the latest values of IDS, K1 and K2 as stored by the 
database rather than de-synch it.   
5.5.3.2 Protection against De-synch Attacks 
There are two main ways in which a de-synch attack can be mounted on a networked 
RFID system. The attacker can either block a key update confirmation between a tag 
and reader and force only the tag or the reader to update thereby de-synching them or he 
can send a false update message to either the tag or reader making them update while 
the other side doesn’t. The protocol proposed by us is secure against both these types of 
attacks. If the attacker blocks the update messages M4 and M5 the backend would be 
updated while the tag would not. But the backend always stores the current IDS, K1 and 
K2 and the last verified IDS, K1, K2 in two separate tables. Therefore if it doesn’t 
receive an IDS it recognises in the current IDS table it will then look in the old IDS 
table for a matching entry. Because the sent IDS and the K1 and K2 stored on the tag 
matches the details in the old IDS table the system would recognise and authenticate the 
tag.  It will then overwrite the details of that tag in the current IDS table with the data 
from the old IDS table and then continue as normal.  Therefore a de-synch attack based 
on blocking key messages will not work on the system. Now let’s consider an attacker 
who tries to de-synch the system by transmitting false update messages M4 and M5. M4
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is used to transmit a PRNG (R2) securely to the tag and M5 is used to verify the integrity 
of that R2. Because an attacker does not have access to K1 the M4 they transmit will be 
X+R2 (where X is random 96 bit string which is not K1) therefore when the tag retrieves 
R2 from the false M4 it will not match the R2 that the attacker generated. Hence the M5
transmitted by the attacker will not match the H(R2) generated by the tag (as the R2 used 
by the attacker in generating M5 is not the same as the R2 retrieved by the tag from the 
false M4 and used to generate H(R2)) and the tag will not go ahead with the update and 
will request for another update variable (R2). Also a combination attack: blocking the 
messages and replaying them later will not work as discussed in the replay attack 
section. 
5.5.3.3 Protection against Man-in-the-middle 
The proposed protocol provides strong mutual authentication, transmission 
confidentially and transmission integrity. Therefore man-in-the-middle attacks do not 
work against it. Any changes to the data will be picked up the integrity checks or they 
will change the random numbers in such a way as to make the attacker and tag have 
different random numbers thereby making it impossible for the attacker to “decrypt” the 
messages. And because the attacker cannot gain access to K1 and K2 or even the random 
numbers used he will be unable to decrypt normal messages that pass through him. 
5.5.3.4 Protection against Eavesdropping Attacks  
As explained in the data confidentiality section above only readers and tag with access 
to the current keys of the tag can decipher the messages broadcast by the system. Our 
system ensures that only the tag and authorised readers will have access to those keys. 
Therefore a potential attacker who eavesdrops on the broadcasts will be unable to 
decipher them making this type of attack futile.  
5.5.3.5 Protection against Crypto Attacks 
By ensuring that all public messages are a XOR of the data and either a PRNG or a 
secret key we ensure that the only way an attacker can decipher the data is through brute 
force attack. And even if a brute force attack is to work the use of the unknown EPC 
(which is only broadcast in one-way hashed messages) in all hash messages used for 
integrity verification ensure that the attacker cannot use the hash he intercepted to check 
the correctness of the data he got through brute force. As an example imagine the 
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attacker intercepts D1||H1 during the data transmission phase. He then mounts a brute 
force attacker to retrieve d1. Once he has retrieved a possible value he has to check that 
against something to ensure that it’s indeed d1. But the H1 which the system uses to 
check the transmission integrity includes the EPC in it. Because the attacker does not 
have the EPC he cannot generate H(EPC+d1+r1) to compare to the received H1 and 
therefore he has no way of knowing if the d1 he retrieved is the real value or a false 
value. 
5.5.3.6 Protection against Data Leakage Attacks 
When we refer to data leakage we refer to specific type of attack on confidentiality that 
can be mounted on RFID systems. Unlike in other attacks such as eavesdropping, man-
in-the-middle where the attack uses only one communication session a data leakage 
attack is mounted over a number of different communication sessions. In these attacks 
the attacker eavesdrops or intercepts the communications between the same tag and 
different readers over a number of different communications sessions and uses that data 
to fully or partially compromise the security of the system. To ensure full protection 
against these types of attacks the protocol must ensure that the messages used over 
multiple different sessions cannot be used to compromise the confidentiality of the data 
being communicated. In our protocol we ensure that when most data is communicated it 
is either as a hash or encrypted using a random number. This ensures that these 
communications cannot be used to mount data leakage attacks as it’s impossible to 
retrieve any usable information (partial or whole) from them. Additionally the only 
message which is not encrypted with a random number or hashed: the current IDS 
transmitted in the initialization phase, is updated using particularly complex update 
methods dating the key updating phase as follows:-  IDSnew = IDS + [(R2left || K1right) + 
(K2left||R2right)]. Therefore it is not possible for an attacker to intercept two consecutive 
broadcasts of the current IDS and use that to gain any valuable information. 
5.5.4 Security Comparison 
As the above analysis shows the proposed protocol not only supports a large number of 
the identified RFID security requirements but it is also secure against a large number of 
common attacks. Table 5.3 shows the comparison of the security properties of some 
common RFID security protocols with the proposed protocol. The table clearly shows 
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that the proposed protocol has much higher security than the other protocols previously 
proposed in literature.  
Table 5.3: Security comparison of some common RFID Protocols 
Ours Gossamer[62] SASI [58]  EMAP 
family [59-
61] 
Mutual 
Authentication 
protocol [65] 
Hash 
Based 
system 
[63]  
Mutual 
Authentication 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Key 
Confidentiality 
Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Key Integrity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Anonymity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Data 
Confidentiality 
Yes No No No No No 
Data Integrity Yes No No No No No 
Replay attacks Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Eavesdropping 
attacks 
Yes No No No No Yes 
Data leakage 
attacks 
Yes No No No No Yes 
De-sync attacks Yes No No No No Yes 
Man-in-the-
middle attacks 
Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Crypto Attacks Yes No No No No Yes 
Forward 
tracking 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Backward 
tracking 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Additionally our protocol is the only one that looks at securely transmitting tag data 
other then the identifier and related keys securely. With more and more systems moving 
to store additional data on the tag this functionality is very soon going to become a very 
important security requirement for any RFID system [17]. 
5.5.5 Potential Weaknesses 
As the security analysis carried out above illustrates the protocol proposed by us offer a 
large number of security functionality and is resistant to a large amount of common 
attacks on RFID systems. But there are still two weaknesses that may be of consequence 
in it. In this section we will discuss these weaknesses, analyse them in context of the 
attack environment and architecture of networked RFID systems and identify ways with 
which to minimize their impact on the overall system. 
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5.5.5.1 Limited Tag Tracking 
One of the main issues with networked RFID systems is the ability for attackers to track 
the tags and thereby invade the privacy of the tag holder [51]. While our proposal is 
immune to most forms of forward and backward tracking as well as tag tracing there is 
still a limited form of tracking that can be mounted on tags using our protocol. For one 
attackers can track tags between two authorised readings as the tag IDS and associated 
keys are only updated after each authorised communication. Fortunately the impact of 
this type of tracking is limited and the amount of information that can be derived from it 
is small. But an attacker can use blocking attacks to extend this attack and increase its 
impact and the amount of information gained. By blocking the last update message (M4
and M5) the attacker can keep the tag from updating its IDS and thereby indefinitely 
track its movements. To avoid this we suggest a simple mechanic as follows: the system 
can be made to track the number of authorised conversations after which a given tag 
does not update its IDS and K1 and K2 (based on the number of consecutive times the 
back-end database uses the old authorization data instead of the current authentication 
data). Then a tag can be tagged as potentially at risk after a certain threshold has been 
reached. Once the tag is tagged as "at risk" either the system can warn the operators and 
request that the tags at be manually updated or the tag could be automatically updated 
by running the update phase of the algorithm repeatedly till the tag does update. Either 
way the attack environment of RFID systems makes this type of attack extremely hard 
to mount: as explained in Section 5.2 most tag communications take place 
simultaneously with hundreds if not thousands of other tag communications over an 
open channel. Therefore selectively blocking the update signal for just 1 tag repeatedly 
for a large number of transmissions is next to impossible. In addition because the range 
of passive RFID tags are so limited it’s unavoidable that the tag will be quite frequently 
able to communicate with authorised readers in places where the attacker cannot gain 
access to the communication due to distance requirements. These two features of the 
attack environment make it so the possibility of this type of attack is minimal and not 
too high a threat.  
5.5.5.2 Jamming Attacks 
Another potential threat to our protocol is active and passive jamming which leads to 
denial of service [51]. Passive jamming carried out by flooding the channel with so 
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much interference that the communications cannot propagate through, cannot be 
prevented at protocol level. Fortunately this type of attack can be easily detected 
because all transmissions will be blocked. To handle this type of attack the system can 
use RFID tags and readers that use multiple different radio frequencies making it harder 
to attack the system. Increasing the amount of power used to generate the reader signals 
when interference is detected can also provide a certain amount of protection against 
this type of attack. Attackers can also try and mount active jamming attacks. These are 
normally mounted by flooding a specific tag with data requests overloading its capacity 
to respond to legitimate readers. This kind of attack is harder to detect. To prevent this 
type of attack we propose a lockout system whereby if any given reader does more than 
a set number of requests for any given time the tags will temporally stop responding or 
accepting data from that reader. While this will not completely stop the issue it will 
alleviate the impact such attacks have on the system. As future work we plan to further 
develop this idea and work on preventing active DoS jamming attacks on RFID 
systems. 
5.6 Performance Analysis and Comparison 
We will now analyse the proposed protocol performance based on a number of different 
performance metrics including storage cost, message cost and computational costs. 
5.6.1 Computational Cost  
All computationally expensive PRNG generation is carried out by the reader. Therefore, 
the protocol only requires the use of one-way hashing, which is a lot less 
computationally expensive than cryptographic hashing or keyed hashing, and simple 
bitwise operations on the tag side. Now while hashing is a bit more computationally 
expensive than the simple bitwise operations used in ultra lightweight protocols it can 
still be implemented in under 2K gates. As far back as 2004 one-way hash functions 
which require only 1.7K gates were developed [60, 77]. Because the current EPCGlobal 
standard RFID tags can have up to 3K gates dedicated for security implementation the 
use of simple one-way hash functions is possible on them. 
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5.6.2 Storage Requirements  
Each tag stores its EPC and one tuple consisting of (IDS, K1, K2).  All of these values 
will be on 96 bit length making it consistent with the EPCglobal numbering scheme. 
The EPC is static and therefore can be stored in the ROM area of the tag. IDS, K1 and 
K2 will be stored in the rewritable area as they need to be updated. Also the tag needs to 
remember at any given time a single random number of 96 bits. Therefore, the total 
storage capacity required for the protocol overheads (IDS, K1, K2 and temporary 
random number) is just 384 bits. Because most low cost tags nowadays have 
significantly more than that in memory this is not an issue.   
Table 5.4: Performance comparison of some common RFID Protocols 
  Ours Gossamer
[62] 
SASI [58]  EMAP 
family 
[59-61] 
Mutual 
Authentic
ation 
protocol 
[65] 
Hash 
Based 
system 
[63]  
Storage Tag 4L 7L 7L 6L 3L 3L 
Reader/ 
database 
7L 4L 4L 6L 5L 4L 
Messages  3.6L 4L 4L 4-5L 4L 5L 
 Hash or 
CRC 
Operations 
Tag  3 0 0 0 2 3 
Reader/ 
database 
3 0 0 0 2-3 3 
PRNG 
Operations 
Tag 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Reader/ 
database 
2 3 2 2 1 1 
Simple 
Bitwise 
Operations 
Tag  7 Around 70 
+ Mixbits 
operations  
18 19-22 3 0 
Reader/ 
database 
10 Around 70 
+ Mixbits 
operations  
18 21-25 3 0 
Operations Tag One-
way 
hash, 
XOR 
Addition 
mod 2m, 
XOR, Left 
Rotation 
and 
Mixbits 
Addition 
mod 2m, 
XOR, AND, 
OR, Left 
Rotation 
And, OR, 
XOR, 
addition 
mod 2m 
CRC, 
PRNG, 
XOR 
Hash, 
PRNG,  
Reader/ 
database 
PRNG, 
One-
way 
hash, 
XOR 
PRNG, 
Addition 
mod 2m, 
XOR, Left 
Rotation 
and 
Mixbits 
PRNG, 
Addition 
mod 2m, 
XOR, AND, 
OR, Left 
Rotation 
And, OR, 
XOR, 
addition 
mod 2m 
CRC, 
PRNG, 
XOR 
Hash, 
PRNG 
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5.6.3 Communication Cost  
The proposed protocol performs mutual authentication and updating using only 3.6L 
messages (where L is the key length) which is lower than what’s used by most other 
protocols. When carrying out the data transmission, the protocol at full security requires 
the overhead of 1.3L (for every data packet of 1L length transmitted a PRNG of 1L 
length and a hash of 0.3L are sent in addition to the data packet itself) for every L data 
sent. At lower security the protocol requires a flat 1L at the beginning and then an 
additional 0.3L (hash) for every L data sent. 
As is illustrated in Table 5.4, our protocol compares very well with other RFID 
security protocols. In areas of storage space and number of messages our protocol 
requires equal or less space and messages for the authentication of the tags and readers. 
Our scheme does not require PRNG or keyed or cryptographic hashing on tag side, and 
therefore is less resource intensive than the mutual authentication protocol and the hash 
based scheme. Our scheme uses one-way hashing on the tag side compared to the ultra-
light-weight protocols but requires significantly less bitwise operations (2 hashes and 6 
XOR operations on tag for our scheme compared to the 40+ bitwise operations, 14 
Rotation operations and the proprietary iterative mix bits algorithm for the Gossamer 
protocol). Also unlike some other protocols which use cryptographic or keyed hash 
algorithms we employ a simple one-way hash which requires significantly less power 
and resources. 
5.7 Summary 
Development of security protocols for RFID systems poses two main challenges (1) 
Developing protocols that can support the large number of different security 
functionality required by networked RFID systems and are resistant to the large number 
of different attacks possible on them [119] and (2) Ensuring that their computing 
requirements are low enough that they can be implemented on low cost RFID tags with 
highly constrained computing and power resources. Most security protocols employing 
traditional cryptographic methods such as encryption algorithms, CRC, tag side PRNG 
and keyed and encryption hashes fail on the second count. Solutions employing only 
bitwise operations have so far failed to remain secure for any significant time span with 
most of them being compromised within a few months of being published.  
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Therefore, we propose and develop a hybrid security protocol which uses a mix of 
traditional cryptographic primitives (one-way hashing and reader side PRNG) and ultra-
light-weight techniques (XOR operations) to develop a highly secure RFID security 
protocol which still remains light-weight enough to be implemented on EPCGlobal 
Class-1 Generation-2 tags. The detailed security analysis carried out and presented 
prove that the proposed protocol implements a large number of networked RFID 
security requirements including the confidentiality and integrity of all data being 
communicated as well as providing reliable mutual authentication and anonymity. The 
analysis also shows that the protocol is resistant to most of the identified attacks 
possible on networked RFID systems including but not limited to DoS attacks, replay 
attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and de-sync attacks and forward and backward 
tracking. Also to the best of our knowledge it is the first and only RFID security 
protocol to look at the secure transmission of tag data other than the EPC and associated 
pseudonyms and keys. In addition the performance analysis and comparison show that 
the computing and memory requirements of the proposed protocol are well within 
what’s available on the current EPCGlobal Class-1 Generation-2 tags. It also shows that 
the proposed protocol’s performance compares very favourably with the performance of 
a number of other recently proposed security protocols for RFID.  
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Chapter 6  
RFID Malware Detection
In this chapter we propose a policy based, dual pronged detection and prevention 
method for tag based malware attacks on RFID systems. Our system is optimized for 
the architecture of RFID systems and consists of a query structure matching method that 
uses simple string comparisons. It provides strong security against a majority of the 
SQLIA types possible on RFID systems. Because all currently identified RFID tag 
malware is based on SQLIA this system provides security against all known RFID 
malware. Our research also looks at detecting and preventing tag based second order 
SQLIA which is a major gap currently in the literature in this area. To provide security 
against this type of SQLIA, the only attack type that the query pattern matching cannot 
detect, we include a fairly straightforward input data validation and sanitization 
technique. The preliminary evaluation of our query matching technique is very 
promising, showing 100% detection rates and 0% false positives while employing a 
comparisons technique which is much simpler than the ones used by most existing 
approaches. We have also justified how input validation and sanitization is very 
possible in the specific architecture of RFID systems even though they are not a 
practical solution for web based applications. Therefore the research contributions of 
this chapter are (1) Review of tag based RFID malware and analysis of their differences 
to traditional SQLIA attacks, (2) Creation of a policy based RFID malware detection 
and prevention system (3) Analysis of the proposed technique to illustrate that the 
security it provides is equal or greater to existing methods while using a simpler 
approach.  
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6.1 Introduction 
One major security concern for RFID systems is their recently identified vulnerability to 
tag based malware. In [111, 112] the authors first identified the possibility of RFID 
based malware attacks. In [26] the vulnerability of RFID systems to SQLIA were 
proven and the authors demonstrated how a fully functional RFID virus can be used to 
infect and spread via SQLIA. These papers not only highlighted the possibility of 
SQLIA attacks compromising RFID systems but also illustrated how the specific 
architecture of RFID systems makes RFID malware a possibility. These RFID malware 
spread by infecting new tags and databases just like normal computer viruses, but unlike 
normal viruses they use SQLIA as their attack vector. The nature of RFID systems 
means that if a RFID network was infected with such a virus it would spread rapidly. In 
a global supply chain application the virus would spread to hundreds of thousands of 
tags and hundreds of different systems very quickly. Currently all of the more complex 
identified types of RFID malware are based on SQLIA [120]. And therefore if we can 
successfully defend against tag based SQLIA then we can defend against a majority of 
RFID malware. SQLIA refers to a specific type of malicious attack in which the data 
provided by the user (or stored on the RFID tag) is integrated into a SQL query so as to 
make that input be treated as part of the code rather than part of the input. Successful 
SQLIA can have a range of detrimental impacts on the overall system including but not 
limited to: allowing attackers to corrupt the information stored in the backend database, 
compromise confidential information or in RFID systems act like a virus and propagate 
from one infected tag to backend databases and from there to new tags [121]. Even 
though SQLIA has been a major issue for web based systems for a number of years the 
possibility of them impacting RFID systems was not considered till recently.  
While the vulnerability that lead to SQLIA are well understood, they still persist 
because there are no effective techniques for detecting and preventing them [92]. A 
number of different techniques have been proposed for SQLIA detection and prevention 
in web applications, but none of them have been completely effective. In addition the 
differences in the architecture of web applications and RFID systems mean that most of 
the approaches proposed for web systems do not work with RFID systems [78]. The 
lack of any research in detecting RFID tag based SQLIA and the drop in updatable 
RFID tag prices have compounded the issue of tag based RFID malware. The increase 
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in storage capacity of said tags have motivated users to store more and more data on the 
tag itself for ease of access [32]. This in turn has increased the ability that attackers have 
of leveraging those tags to try and mount SQLIA based malware attacks on RFID 
systems thereby increasing the potential threat they pose. Hence removing the 
vulnerability of RFID systems to SQLIA and therefore malware is currently a very high 
priority.  
The method we proposed is based on existing SQLIA detection techniques but 
modified and optimized for RFID systems based on three key features they exhibit. (1) 
RFID tag data is highly structured and the dynamically generated SQL queries are built 
by a single point in the middleware [122]. Therefore intercepting, validating and 
sanitizing that data is much easier compared to doing it in web based systems. (2) All 
dynamic queries have a structure that is defined by the programmer, and SQLIA, by 
injecting additional SQL code would change the structure of the generated query from 
the legal structure defined for that query by the programmer. (3) Networked RFID 
systems require very high tag read through-put which require that the SQLIA defence 
mechanism be as simple and efficient as possible. 
The proposed technique is a dual pronged defence mechanism for protecting RFID 
systems from tag-based SQLIA and is based around policies set by the system 
developer. Our methods consists of (1) Validation and sanitization of RFID based data 
to ensure that no “bad” data is used in generating dynamic queries and (2) Matching the 
structure of those dynamic queries with the legal structure as defined by the 
programmers using simple string comparison. Each mechanism consists of two phases. 
First, a static analysis phase to identify the formatting and content policies for the data 
stored on the RFID tags and to identify the legal query structures for dynamic queries. 
Second, a dynamic runtime monitoring phase during which the data is validated and 
sanitized according to the policies developed and the structure of the dynamic queries is 
matched with the legal structure defined from those queries. In this paper we also 
present the results of the evaluation which were promising with the system giving a 
100% detection rate from the tested attacks and a 0% false positive rate over around 170 
attacks and 130 non malicious queries. 
Therefore the main contributions of the work presented in this chapter are: (1) 
analysis of tag based malware in RFID systems and the identification of key 
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requirements of any defence techniques, (2) Review of current SQLIA prevention 
techniques and identification of their weaknesses in relation to RFID networks, (3) 
Creation of a SQLIA defence mechanism for networked RFID systems that meets the 
requirements of RFID systems and (4) Evaluation of the proposed system to quantify its 
success rate. 
6.2 SQL Injection Attacks 
Before we describe our proposed defence system will first introduce SQLIA’s. We will 
then look at how SQLIA are mounted on RFID systems and then analyse the 
mechanism behind tag based RFID malware. We will also analyse the main differences 
in web based SQLIA and RFID based SQLIA and discuss how those differences affect 
any proposed mechanisms for RFID malware prevention. 
6.2.1 Definition of SQLIA 
An SQLIA occurs when an attacker successfully changes the logic, semantics or syntax 
of a legitimate SQL query by inserting additional SQL keywords and operators into it in 
such a manner as to make the changed query compromise the security of the database in 
some manner when executed [123]. This definition includes all types of SQLIA 
included in including but not limited to tautologies, stored procedures, piggy backed 
queries, union attacks and attacks by errors. 
Most current IT systems employ databases which use SQL as the main query 
language. To allow the use of these databases’ to the maximum most systems allow the 
users to input various parameters that are then used as part of an automatically 
generated SQL query. These queries are then forwarded to the database and the system 
carries out various processes based on the outcome of that query. SQL injection attacks 
(SQLIA) are a unique form of malware that depends on injecting malicious SQL code 
into normal SQL queries and therefore the database. Imagine a web page which takes in 
a user name and password and displays the users profile information. Once the user 
inputs a user name and password and clicks the submit button the page will run a script 
that dynamically generates a SQL query which contains both the user name and the 
password input by the user. The auto generated SQL command will be something like 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE login = ‘usrnme’ AND password = ‘pswd’; 
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Where usrnme is the username input by the user and pswd is the password input by the 
user. Now imagine the attacker inputs “hsf’ or 1=1 –“ as username and “gshg” into the 
web fields. Then the resulting query is: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE login = ‘hsf’ or 1=1 --‘ AND password = ‘gshg’; 
Once this query has been generated it will be sent to the database for evaluation. The 
database will interpret everything after the WHERE keyword as a conditional clause 
and everything after – would be ignored as a comment. Because the “or 1=1” part of the 
query is always true its inclusion into conditional clause causes the statement to always 
evaluate to true. Therefore on receiving the above query the database would return all 
details of all users to the attacker after executing this query. This is just one simple 
example of the wide range of possible attacks possible via SQLIA. For full details refer 
to [80]. 
6.2.2 Malware in RFID Systems 
RFID malware are malicious code that stored on RFID tags that can propagate to the 
back end database and other tags. When executed the malware has a detrimental effect 
on the overall system. Figure 6.1 shows a typical RFID system and illustrates how 
RFID malware can be used to infect the system via SQLIA using tags for the malicious 
data input. 
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Figure 6.1: Tag based malware in RFID systems 
RFID tags store data that is read by readers. This data is then forwarded by the readers 
to the middleware. The middleware uses the received data to build dynamic RFID 
queries (queries which have the tag data embedded into them). These queries are then 
forwarded onto the database. These dynamically generated queries can either retrieve 
data from the database or update the existing data. Any results of the queries are sent 
back to the middleware but they are not forwarded to the tags. When queried by 
business applications the middleware retrieves the information as required from the 
database and forwards in to the business applications.  
When an attacker wants to mount an SQLIA on this system he saves the malicious 
data on the tag itself. This can be done by either physically updating the systems tags or 
by remotely updating the system tags. In addition the attacker may also try and 
introduce completely new tags which contain malicious data into the system. Then 
when a reader polls a tag containing the attacker’s data it will read and forward that 
malicious data to the middleware. The middleware will in turn then use that data to 
build dynamic SQL queries (queries which are built at runtime based on the data which 
is received from the tags) which are malicious and forward them to the database for 
execution [111]. These queries will command the database to carryout processes which 
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compromise it or the data stored in it. In addition properly written data will act as an 
RFID virus and propagate to the database. Later on additional tags may be updated with 
the corrupted data stored in the database. If the malicious data is written correctly this 
will cause the recently updated tag to also become infected and it will in turn go on to 
infect and compromise other system’s middleware and databases. This kind of RFID 
SQLIA malware can propagate and infect a large number of tags and databases 
compromising them all [79]. 
6.2.3 Web Based SQLIA vs. RFID Based SQLIA 
Because of the architecture differences in web and RFID systems attacking an RFID 
based system with a SQLIA is a lot more difficult proposition that attacking a web 
based system. In web based systems, because the dynamic SQL generation is carried out 
on the user machine, the data needs to be validated on the user’s machine. Moreover 
there can be very large number of constantly changing and expanding input sources for 
parameters in the form of interactive web pages. These web sites and pages can be built 
and maintained by external companies who are not as concerned about the security of 
the third party database they are accessing as the owner of said database is. This makes 
it extremely difficult to ensure the proper validation of all inputs possible in to the 
system [80]. But in RFID systems data is received only from RFID tags and the 
dynamic queries are generated at a single point in the RFID middleware. Therefore 
proper validation can be carried out by a single point in the middleware as well. In 
addition unlike in web applications where the input can vary considerable the data 
received from RFID tags have a much more limited scope [122]. Hence setting up data 
standards and checking for those are also significantly easier in RFID systems. 
Consequently input validation and sanitization is much easier in RFID systems 
compared to web based systems. But RFID data validation has its challenges as well. 
One main difference in web data and RFID data is that web data is normally input as 
discrete blocks with each data field being input separately. But in RFID tags the data is 
stored as one contiguous block and it is up to the middleware to actually identify each 
field and separate the data block into its component field. Therefore decisions on how 
the data will be stored on the tag and what formatting standards will be used have to be 
made and enforced if RFID malware is to be successfully defended against [2].  
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Another key feature of RFID systems is the limited number of data stored on the 
tag and the limited access given to the tag [55]. In web based systems the web clients 
may have full administrator access and be able to input a vast number of different 
parameters for query generation. This allows the setting of very strict data standards in 
RFID systems as the type, size and amount of data expected from each tag is known in 
advance. This along with the single generation point for dynamic queries makes it much 
easier to validate and sanitize input data coming from the RFID tags relative to input 
data from web based systems. In addition the numbers of different types of SQL queries 
that are automatically generated by the middleware are also much lower than the 
number of different queries generated in a web/application based system [78]. Because 
of the limited number of queries and the fact that all those queries are set by the 
company itself and not outside companies makes the number of valid structures possible 
for the dynamically generated queries very low and easy to track.  
Table 6.1: Differences in web based SQLIA and RFID SQLIA 
 Web-based Systems RFID Systems 
Query generation 
location 
External (at clients computer) Internal (in middleware) 
Number of origin 
points for generated 
queries 
Very large (large number of different 
web pages and web sites) 
Single (only the middleware) 
Number of different 
valid query 
structures based on 
input 
Large and constantly changing Small and fixed 
Input output 
capabilities of attack 
origin 
The web browser is both a input and 
output device letting the user input 
parameters and then view the results 
of the generated queries  
The tags are treated as simple data 
containers. They hold data that can 
only be updated by the readers of 
the system. They cannot request 
for data and they do not receive 
any feedback 
Data formatting and 
standards 
Hard to set due to large number of 
different input points and input values 
possible 
Can be easily set as tags contents 
are known well in advance 
Number of possible 
inputs for query 
generation 
Very large and constantly increasing 
as more and more web pages and web 
sites are created which query the 
database 
Small and known in advance 
Access to query 
structures by 
attacker 
Accessible as the query generation 
scripts must be sent to the attackers 
web browser 
Not accessible by attacker as all 
query generation is done by 
middleware 
Finally the RFID tags are treated as simple data containers as opposed to the web pages 
in web based systems which are treated as input output devices. This means the tags can 
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only provide raw data not queries. They also cannot perform or request for any other 
processes or data. Also RFID tags origins do not receive data based on queries sent and 
cannot retrieve data. The data upgrades are done by the middleware in its own choosing 
[120]. Additionally, unlike in the web based systems where the queries are generated on 
an external client machine the dynamic queries in RFID are all generated by internal 
servers. Therefore it is not possible for potential attackers to gain access to the query 
structures beforehand making it much more difficult for them to create the data they 
must inject for successful SQLIA. 
Table 6.2: Types of SQLIA 
Type  Notes 
Tautologies Applicable While tautologies are most commonly used to extract data 
they can also be used to bypass filters in UPDATE queries 
and overwrite a whole column of data rather than just a 
single cell 
Illegal/logically 
Incorrect queries 
N/A These attacks require the attacker to receive feedback based 
error message generated by the incorrect query. Because the 
attacker cannot gain feedback in RFID systems this type of 
attack is useless  
Union query Applicable Even though union queries are mainly used to either retrieve 
data from additional tables or to try and bypass 
authentication mechanisms they can still be injected into 
update or insert commands to corrupt those queries or can be 
injected to make the middleware retrieve wrong information 
based on tag data.  
Piggy backed 
queries 
Applicable Piggy backing a query (inserting another full query along 
with the original query) is possible in RFID systems 
Stored procedures N/A If stored procedures are used attackers can use SQLIA to 
execute remote commands in RFID systems using them. 
Stored procedures are used in web applications to stop the 
client machines from receiving the SQL query details. In 
RFID systems this is not required as the queries are all 
generated internally. 
Inference (blind 
injection, timing 
attacks) 
N/A These attacks require the attacker to receive feedback based 
on the incorrect query. Because in RFID systems this does 
not happen these attacks are useless against them 
Alternate encodings Applicable In this case the attackers mount one of the above attacks but 
encode the injected strings in such a way as to bypass most 
defensive coding mechanisms in place such as data 
validation and sanitization. They use mechanics such as the 
char() function and UNHEX() function to input the string 
and it is then converted by the DB into malicious data during 
execution. 
Second order 
injection 
Applicable In these attacks the attacker stores data in the database that 
compromises the system when it’s later retrieved and used 
by other applications. The injected malicious data do not 
affect the DB and is treated and stored by the database as 
normal string inputs. 
Commenting queries Applicable Here the attacker uses a comment symbol in the input to 
truncate the SQL query and make only part of it execute. 
Only possible for queries which take two user inputs. 
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Table 6.1 highlights the major architecture differences of web based systems and RFID 
systems. These differences in architecture mean that some types of SQLIA’s cannot be 
mounted on RFID systems. Hence while there are 9 different types of SQLIA that can 
be mounted on web based systems [80] only 6 can be mounted on RFID systems. The 
reasons for this are explained in Table 6.2. This is mainly because RFID tags do not 
receive results or error messages and therefore attacks based on receiving feedback from 
the system in response to the SQLIA are ineffectual on RFID systems. Overall it is 
much more difficult to mount SQLIA attacks on RFID systems and therefore protecting 
against them become much easier for RFID systems as well.  
6.3 Policy Based RFID Malware Detection and 
Prevention 
In this section we propose a simple yet effective policy based two pronged system for 
the detection and prevention of RFID based SQLIA. The method we proposed is based 
on existing SQLIA detection techniques which have been proposed for use in web based 
systems.  But we have modified and optimized those approaches significantly so that 
they are better suited for use in RFID systems. We have done these modifications and 
optimizations based on two key features that differentiate web systems from RFID 
systems.  
1. RFID tag data is highly structured and of lower volume compared web based inputs 
and the dynamically generated therefore intercepting, validating and sanitizing that 
data is much easier compared to doing it in web based systems.  
2. SQL queries are built by a single point in the middleware compared to web systems 
where they are generated on external client machines. Additionally the number of 
different types of dynamic queries is much less in RFID systems compared to web 
systems. 
We describe the proposed approach as ͆policy based͇ because it requires that the 
developers set a number of policies concerning the valid tag inputs and legal query. In 
the following section we will describe the proposed approach in detail. 
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6.3.1 Approach Overview 
The proposed system (Figure 6.2) compromises of two different techniques: RFID tag 
data cleaning and query pattern matching. Each technique has two main phases: static 
analysis phase and runtime monitoring phase.  
The first technique creates data validation and sanitization policies during static 
analysis and enforces those policies during runtime monitoring. This ensures that only 
“clean” data is used in generating dynamic queries. The second technique is a SQL 
query pattern matching system based on simple string comparison methods. This 
technique requires that the programmers define policies concerning the legal query 
structures of the allowed queries during static analysis. The structure of the dynamically 
generated queries are then matched and validated, during runtime, against the legal 
query structures defined in the policies.  
Figure 6.2: Policy based RFID malware detection and prevention 
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6.3.1.1 RFID Tag Data Cleaning 
SQLIAs depend on inputting data in unexpected or unusual formations and structures to 
be successful. Therefore the root cause of SQLIA is insufficient input cleaning [80].  To 
ensure full RFID tag data cleaning we employ two different processes: validation and 
sanitization. Validation ensures that the data received from the external source adheres 
to pre-defined set of standards. Sanitization ensures that the data does not contain any 
“bad” data such as special characters or key words that have specific meaning to the 
system.  
Data validation and sanitization has been dismissed as being unsuitable for securing 
web systems. But key differences in the architecture of web systems and RFID systems 
make it a very good option for securing RFID systems as long as care is taken to ensure 
that the data validation system has been properly modified to suit RFID system 
architecture. Additionally, because data validation and sanitization uses simple string 
comparison techniques their overhead is minimal ensuring high throughput and 
scalability. There are two distinct phases/steps to RFID tag data cleaning. 
1. Setting validation and sanitization policies – This is carried out by a person with 
knowledge of both the contents of the tag and the DBMS used by the system. It is 
carried out during static analysis. This includes setting policies on tag data details 
such as length, type and formatting of the data. Policies also need to be set on illegal 
keywords and characters for each data field. 
2. Tag data validation and sanitization – This is done automatically by the system 
during runtime monitoring by identifying inputs that do not match the validation and 
sanitization policies. 
6.3.1.2 SQL Query Pattern Matching 
While data validation and sanitization is one of the simplest and most effective 
countermeasures to SQLIA there are methods with which it can be bypassed [80]. By 
using alternate encoding mechanisms as well more complex SQLIA, attackers can 
bypass the data validation and sanitization. To ensure security against these types of 
attacks we propose a second security mechanism. This approach takes into account the 
structure of legal SQL queries for the system and compares it to the structure of the 
queries dynamically generated using RFID data. Our query pattern matching 
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mechanism takes advantage of the fact that SQL injection changes the structure of the 
query to identify potential SQLIA and prevent them from being sent to the database. 
The proposed approach is a simple query pattern matching technique which 
employs string comparisons and is sufficient for protecting RFID systems. It is also 
easy to develop as most systems already include simple string comparison functionality. 
Evaluation shows that it provides stronger or equivalent protection to what is offered by 
other query pattern matching systems which use more complex comparison methods 
such as [86, 89, 90] when implemented in the specific architecture present in RFID 
systems. The simplicity of the technique is possible because the query generation is 
done on the middleware which has access to the parse function calls of the database and 
not on external web pages run on client machines. The query pattern matching approach 
technique consists of two steps: 
1. Defining legal query structure policies – done during the static analysis phase, this 
consists of giving each different query a unique identifier and defining their query 
structure in a format available and understandable by the middleware. This process is 
explained in detail in Section 5. In our technique this is manually done by the 
developer who codes the dynamic query generation code.  
2. Query structure matching – this consists of extracting the structure of dynamically 
generated queries by parsing (but not executing it) and seeing if it matches the legal 
query structure for that type of query as defined in the legal query structure policies 
6.3.2 Static Analysis 
During static analysis the first task is the creation of the validation policies which 
contain rules about the structure of tag data. For this, first data must be stored as 
separate values rather than one long contiguous block on the RFID tags. This can be 
done by first identifying all data fields that will be stored on the tag and by ensuring that 
each field has a specific use. Then a method with which to identify each field needs to 
be developed. This can be done by giving each field a unique identifier, whether it is a 
number or name. E.G:- ID, Product Name, etc. Next key data features that can be used 
for validation of must be identified. Normally this is features such as data-type, max 
length, min length etc. Finally the values for each of the data features must be identified 
for each field and stored in a form which is available to the middleware. This is 
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information such as data-type, format, max length and min length of each data field. 
Table 6.3 shows an example of a validation policy table for a simple system. 
Table 6.3: Example validation policy table 
Field 
ID 
Name Type Max 
length 
Min 
length 
Structure Min 
value 
Max 
value 
1 Name Alphabetic 30 5 String N/A N/A 
2 Manufacture date Date 10 10 --/--/---- 01/01
/2000 
Curre
nt 
date 
3 Batch number Numeric 10 10 ___-___-____ 000-
000-
0000 
999-
999-
9999 
4 Price Numeric 8 4 Number 0 1000 
5 Delivery Address Alphanumeric 30 30 String N/A N/A 

Next the data sanitization policies must be set (Figure 6.3). As we have already 
identified and named/numbered all possible fields that will be stored on the tag, now we 
must create the sanitization rules for each of those fields.   
  
Figure 6.3: Sanitization data creation 
There are two main requirements to fully sanitize data. Data must be clean of illegal 
specials characters (=, *, ; “ etc) and data must be clean of any illegal keywords, tokens 
or function names. (Keywords and tokens are defined here as strings or parts of string 
that have specific meaning to either the DBMS or other software that use data from the 
database).  
144 
Table 6.4: Example sanitization policy table 
Field 
ID 
Name Type Characters 
not 
allowed 
Character 
instances 
not allowed 
Keywords 
not 
allowed 
Keyword 
instances 
not 
allowed 
1 Name Alphabetic YES / : * = - . ( ) 
! > < ; 
YES IF, OR, 
SHUT, 
NULL 
2 Manufacture date Date YES : * = . ( ) ! < 
> ; 
N/A N/A 
3 Batch number Numeric YES / : * = . ( ) ! 
< > ; 
N/A N/A 
4 Price Numeric YES / : * = - ( ) ! 
< > ; 
N/A N/A 
5 Delivery Address Alphanumeric YES : * = - ( ) ! < 
> ; 
YES IF, OR, 
SHUT, 
NULL 
To do this for each identified field first analyse if any special characters are not allowed 
to be contained in that field. If so decide which characters are not allowed and store 
them in form available to the middleware. Next for each identified field identify if any 
keywords are not allowed in that field. If yes decide which “bad” data (key words, 
special characters and reserve words etc) are not allowed and store them as the 
sanitization data which is available to the middleware. Table 6.4 shows an example 
sanitization policy table. To ensure continual strengthen of the data cleaning policies we 
recommend that the static analyses phase be an ongoing process with the rules being 
constantly updated as new functionality and programs that access the database are added 
to the overall system. 
Finally the legal query structure policies must be created for each query that can be 
generated by the middleware. For this, first, all possible query types that incorporate 
RFID tag data and are dynamically generated by the middleware need to be identified 
and given a unique identifier. Then, the final syntax for each identified query must be 
defined and the legal query structure must be created (further explained in Section 
6.3.4). RFID systems have relatively little dynamically generated queries containing tag 
input compared to web systems. Additionally all the queries are developed internally by 
the company who develops and runs the middleware and database. Therefore, we 
recommend that the programmer who develops the query generation software also 
define the legal query structure for each query manually. This has the twin advantages 
of minimizing the coding required and ensuring the correctness of the developed query 
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models without fear of over compensation inherent in models developed by automated 
systems.  
6.3.3 Runtime Monitoring 
Once all required policies have been identified during the static phase the system enters 
the run time monitoring phase. During this phase the system reads data from the tags. 
When data is retrieved from the RFID tags it arrives at the middleware as a single 
stream of tag data (TD). Before the middleware can apply the validation and sanitization 
policies it must first identify and separate each individual field (tdi where i = 1 to n) in 
the stream. The field identifier (i) is then used to extract the validation policies (tdiFF) 
for that field from storage. Then for each individual field of data (Tdi) the data feature 
values such as max length, min length and data-type (tdivj) must be extracted by 
analysing the separated data fields. Then those extracted feature values must be matched 
against the values stored in the validation data (tdiffj) to see if adheres to the proper data 
standard. If the values match the policies, then the data is passed on for sanitization else 
it’s rejected and the tag is identified as being malicious in the malicious tag details. 
Algorithm 1: RFID tag data cleaning algorithm 
INPUT: TD, tdiFF, tdiC, tdiK 
OUTPUT: Validated and sanitized RFID tag data 
BEGIN RFID tag data cleaning
1. Receive tag data (TD) from a reader 
2. Split TD into the separate fields  (tdi,…,tdn) 
3. FOR EACH (tdi where i = 1 to n) DO
4.         Identify the data field using i 
5.         Retrieve the feature values tdiFF = [tdiff1,…, tdiffm] for tdi 
6.         FOR EACH (tdiffj where j = 1 to m) DO
7.                Extract the corresponding values tdivj from tdi
8.                IF (tdivj is not consistent with tdiffj) THEN
9.                        Reject data 
10.                        Mark that tag as suspicious 
11.                ENDIF 
12.          ENDFOR 
13.          Retrieve the illegal keyword data tdiK for tdi
14.                IF (any keywords in tdiK exist in tdi) THEN
15.                         Reject data 
16.                         Mark that tag as suspicious
17.                ENDIF 
18.          Forward to SQL query engine 
19.    ENDFOR 
END RFID tag data cleaning
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
TD     - Tag data as a BLOCK 
Tdi      - Tag data (TD) divided into n different fields with each field identified by i 
tdiFF   - The feature values (max length, data type etc) set for the tag data field tdi  
tdiffj    - The allowed value of feature j for tag data field i 
tdivj     - The actual value of feature j for tag data field i 
tdiK     - The illegal keywords/characters for tag field i 

Then the system needs to sanitize that data to ensure that it does not contain known 
“bad” data as defined by the sanitization policies. The sanitization function checks the 
data for illegal keywords/characters in the inputs as defined by the sanitization policies. 
To do this it takes the validated data (tdi where i = 1 to n) and retrieves the 
corresponding illegal keyword/character data (tdiK) for that field from the sanitization 
data. It then analyses tdi to see if any illegal tokens/keywords are included in that data. 
If any illegal tokens/keywords exist that data is rejected and the tag is marked as 
malicious. If it passes sanitization tdi is handed over to the query generation system. 
Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm for data cleaning based on preset policies. 
The next step during runtime is comparing the structure of the dynamically 
generated queries with the structures in the legal query structure policies. To do this the 
query matching modules must first receive a generated query (GQ) and the associated 
identifier (ID) from the query generation module. When the query is received the 
module calls the parse function of the DBMS and inputs GQ as a parameter. The DBMS 
parses that query (but does not execute it) and returns the resulting parsed query (GQp) 
back to the query matching module. The module then uses GQp to generate the actual 
query structure (QSa) of GQ. Then the module uses ID to retrieve the legal query 
structure policies QSl corresponding to GQ. Finally it compares QSl with QSa. If the 
two does not match the query is identified as a SQLIA and rejected. Otherwise it’s 
forwarded to the database for execution. The algorithm for this process is presented in 
Algorithm 2. 
GQ    – Dynamically generated query 
ID      - Unique identifier that associates GQ with the legal query pattern 
GQp   – GQ after is has been parsed by the database 
QSa    – Actual query structure of GQ as extracted from GQp
QSl     – Legal query structure for GQ as defined by developer 
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Algorithm 2: Query structure matching algorithm 
INPUT: GQ, ID, QSl
OUTPUT: validated QS 
BEGIN Query structure matching
1. Receive GQ and corresponding ID from middleware 
2. Submit GQ to a parse function of the DBMS 
3. Receive GQp as output of parse function 
4. Generate QSa by removing literals from the parsed query GQp
5. Use ID to retrieve QSl from storage 
6. IF (QSl != QSa) THEN
7.         Reject query 
8. ELSE  
9.         Submit query to DBMS for execution 
10. ENDIF 
END Query structure matching 
6.3.4 Query Structure Format and Matching 
In developing a query structure format we used the concept of tokens to decompose the 
query into its different constituent parts. We then use those tokens to develop a string 
based query structure for any given SQL query which indicates the logical structure of 
the query but removes any user inputs. Our technique is based on two important features 
in RFID dynamic queries:- 
• The same type of query generated in a dynamic manner using tag data in an RFID 
system will differ only in the user input values in the query. 
• The input from the tag will not change the overall logic and structure of the resulting 
dynamic queries. In other words the user input from the tag is not meant to have any 
SQL statements or sub statements. 
Also unlike a lot of other similar systems which converts the tag structure into a XML 
document for analysis [124], or employ complex parse trees and compare them [90, 91], 
or build finite automata for comparison purposes [89, 125] we build string structures 
and use a simple string comparison to match the structure of the dynamically generated 
query with the valid query structure policies that were defined by the developer. 
6.3.4.1 Query Tokenization 
In our query matching approach tokens are defined as individual string parts and can be 
one of five main types: Keywords, Symbols/Operators, Identifiers, Literals and 
Comments. 
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• Keywords: these are words that have specific meaning to the DMBS (SELECT, 
FROM, INSERT, WHERE and predefined functions such as AVG(), SUM(), 
CONCAT()) 
• Symbols/operators: these are either single or compound symbols that have a specific 
meaning to the DBMS (+, =, ‘,;, etc) 
• Identifiers: these are words that identify specific database components (table names, 
column names and user defined variables) 
• Literal: These are bits of code that indicate the literal value of an item (e.g.:- scott, 
23.56, 12/07/1982). In our system variables are also considered literals as the 
variable itself will be replaced by a literal value when the query is dynamically 
generated by the middleware. 
• Comments: extra code that do not have any meaning to the database and is therefore 
ignored.  
The first three types of tokens are important for the logic and structure of the query the 
third is only user input which has no effect on either the logic or the structure of the 
query while the last is used by the programmers to makes notes for future use and have 
no effect what so ever on the actual query. Legitimate RFID tags are not meant to 
contain any of the first three types of tokens or comments and only contain actual 
values, or in other words the literals contained in the query. Keeping this in mind we 
begin developing SQL query structures as follow: The first step in creating the SQL 
query structures is to break the query down into its component string compromising of 
words and symbols and identify the type of each token each substring is. 
6.3.4.2 Query Structure Policy Generation 
Imagine a system which takes as input the tag ID and the product it’s attached to as 
input from the tag and saves that data to a database table. The resulting query for this 
process is as follows: 
INSERT INTO product (tag_id, product_name) VALUES (‘tagid’, ‘productname’); 
In the above query ‘tagid’ and ‘productname’ are string variables which are read in from 
the RFID tag. The tokenized version of the above query, with each bit string separated 
and identified, would be: 
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Light blue – keywords 
Orange – identifiers 
Green – operators/symbol 
Yellow – literals 
Figure 6.4: Tokenized query 
Now if we strip the literals (the red background)  and replace them with “?” as a marker 
and remove comments from the query we get the common query structure for all 
dynamic queries generated for inputting product details into the product table based on 
tag input which is as follows: 


Figure 6.5: Tokenized query with literals removed 
By replacing the literals with “?” we ensure that the structure does not take into account 
the changing values for each different query, allowing the tag input to change as 
required. By keeping the first three types of tokens we ensure that the structure contains 
all the data concerning the query logic and structure, allowing for the logic of the 
dynamic queries to be validated. We discard the comments as they play no part in the 
query and are not used by the database. Once the query structure is identified, by 
stripping all the literals and comments, it is then converted into all lowercase (as SQL is 
case insensitive) and saved as a string along with the unique identifier for that particular 
query type. In the same manner the query structure for all dynamically generated 
queries must be identified and analysed. An example for a legal query structure policy 
table can be found in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Legal query structure table 
Query Identifier Query Structure STRING policy 
1 insert into product (tag_id, product_name) values(?,?); 
2 select * from product where tag_id = ?; 
6.3.4.3 Runtime Query Matching 
During runtime the query structure matching module receives, from the dynamic query 
building module, the generated query and the query identifier which indicates which 
query pattern policy it should match. At this point the module first parses the received 
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query and uses the resulting parse information to strip it of any literal values and replace 
them with “?”. It then uses the received ID to retrieve the legal query structure string for 
the received query and compares it with the query structure string it generated. If the 
two match the query is validated and sent to the database for execution if not it's 
identified as containing a SQLIA and discarded.  
Our technique uses a much simpler method of comparison compared to the methods 
used by other techniques such as parse trees, XML documents or finite. Most systems 
and programming languages have built in string comparison and manipulation controls 
which make implementing this kind of comparison easier than the more complex 
custom types. Additionally string comparison is also a much quicker and less resource 
intensive comparison method compared to the other more complex methods used. 
6.4 Security Evaluation 
The goal of the evaluation presented in this section is to test the effectiveness of the 
approach presented in this chapter. Because the strength of the security afforded by the 
data cleaning is directly tied to the completeness and strength of the data cleaning 
policies we will discuss the additional security afforded by it. Additionally we will also 
present the results of the testing of the query structure matching mechanism. 
6.4.1 RFID Tag Data Cleaning 
Input validation is one of the simplest and most effective ways of preventing the simpler 
types SQLIA [80]. Unfortunately, because the security it affords depend on the strength 
of the data cleaning rules most data checking/cleaning techniques fail, not due to a flaw 
in its concept but due to weaknesses or incompleteness in the rules developed for them 
or due to incompatibilities between them the architecture of the system they are 
implemented in [80]. We have already analysed the architecture of RFID systems and 
determined that it’s suited for input validation techniques as a security measure against 
tag based SQLIA in Section 6.2.3. To minimize the possibility of weak or incomplete 
data cleaning policies we have set up a strict policy generation methodology (explained 
in Section 6.3.2) and used two different types of data cleaning approaches based on two 
different core concepts: (1) Validation: Which is based on the concept of white listing 
and (2) Sanitization: Which is based on the concept of black listing. The use of this 
combination enhances the security afforded by the technique by ensuring that more 
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variables and factors are taken into account by the people who develop the data cleaning 
rules. Additionally the validation and sanitization policy creation process we have 
developed and presented in Section 4.2 has been specially designed to ensure the 
strength and completeness of the policies created. This is done by ensuring that the 
policies take each separate data field into account. The policy creation process also 
ensures that multiple features and attributes of each data field are used in creating the 
validation and sanitization policies leading to much stronger and through policies. 
In addition to its effectiveness against simpler SQLIA and its simplicity the other 
reason we use validation and sanitization in our technique is protection against second 
order SQLIA. Second order injection attacks do not change the structure of the 
dynamically generated query [78]. Therefore SQLIA detection techniques that rely on 
query structure/pattern matching, such as [84, 86, 88, 89], are ineffective against these 
types of attacks and second order injection still remains a very prominent threat to the 
security of most web and RFID applications. But, because RFID tag data cleaning does 
not depend on the query structure, but the rather the format and content of the input 
data, it can still be used to spot possible instances of second order injection in RFID 
tags. Therefore in our proposal we have included the data validation and sanitization 
technique in addition to the query matching technique to ensure that there is some 
protection against second order SQLIA. But to ensure adequate protection against 
second order injection it is imperative that the analyses carried out in the static phase are 
complete and the rules created are comprehensive. It’s also important that the 
developers take into account the other systems that will be accessing the RFID database 
and build the tag data cleaning rules with their weaknesses in mind.  
6.4.2 Query Structure Matching 
We also carried out testing to evaluate the security of the query structure matching 
technique. To carry out a thorough evaluation all three main types of dynamically 
generated SQL queries possible in RFID systems (SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT) had to 
be tested. Therefore we developed a number of queries of each type ranging from 
simple to complex and developed the legal query structure for each query. 
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6.4.2.1 Methodology 
To evaluate our technique we used two programs. One is the freely available demo 
version of the General SQL parser (GSP Demo) downloadable at 
http://www.sqlparser.com/download.php. The other was a simple string comparison 
program written by us. For parsing of the dynamic queries we used the pretty print 
facility of the GSP Demo. We set the pretty print format options as shown in Figure 6.6. 
All tokens except comments, strings and numbers were set to show with green font 
colour. Comments were blue while strings and numbers were red. Shows a dynamic 
query containing a tautology after it has been passed. 
Figure 6.6: Example of a parsed query 
Once the query was parsed we replaced all red text (literals) with “?” and deleted all 
blue text (comments). The resulting string was then compared with the legal query 
structure (for the more complex queries and attacks) using the comparison program we 
had written (Figure 6.7). The program takes the dynamic query and strips any newline 
characters and any multiple spaces replacing them with single spaces. It then runs a 
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single string comparison to compare result with the legal query structure input at the 
bottom of the program.  
Figure 6.7: Example of a query comparison 
6.4.2.2 Results 
Not all types of SQLIA can be mounted on RFID systems. Therefore when testing our 
system we only tested the types of attacks possible on RFID systems and ignored SQL 
attacks such as timing attacks, inference and illegal/illogical queries. The Table 6.6 
shows the breakdown of our testing process and the results obtained when testing 
malicious queries. In total around 300 queries were manually tested. 
Table 6.6: Evaluation results 
 Select Queries 
tested(Detected) 
Update Queries 
tested(Detected) 
Insert Queries 
tested(Detected) 
Total 
(Detected) 
Tautologies 21(21) 21(21) N/A 42(42) 
Union query 18(18) 6(6) 12(12) 36(36) 
Piggy 
backed 
queries 
15(15) 15(15) 15(15) 45(45) 
Alternate 
encodings 
12(12) 12(12) 12(12) 36(36) 
Commenting 
queries 
2(2) 5(5) 1(1) 8(8) 
Total 68(68) 59(59) 40(40) 167(167) 
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For all types of queries and all types of SQLIA types tested our query structure 
matching technique was able to identify SQLIA with 100% efficacy. In addition during 
the testing process we also tested around 120-130 legal queries. All legal queries were 
allowed by the technique with a 0% false positive rate. Even though the testing was 
limited to around 300 queries in total and carried out at logical level rather than 
implementation level the 100% detection rate and 0% rate in false positives are very 
promising.   
Table 6.7: Security comparison table 
Detection rate False Positive rate 
Proposed Approach 100% 0% 
AMNESIA [89] 100% 0% 
SQLCheck [91] 100% 0% 
SQLGuard [90] Results not presented Results not presented 
SQLrand [86] Results not presented Results not presented 
Tautology-checker [87] < 100% Not available 
CANDID [126] 100% 0% 
SQLDOM [127] Results not presented Results not presented 

In Table 6.7 we compare the detection results of our approach against the security by 
some other SQLIA detection techniques. Please note the results do not take into account 
second order injection attacks. As the results show our approach is on par if not better 
than the best of the other approaches that are available in literature. 
Table 6.8: Comparison of SQLIA detection techniques
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Proposed 
Approach 
1 1 1 1 1 1 Uses simple string comparison for both 
approaches 
AMNESIA 
[89] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Uses NDFA which may over or under 
estimate the structures 
SQLCheck 
[91] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Uses parse trees for comparison and secret 
keys which increase system overhead 
SQLGuard 
[90] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Uses parse trees for comparison and secret 
keys which increase system overhead 
SQLrand 
[86] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Use high over cryptographic techniques 
Tautology-
checker [87] 
1 0 0 0 0 0 Only works for tautologies 
CANDID 
[126] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Uses a dynamic method to guess the 
programmer intended query structure 
SQLDOM 
[127] 
1 1 1 1 1 0 Needs a custom set of classes be built for 
each database schema 
High overhead 
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Additionally, as Table 6.8 shows our technique is the only technique that actually has a 
possibility of detecting and preventing second order injections (given strong enough 
data cleaning rules). It is also one of the simplest approaches available as its uses only 
simple string comparison for both techniques compared to the more complex techniques 
used by other systems.  
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we presented a simple but secure approach for detecting and preventing 
tag based RFID SQLIA.  The overall technique consists of two different methods. The 
first method is a simple validation and sanitization technique for the RFID tag data 
which is based on data formatting and sanitization policies created after careful analysis 
of the data stored on the tag. This technique prevents ‘bad’ data from being used while 
building dynamic queries and is effective against second order injection attacks. The 
second method is a SQL query structure matching technique which uses simple string 
comparisons to identify possible SQLIA. This technique has the advantage of protecting 
against all other SQLIA types possible on RFID systems while being simpler than other 
proposals that use more complex matching techniques such as parse tree validation [90] 
or query randomization [86] .  
The testing of the query structure matching method yielded very positive results. 
We tested all possible types of dynamic queries that may be generated in RFID systems 
with all possible types of attacks that can be mounted on those systems. In all more than 
300 queries were tested with around 170 attacks and around 130 legal queries. The 
testing showed a detection rate of 100% and false positive rate of 0%. Our approach 
(specifically the validation and sanitization technique) was specifically designed to 
protect against second order injection attacks on RFID systems. This type of SQLIA 
cannot be detected by any query matching system. The main weakness of the proposed 
techniques is that the security against second order injection relies heavily on the data 
cleaning policies. To ensure the strength and completeness of the data cleaning policies 
we have a developed and presented a data cleaning policy creation methodology that is 
highly structured. This methodology ensures that policies created by following it takes a 
large number of different attributes into account and is as complete as possible, ensuring 
that a high level of protection is afforded by the approach. 
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future 
Research 
Even though RFID research and adoption has seen a significant increase in the last 
decade there are still some barriers that pose a hurdle to its total acceptance. These 
barriers come in the form of security concerns and performance issues. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to enable the wider adoption of RFID technology in large 
networked environments and systems. To achieve this aim we have first developed and 
presented a networked RFID architecture framework optimised for this type of large 
scale systems. We have also carried out research on different means with which the 
security of these types of systems can be improved. This research includes a 
comprehensive networked RFID security framework, an RFID security protocol and a 
tag based malware detection and prevention technique for RFID systems. Throughout 
this thesis we have presented the main outcomes of our research and also the analyses 
we carried out that show the improvements and advantage our solutions pose over 
currently existing solutions. 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
The first task that was carried out during the research carried out for this thesis was the 
completion of a comprehensive literature review on a number of different areas of RFID 
research. For this the following four main areas were reviewed: (1) Current RFID 
architecture frameworks in context of the requirements and features of very large multi 
entity RFID systems, (2) Network and RFID security frameworks, (3) RFID security 
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protocols and (4) SQLIA detection and prevention techniques. During the review we 
made the following conclusions concerning networked RFID systems and their 
performance and security:- 
• The EPCGlobal Architecture Framework has a number of significant issues 
when used to develop very large scale multi entity RFID networks. These issues 
include inefficient data storage and look-up, needlessly complex and lengthy 
partner lookup and unnecessary duplicate data processing. Some of the other 
proposed architectures have some advantages over the EPCGAF but they also 
contain some weaknesses. Therefore a new architecture framework must be 
developed which can perform more efficiently in large scale networked RFID 
systems. 
• The currently existing security frameworks are not suitable for applying to and 
securing large scale networked RFID systems. The general network security 
frameworks do not take into account the many differences in RFID systems and 
general IT networks and therefore lack a lot of detail and security features 
required by the RFID networks. The frameworks on RFID security are not 
complete as they only look at some aspects of the overall security of the system. 
Therefore the need for a targeted and comprehensive security framework for 
large scale networked RFID systems is very acute. 
• While there are a large number of RFID security protocols in current literature 
none of them have been successful in securing the tag-reader communications of 
RFID systems employing low cost tags. Some proposed protocols have proven 
to be secure but they are too resource intensive to be implemented on low cost 
RFID tags. The protocols that are simple enough to be implemented on low cost 
RFID tags have been proven to be unsecure and vulnerable to a wide range of 
different attacks. Therefore an RFID security protocol that is both simple 
enough to be implemented on low cost tags and provably secure still need to be 
proposed. 
• RFID malware is a threat which has received very little attention but pose a very 
real and major threat to RFID systems. Next to no research has been carried out 
and detecting or preventing these types of attacks on RFID systems. The 
currently existing SQLIA detection techniques can be modified and used to 
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detect RFID malware but they need to be significantly modified and altered to 
ensure they can perform at the required efficiently and in the specific 
environment of  
Once the literature review was completed we then started developing RFID architecture 
which would perform better in the specific environment found in very large scale RFID 
systems such as global supply chain management systems.  In chapter 3 we present the 
outcome of this research. The architecture developed in this chapter is of a modular and 
extensible nature allowing for developers to pick and chose the kind of functionality the 
they want/need from there system. The proposed architecture uses p2P techniques for 
both data look-up and data sharing leading to significant advantages. It is also a 
networked RFID architecture optimised and targeted for large scale RFID systems with 
multiple independent partners. The comparative analysis carried out and presented at the 
end of the chapter show that our architecture has a number of advantages over the 
EPCGAF including less data lookup, reduced duplication of data retrieval and 
processing and more reliability due to reduced reliance on external data sources. 
Another major concern for RFID adopters are all the security and privacy issues 
associated with RFID systems. Because a methodical method with which an RFID 
developer can identify all the threats, attacks and security requirements of any given 
RFID system was needed we developed a networked RFID security framework. The 
outcome of this research is presented in chapter 4. The proposed framework consists of 
a threat model, attack model and security model. The framework looks at a large 
number of different security aspects of RFID systems including identification of threats 
and attacks possible on RFID systems, identification of the core components and 
security concepts that must be maintained and the identification of all the security 
functionality required to protect them. We validated the proposed framework by 
applying it to a real world RFID system. The validation showed the effectiveness of the 
framework as it identified a few security issues as well as novel methods with which 
those issues could be mitigated. 
In chapter 5 we develop and present an RFID security protocol that uses a hybrid of 
traditional and ultra-light-weight cryptographic techniques. By using traditional security 
techniques such as reader side PRNG and one-way hashing we ensure that the protocol 
has high security. The use of ultra-light-weight techniques such as bitwise XOR 
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operators ensures that the resource requirements are low. Therefore the protocol we 
propose, unlike a number of recently proposed RFID protocols, manages to provide 
both high security and low resource requirements. The proposed protocol was then 
evaluated for both its security and its performance. The security evaluation shows that 
the protocol is immune to a large number of common RFID attacks while still providing 
a number of core security requirements such as mutual authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity and privacy. The performance comparison proves that the resource 
requirements of the proposed protocol are less than or comparable to other recently 
developed ultra-light-weight RFID security protocols. 
Finally we looked at the issue of RFID malware detection and prevention. RFID 
malware is a relatively new type of security threat and was only identified as being 
possible in 2006. Therefore there has been very little work done on actually securing an 
RFID system from this kind of attack. In chapter 6 we first analyse RFID malware and 
conclude that all currently existing RFID malware are based on SQLIA. Because 
SQLIA is an old and established threat in web systems we then analyse web systems 
and normal RFID systems to see the differences in SQLIA in web systems vs. SQLIA in 
RFID systems. Based on the differences identified we conclude that some of the 
prevention methods deemed unsuitable for securing web systems from SQLIA can be 
successfully implemented to secure RFID systems from SQLIA. Next we propose and 
develop RFID malware detection and prevention system that uses two different 
techniques to detect tag based RFID malware and prevents it from infecting the backend 
databases. One of these techniques is tag data validation and sanitization system. To 
ensure that the strength of the black list and white list rules used in this system we 
present a highly structured method with which these rules can be developed. The second 
technique is a dynamic query matching system that employs a new method of string 
comparison to match the structure of the dynamically generated queries with the 
structure of the legal queries. The security evaluation of the query matching system 
shows very high detection rates and no false positives. 
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7.2 Future Research Opportunities 
In the course of the research carried out for this thesis we identified a number of open 
research areas or current solutions that need to be improved upon. For the benefit of 
future researchers in this area we will now list these research opportunities.  
7.2.1 RFID Identifier Management 
One of the biggest challenges in massively networked RFID systems is the issue of 
managing and distributing the identifier used to uniquely identify the tags and the issue 
of identifying data sources that have data about any given tag in an efficient manner 
[128]. Currently this task is carried out by the ONS service provided by the EPCGlobal 
[13]. One of the biggest issues with this system is the lengthy lookup process associated 
with identifying any given tag and then locating and retrieving data about that tag from 
partner EPCIS [2]. If this process could be eliminated or at least streamlined and 
simplified the performance of massively networked RFID systems would be improved. 
Therefore networked RFID systems are in dire need of new efficient methods with 
which the identifiers of RFID tags and the associated data storage locations can be 
distributed to the partners of the systems. This problem can only become more pertinent 
with time as the number of RFID tagged objects, RFID systems partners and RFID data 
locations will only grow over time adding even more complexity and lad on the 
currently used ONS services [128]. 
7.2.2 ONS Security and Performance 
One of the main requirements of the data lookup service provided by the EPCGlobal 
was scalability and a relatively high degree of availability. The DNS services used to 
identify and locate web addresses on the World Wide Web has both of these qualities. 
Therefore the EPCGlobal data lookup service (the ONS) was developed based on the 
DNS service [13]. While this ensured the scalability and availability of the ONS service 
it also meant that it inherited a number of the weaknesses inherent in the DNS service. 
These weaknesses include vulnerabilities to DDoS attacks, vulnerabilities to cache 
poisoning attacks, the need for duplication and real time update of the servers to ensure 
scalability and availability, and the slow update rate of DNS servers [31]. Because of 
reliability and scalability requirements of RFID systems are even greater than those of 
the World Wide Web the weaknesses of the DNS are only magnified when they are 
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translated to the RFID environment. Therefore research on how to improve the security 
and performance of the ONS service can have great benefits on RFID systems as well as 
improving the DNS services used by the World Wide Web. 
7.2.3 Creation of Low Resource Cryptographic Primitives 
A large number of security solutions are based around the use of common concepts such 
as PRNG, one-way hashes, cryptographic hashes, encryption algorithms and CRC 
algorithms. Therefore over the past years a large number of such cryptographic 
primitives have been developed by researchers. Now, strong and secure security 
solutions can easily be created by mixing and matching already existing, proven secure 
cryptographic primitives [129]. Unfortunately most of the currently existing 
cryptographic primitives were developed focused on typical IT systems and therefore 
require much more resources than are available on low cost RFID tags. While some 
research has been done on creating low cost, efficient, cryptographic primitives for use 
in resource constrained environments [77, 130], there still remains a number of 
significant gaps in this area. Additionally the progress in creation of low cost 
cryptographic primitives would pave the path for more efficient security solutions for 
typical IT systems as well as increase the security available in other low cost IT systems 
such as sensor networks. 
7.2.3 Protection against Active Jamming  
A major vulnerability of RFID systems is there weaknesses to active jamming. RFID 
active jamming is when attackers create a denial of service between tags and readers. 
The two most common ways of active jamming RFID systems is: (1) Emitting a very 
strong radio wave that drowns out the tag transmissions and (2) flooding a reader or tag 
with so many requests that it get overloaded and cannot respond to legitimate requests. 
The first type of attack is easily detected is much harder to recover from. The second 
type of request is hard to detect if it’s aimed at tags. Currently next to no work has been 
done on securing these kinds of attacks on RFID systems. There are a number of 
approaches that are used to detect and recover from active jamming attacks in other 
types of systems, especially in web systems where they are commonly mounted in the 
form of DDoS attacks. Therefore research into the viability of modifying and using 
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those techniques for RFID systems security can be fruitful as completely new ways in 
which active jamming attacks can be detected and stopped. 
7.2.4 RFID Tag Data Security  
With the price on memory dropping more and more RFID systems will start to store tag 
data on the tag itself for easier and faster access. Unfortunately unlike data storage 
components in typical IT systems the tags of RFID systems are highly vulnerable to 
physical access by attackers. Therefore it is imperative that security solutions that keep 
the data stored on the tag secure in case of physical access by an attacker to the tags. 
This means that if an attacker does steal a tag of a system they must not be able to 
understand the data stored on the tag. In addition with physical access they can now 
bypass the security protocols embedded in the tag and directly modify the tag contents. 
Therefore there must be means by which the readers can verify that the tag data has not 
been compromised directly. Hence there will be a need for security solutions that focus 
on keeping the data stored on the tag secure in case of physical compromise of the tag 
and also look at how such compromises can be detected.  
7.2.5 RFID Tag Access and Update Control 
Very large networked RFID systems are used by a number of independent partners. 
With the dropping price of tags and increases in the storage capacity of the tags these 
partners may want to store private data on the tag itself for easier access [2]. In this kind 
of environment there must exist means to ensure that other partners that have access to 
the tags do not gain access to the private data of other partners. Similarly the system 
must also ensure that the private data of one partner cannot be modified by other 
partners. This requires access and update controls that are based on a set of very fine 
access rules which are set by an overall system administrator [17]. While access 
controls exists for other types of IT components such as Databases and programs 
currently no research has been done in this area for RFID tag data. This remains a very 
open and compelling area of research. 
 7.2.6 Non-repudiation  
Non-repudiation is the assurance that when a person or entity carries out an action they 
are entitled to that person or entity cannot, in the future, deny that action. In IT this is a 
requirement for most shared or communication systems to ensure that users can place 
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trust in the systems data and information. When networked RFID systems start storing 
data about the objects it’s attached to on the RFID tags themselves the tags will change 
from simple data storage containers to a communication mechanism between the 
different partners. For example a partner can change the final destination data field on 
the tag to let other partners know where that specific object should be sent to. But once 
this happens the issue of repudiation will become a security concern for RFID tag data 
[17]. If a partner can change the data stored on the tag and then later deny making those 
changes then user trust in the system will decline. Therefore a means by which non-
repudiation of tag data updates can be assured is of utmost importance and no research 
has yet been carried out in this area. 
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΀ϭϴ΁ ͘:͘DĞƌĐĞƌ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗZ&/ƚĞƐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌĂŶZ&ͲŚĂƌƐŚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͕ΗŝŶ/
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶZ&/ͲdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ;Z&/ͲdͿ͕ ϮϬϭϭ͕ ƉƉ͘
ϵϱͲϭϬϮ͘
΀ϭϵ΁ W͘dƵǇůƐĂŶĚ>͘ĂƚŝŶĂ͕ΗZ&/ͲƚĂŐƐĨŽƌŶƚŝͲŽƵŶƚĞƌĨĞŝƚŝŶŐ͕ΗŝŶdŚĞƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌƐ͛dƌĂĐŬ
ĂƚƚŚĞZ^ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕^ĂŶ:ŽƐĞ͕͕h^͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϭϱͲϭϯϭ͘
΀ϮϬ΁ ,͘ &ĞƌŶĂŶĚŽ ĂŶĚ :͘ ďĂǁĂũǇ͕ ΗDƵƚƵĂů ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů ĨŽƌ EĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚ Z&/
^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕Η ŝŶ ϭϬƚŚ / /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ dƌƵƐƚ͕ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ WƌŝǀĂĐǇ ŝŶ
ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ŚĂŶŐƐĂ͕ŚŝŶĂ͕ϮϬϭϭ͘
΀Ϯϭ΁ ͘:ƵĞůƐ͕ΗZ&/ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ͗ĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐƵƌǀĞǇ͕Η/:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽŶ^ĞůĞĐƚĞĚƌĞĂƐ
ŝŶŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯϰ͕Ɖ͘ϭϰ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϮϮ΁ ,͘ &ĞƌŶĂŶĚŽĂŶĚ :͘ďĂǁĂũǇ͕ Η,ǇďƌŝĚDƵƚƵĂůƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽƚŽĐŽů ĨŽƌZ&/͕Η ŝŶ
ϳƚŚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů /^d ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ DŽďŝůĞ ĂŶĚ hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͗ ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕
EĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ^ǇĚŶĞǇ͕ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͕ϮϬϭϬ͕Ɖ͘Ϯ͘
΀Ϯϯ΁ E͘ ^ĐŚŽĞŶĞŵĂŶŶ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗWϮW ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƵďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ĐŚĂŝŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕Η ŝŶ
ϭϳƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϮϱϱͲϮϮϲϲ͘
΀Ϯϰ΁ ͘ DŝƚƌŽŬŽƚƐĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗůĂƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐ Z&/ ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͕Η /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ
&ƌŽŶƚŝĞƌƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϭϮ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϵϭͲϱϬϱ͕ϮϬϭϬ͘
΀Ϯϱ΁ Y͘tĂŶŐ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η>ŽǁͲŽƐƚ Z&/͗ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ WƌŽďůĞŵƐ ĂŶĚ ^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ;D^^Ϳ͕^ŚĂŶŐŚĂŝ͕ŚŝŶĂ͕ϮϬϭϭ͕ƉƉ͘ϭͲ
ϰ͘
΀Ϯϲ΁ D͘ ZŝĞďĂĐŬ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗZ&/ ŵĂůǁĂƌĞ͗ ĞƐŝŐŶ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ͕Η WĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ
ŵŽďŝůĞĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϬϱͲϰϮϲ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀Ϯϳ΁ ͘ dƌŝďŽǁƐŬŝ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗW/^ͲĂƐĞĚ ^ƵƉƉůǇ ŚĂŝŶ ǀĞŶƚ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͖  YƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ŽĨ ĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ
ŽŵƉůĞǆ͕/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚĂŶĚ^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ/ŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϵϰͲϰϵϵ͘
΀Ϯϴ΁ ͘hŐĂǌŝŽĂŶĚ&͘WŝŐŶŝ͕ ΗDĞĂƐƵƌŝŶŐZ&/ĚĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ^ƵƉƉůǇŚĂŝŶ͕Η ŝŶ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͗WĞŽƉůĞ͕KƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ͕ĂŶĚdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕͘ΖƚƌŝĂŶĚ͘^ĂĐĐă͕
ĚƐ͕͘ĞĚ͗WŚǇƐŝĐĂͲsĞƌůĂŐ͕ϮϬϭϬ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϲϵͲϰϳϲ͘
΀Ϯϵ΁ ͘'ůŽǀĞƌĂŶĚ,͘ŚĂƚƚ͕Z&/ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƐ͗KΖZĞŝůůǇDĞĚŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϯϬ΁ ͘Z͘ĂŶŶŽŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗZ&/ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶ͗ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶ
ŝƚƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĂŶĚƌŝƐŬƐ͕Η/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨKƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐΘWƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶDĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͕
ǀŽů͘Ϯϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϯϯͲϰϱϰ͕ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϯϭ΁ ͘ &ĂďŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ '͘ KůŝǀĞƌ͕ Η^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WŐůŽďĂů ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕Η
ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞD͕ǀŽů͘ϱϮ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϮϭͲϭϮϱ͕ϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϯϮ΁ ͘t͘^ĐŚƵƐƚĞƌ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘'ůŽďĂůZ&/͘ĞƌůŝŶ͗^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϯϯ΁ d͘ ,ĂƐƐĂŶ ĂŶĚ ^͘ ŚĂƚƚĞƌũĞĞ͕ Η dĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ĨŽƌ Z&/͕Η ŝŶ ϯϵƚŚ ŶŶƵĂů ,ĂǁĂŝŝ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ͕,ĂǁĂŝ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϴϰďͲϭϴϰď
΀ϯϰ΁ ͘'ůŽǀĞƌĂŶĚ,͘ŚĂƚƚ͕Z&/ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƐ͗KΖZĞŝůůǇDĞĚŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
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΀ϯϱ΁ ͘ ͘ ZĂŶĂƐŝŶŐŚĞ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ Ă hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ Z&/ ^ĞŶƐŝŶŐ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕ΗŝŶWƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ^ĞŶƐŽƌƐ͕
^ĞŶƐŽƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ͕DĞůďŽƵƌŶĞ͕ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϳͲϭϮ͘
΀ϯϲ΁ :͘zƵĂŶĚ^͘>Ăŝ͕ΗZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĨZ&/ŵŝĚĚůĞǁĂƌĞƉƵďůŝƐŚͬƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵďĂƐĞĚŽŶ
^K͕Η ŝŶϱƚŚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶtŝƌĞůĞƐƐ ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ EĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
DŽďŝůĞŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕'ƵĂŶŐǌŚŽƵ͕ŚŝŶĂϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϭͲϱ͘
΀ϯϳ΁ ͘ &ůŽĞƌŬĞŵĞŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ D͘ >ĂŵƉĞ͕ ΗZ&/ ŵŝĚĚůĞǁĂƌĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ͗ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ Z&/ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ͕Η ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ũŽŝŶƚ
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ^ŵĂƌƚ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŵďŝĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͗ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚͲĂǁĂƌĞ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͗ƵƐĂŐĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕'ƌĞŶŽďůĞ͕&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͘
΀ϯϴ΁ ͘ &ůŽĞƌŬĞŵĞŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ D͘ >ĂŵƉĞ͕ Η/ƐƐƵĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ Z&/ hƐĂŐĞ ŝŶ hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ
ƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ Η ŝŶ ^ĞĐŽŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ WĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞ ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕
>ŝŶǌͬsŝĞŶŶĂ͕ƵƐƚƌŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϴϴͲϭϵϯ͘
΀ϯϵ΁ ͘ƐŝĨĂŶĚD͘DĂŶĚǀŝǁĂůůĂ͕Η/ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶǁŝƚŚZ&/͗ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͕ΗŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϭϱ͕
ƉƉ͘ϯϵϯʹϰϮϲ͕ϮϬϬϱ͘
΀ϰϬ΁ z͘ >ŝ ĂŶĚ y͘ ŝŶŐ͕ ΗWƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ Z&/ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ĐŚĂŝŶƐ͕Η ŝŶ ϮŶĚ D
ƐǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ ^ŝŶŐĂƉŽƌĞϮϬϬϳ͕
ƉƉ͘ϮϯϰͲϮϰϭ͘
΀ϰϭ΁ ^͘ tĂŬĂǇĂŵĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗŽƐƚͲĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ WƌŽĚƵĐƚ dƌĂĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ tŝĚĞůǇ
ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚĂƚĂďĂƐĞƐ͕Η:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯ͕Ɖ͘ϴ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϰϮ΁ ^͘ ^ŚƌĞƐƚŚĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η WĞĞƌͲƚŽͲWĞĞƌ Z&/ ZĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ &ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ^ƵƉƉůǇ ŚĂŝŶ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕ΗŝŶ^ĞĐŽŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ&ƵƚƵƌĞEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͕/&EΖϭϬ͘͕'ŽǇĂŶŐ͕
^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂϮϬϭϬ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϭϴͲϯϮϮ͘
΀ϰϯ΁ :͘ >ĞĞ ĂŶĚ <͘ ůͲ<ŚĂƚŝď͕ Η WƌŝǀĂĐǇͲŶĂďůĞĚ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ĂŶ Z&/ͲďĂƐĞĚ >ŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ
DŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ͕Η ŝŶ / ^ĞĐŽŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ^ŽĐŝĂů ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ
;^ŽĐŝĂůŽŵͿ͕DŝŶŶĞĂƉŽůŝƐ͕ϮϬϭϬ͕ƉƉ͘ϵϯϰͲϵϯϳ͘
΀ϰϰ΁ ͘ ^ŽůĂŶĂƐ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƐĐĂůĂďůĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ Z&/ ƚĂŐ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ΗŽŵƉƵƚĞƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϱϭ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϮϲϴͲϮϮϳϵ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϰϱ΁ ,͘Ͳz͘ <ƵŶŐ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗĂƚĂ ZĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ &ŝůƚĞƌŝŶŐ ĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ Z&/ ĂƚĂ
WƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐŽŶƚƌŽů^ĐŚĞŵĞƐ͕Η/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ǀŽů͘ϭϯϰ͕
ƉƉ͘ϱϵϲͲϲϬϭ͕ϮϬϭϭ͘
΀ϰϲ΁ E͘͘tƵ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽŐůŽďĂůZ&/ĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶ͕ΗdĞĐŚŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϯϭϳͲ
ϭϯϮϯ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϰϳ΁ :͘ :ĞŽŶŐ ĂŶĚ ͘ :͘ ,ĂĂƐ͕ ΗŶ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ &ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ŽƉĞŶ ǁŝƌĞůĞƐƐ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ͕Η/tŝƌĞůĞƐƐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϭϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϬͲϭϴ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϰϴ΁ ͘ DĐ'ĞĞ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕Η Ğůů >ĂďƐ dĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů
:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ǀŽů͘ϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϳͲϮϳ͕ϮϬϬϰ͘
΀ϰϵ΁ :͘ :ĞŽŶŐ ĂŶĚ ͘ :͘ ,ĂĂƐ͕ ΗŶ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ &ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ŽƉĞŶ ǁŝƌĞůĞƐƐ
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ͕ΗtŝƌĞůĞƐƐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕/͕ǀŽů͘ϭϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϬͲϭϴ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϱϬ΁ W͘ ZŽƚƚĞƌ͕ Η ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ Z&/ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ ƌŝƐŬƐ͕Η /
WĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϳ͕ƉƉ͘ϳϬͲϳϳ͕ϮϬϬϴ͘
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΀ϱϭ΁ ͘DŝƚƌŽŬŽƚƐĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Z&/ ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ hŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
ǁŽƌŬ͕ϮϬϭϬ͘
΀ϱϮ΁ :͘ ǇŽĂĚĞ͕ ΗZŽĂĚŵĂƉ ƚŽ ƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ŝŶ Z&/ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕Η
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌůĂǁΘƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƌĞƉŽƌƚ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϱϱϱͲϱϲϭ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϱϯ΁ ͘^͘<ŝŵ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ ΗƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŝŶZ&/ŵƵůƚŝͲĚŽŵĂŝŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ͕Η ŝŶdŚĞ^ĞĐŽŶĚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕ZĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ϮϬϬϳ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϮϮϳͲϭϮϯϰ͘
΀ϱϰ΁ W͘ WĞƌŝƐͲ>ŽƉĞǌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗZ&/ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͗  ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ŽŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ
ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ͕Η ŝŶ ϭϭƚŚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ WĞƌƐŽŶĂů tŝƌĞůĞƐƐ ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕
ůďĂĐĞƚĞ͕^ƉĂŝŶ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϱϵͲϭϳϬ͘
΀ϱϱ΁ ^͘ ŚƵũĂ ĂŶĚ W͘ WŽƚƚŝ͕ ΗŶ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ Z&/ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕Η ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϴϯʹϭϴϲ͕ϮϬϭϬ͘
΀ϱϲ΁ ͘:ƵĞůƐ͕ΗDŝŶŝŵĂůŝƐƚĐƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇĨŽƌůŽǁͲĐŽƐƚZ&/ƚĂŐƐ͕Η^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϯϯϱϮ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϰϵʹϭϲϰ͕ϮϬϬϰ͘
΀ϱϳ΁ <͘ EŽŚů ĂŶĚ ͘ ǀĂŶƐ͕ ΗĞƐŝŐŶ dƌĂĚĞͲKĨĨƐ ĨŽƌ ZĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ WƌŝǀĂĐǇ͕Η ŝŶ Z&/ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ W͘
<ŝƚƐŽƐĂŶĚz͘ŚĂŶŐ͕ĚƐ͕͘ĞĚh^͗^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌ͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϴϯͲϭϬϭ͘
΀ϱϴ΁ ,͘Ͳz͘ ŚŝĞŶ͕ Η^^/͗  EĞǁ hůƚƌĂůŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚ Z&/ ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů WƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ
^ƚƌŽŶŐƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚƌŽŶŐ /ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ͕ΗdƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĞƉĞŶĚĂďůĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌĞ
ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϯϳͲϯϰϬ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϱϵ΁ W͘WĞƌŝƐͲ>ŽƉĞǌ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗDW͗ŶĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚDƵƚƵĂůͲƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽƚŽĐŽůĨŽƌ>ŽǁͲŽƐƚ
Z&/dĂŐƐ͕Η ŝŶŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂƚĞĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůtŽƌŬƐŚŽƉƐĂŶĚWŽƐƚĞƌƐŽŶKŶƚŚĞDŽǀĞƚŽ
DĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů/ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐDŽŶƚƉĞůůŝĞƌ͕&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϱϮͲϯϲϭ͘
΀ϲϬ΁ W͘ WĞƌŝƐͲ>ŽƉĞǌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η>DW͗ZĞĂů >ŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚDƵƚƵĂůƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽƚŽĐŽů ĨŽƌ
>ŽǁͲĐŽƐƚZ&/ƚĂŐƐ͕Η ŝŶtŽƌŬ^ŚŽƉŽŶŽŶZ&/ĂŶĚ>ŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚƌǇƉƚŽ͕'ƌĂǌ͕ƵƐƚƌŝĂ͕
ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϲϭ΁ W͘WĞƌŝƐͲ>ŽƉĞǌ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗDΔϮW͗DŝŶŝŵĂůŝƐƚDƵƚƵĂůͲƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽƚŽĐŽůĨŽƌ>ŽǁͲ
ŽƐƚ Z&/ dĂŐƐ͕Η ŝŶ dŚŝƌĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ /ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ
ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐtƵŚĂŶ͕ŚŝŶĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕Ɖ͘ϵϭϮ͘
΀ϲϮ΁ W͘ WĞƌŝƐͲ>ŽƉĞǌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ hůƚƌĂůŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚ ƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĨŽƌ >ŽǁͲĐŽƐƚ Z&/
dĂŐƐ͗ 'ŽƐƐĂŵĞƌ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů͕Η >ĞĐƚƵƌĞ EŽƚĞƐ ŝŶ ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ ǀŽů͘ ϱϯϳϵ͕ ƉƉ͘ ϱϲͲϲϴ͕
ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϲϯ΁ :͘ >ŝŵ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η EĞǁ ,ĂƐŚͲĂƐĞĚ Z&/ DƵƚƵĂů ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů WƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ
ŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ hƐĞƌ WƌŝǀĂĐǇ WƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ͕Η ŝŶ ϰƚŚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇWƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ^ǇĚŶĞǇ͕ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϴ͕Ɖ͘Ϯϳϴ͘
΀ϲϰ΁ d͘ŝŵŝƚƌŝŽƵ͕Η>ŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚZ&/WƌŽƚŽĐŽůƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚdƌĂĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚůŽŶŝŶŐ
ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η ŝŶ&ŝƌƐƚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚWƌŝǀĂĐǇĨŽƌŵĞƌŐŝŶŐƌĞĂƐ
ŝŶŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐƚŚĞŶƐ͕'ƌĞĞĐĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϱϵͲϲϲ͘
΀ϲϱ΁ ,͘ z͘ ŚŝĞŶĂŶĚ͘,͘ŚĞŶ͕ ΗDƵƚƵĂů ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƚŽĐŽů ĨŽƌZ&/ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ƚŽ
W ůĂƐƐ ϭ 'ĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ Ϯ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ͕ΗŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐΘ /ŶƚĞƌĨĂĐĞƐ͕ ǀŽů͘ Ϯϵ͕ ƉƉ͘
ϮϱϰͲϮϱϵ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϲϲ΁ ͘E͘ƵĐ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨWŐůŽďĂů'ĞŶͲϮZ&/dĂŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚdƌĂĐĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚ ůŽŶŝŶŐ͕Η ŝŶ ^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ŽŶ ƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂŶĚ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ ,ŝƌŽƐŚŝŵĂ͕
:ĂƉĂŶ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
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΀ϲϳ΁ ^͘ ,ĂŶ ĂŶĚ ͘ ŚĂŽͲ,ƐŝĞŶ͕ ΗdĂŵƉĞƌ ĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ Z&/ͲŶĂďůĞĚ ^ƵƉƉůǇ ŚĂŝŶƐ hƐŝŶŐ
&ƌĂŐŝůĞtĂƚĞƌŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ͕Η ŝŶ / /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶZ&/͕ >ĂƐsĞŐĂƐ͕EĞǀĂĚĂ͕
ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϭϭͲϭϭϳ͘
΀ϲϴ΁ s͘ WŽƚĚĂƌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗdĂŵƉĞƌ ĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ Z&/ dĂŐƐ ƵƐŝŶŐ &ƌĂŐŝůĞ tĂƚĞƌŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ͕Η ŝŶ
WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ / /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕DƵŵďĂŝͲ
/ŶĚŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϱͲϭϳ͘
΀ϲϵ΁ ͘ zĂŵĂŵŽƚŽ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η dĂŵƉĞƌ ĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ DĞƚŚŽĚ ĨŽƌ Z&/ dĂŐ ĂƚĂ͕Η ŝŶ /
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶZ&/͕>ĂƐsĞŐĂƐ͕EĞǀĂĚĂ͕ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϱϭͲϱϳ͘
΀ϳϬ΁ D͘DŽŚĂŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗZĞĐŽǀĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞƐƚŽƌŝŶŐƚĂŵƉĞƌĞĚZ&/ĚĂƚĂƵƐŝŶŐƐƚĞŐĂŶŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ͕Η ŝŶ WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ / /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů
dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕DƵŵďĂŝ͕/ŶĚŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϱͲϭϳ͘
΀ϳϭ΁ d͘ >ŝ ĂŶĚ '͘tĂŶŐ͕ Η^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ dǁŽ hůƚƌĂͲ>ŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚ Z&/ ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
WƌŽƚŽĐŽůƐ͕Η ŝŶ EĞǁ ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ĨŽƌ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ WƌŝǀĂĐǇ ĂŶĚ dƌƵƐƚ ŝŶ ŽŵƉůĞǆ
ŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ͘ǀŽů͘ϮϯϮ͕ĞĚ͗^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌ͕ϮϬϬϳ͕Ɖ͘ϭϬϵ͘
΀ϳϮ΁ d͘ĂŽ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘Η^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞ^^/WƌŽƚŽĐŽů͕Η/dƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶĞƉĞŶĚĂďůĞ
ĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌĞŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϳϯͲϳϳϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϳϯ΁ ͘ŝůĂů͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ Η^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨhůƚƌĂͲůŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐWƌŽƚŽĐŽů ĨŽƌ>ŽǁͲ
ĐŽƐƚ Z&/ dĂŐƐ͗ 'ŽƐƐĂŵĞƌ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ EĞƚǁŽƌŬͲĂƐĞĚ
/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϲϬͲϮϲϳ͘
΀ϳϰ΁ d͘ >ŝ ĂŶĚ Z͘ ,͘ ĞŶŐ͕ ΗsƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ DWͲŶ ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ Z&/ DƵƚƵĂů
ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕ ZĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ
^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕sŝĞŶŶĂ͕ϮϬϬϳ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϬͲϭϯ͘
΀ϳϱ΁ :͘ ͘ ,ĞƌŶĂŶĚĞǌͲĂƐƚƌŽ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗƌǇƉƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^^/ hůƚƌĂůŝŐŚƚǁĞŝŐŚƚ Z&/
ƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽƚŽĐŽů ǁŝƚŚ DŽĚƵůĂƌ ZŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕Η ƌǆŝǀ ƉƌĞƉƌŝŶƚ Ăƌyŝǀ͗Ϭϴϭϭ͘ϰϮϱϳ͕
ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϳϲ΁ D͘ĂƌĂƐǌ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ>DW͕ΗŝŶZ&/^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕DĂůĂŐĂ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϳϳ΁ <͘zƵŬƐĞů͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗhŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŚĂƐŚ&ƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĞƌŐŝŶŐhůƚƌĂͲ>ŽǁͲWŽǁĞƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͕Η
ŝŶ ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ EĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ DŽĚĞůŝŶŐ ŶĚ ^ŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕^ĂŶŝĞŐŽ͕ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂ͕ϮϬϬϰ͘
΀ϳϴ΁ ,͘&ĞƌŶĂŶĚŽĂŶĚ:͘ďĂǁĂũǇ͕Η^ĞĐƵƌŝŶŐZ&/^ǇƐƚĞŵƐĨƌŽŵ^Y>/͕ΗŝŶϭϭƚŚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ĂůŐŽƌŝƚŚŵƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ͕ DĞůďŽƵƌŶĞ͕
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ͕ϮϬϭϭ͘
΀ϳϵ΁ ͘^ƵůŝŵĂŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗZ&/ŵĂůǁĂƌĞĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ΗŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ
ŽŶŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂŶĚ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕/ƌǀŝŶĞ͕ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϱϯϯͲϱϯϵ͘
΀ϴϬ΁ t͘,ĂůĨŽŶĚ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^Y>ͲŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ͕ΗŝŶ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶ^ĞĐƵƌĞ^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϴϭ΁ ͘ƌĂďƌĂŶĚ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗWŽǁĞƌĨŽƌŵƐ͗ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝǀĞĐůŝĞŶƚͲƐŝĚĞĨŽƌŵĨŝĞůĚǀĂůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ͕ΗtŽƌůĚ
tŝĚĞtĞď͕ǀŽů͘ϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϬϱͲϮϭϰ͕ϮϬϬϬ͘
΀ϴϮ΁ :͘ &ŽŶƐĞĐĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗdĞƐƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐ ǁĞď ǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƐĐĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŽŽůƐ ĨŽƌ ^Y>
ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚy^^ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ΗŝŶϭϯƚŚWĂĐŝĨŝĐZŝŵ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶĞƉĞŶĚĂďůĞ
ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϲϱͲϯϳϮ͘
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΀ϴϯ΁ z͘ t͘ ,ƵĂŶŐ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗtĞď ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ďǇ ĨĂƵůƚ ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ͕Η ŝŶ ϭϭƚŚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůtŽƌůĚtŝĚĞtĞď ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕ ,ŽŶŽůƵůƵ͕
,ĂǁĂŝŝ͕ϮϬϬϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϰϴͲϭϱϵ͘
΀ϴϰ΁ Z͘ ͘ DĐůƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ /͘ ,͘ <ƌƺŐĞƌ͕ Η^Y> KD͗ ĐŽŵƉŝůĞ ƚŝŵĞ ĐŚĞĐŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ^Y>
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ͕ΗŝŶϮϳƚŚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ͕DŝƐƐŽƵƌŝ͕h^͕
ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϴϴͲϵϲ͘
΀ϴϱ΁ &͘ sĂůĞƵƌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐͲďĂƐĞĚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƋů ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η ŝŶ
/ŶƚƌƵƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚDĂůǁĂƌĞ ĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ͘ ǀŽů͘ ϯϱϰϴ͕ ĞĚ͕ ϮϬϬϱ͕
ƉƉ͘ϱϯϯͲϱϰϲ͘
΀ϴϲ΁ ^͘t͘ŽǇĚĂŶĚ͘͘ <ĞƌŽŵǇƚŝƐ͕ Η^Y>ƌĂŶĚ͗WƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ^Y> ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η ŝŶϮŶĚ
ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶƉƉůŝĞĚƌǇƉƚŽŐƌĂƉŚǇĂŶĚEĞƚǁŽƌŬ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ϮϬϬϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϵϮͲϯϬϮ͘
΀ϴϳ΁ '͘tĂƐƐĞƌŵĂŶŶĂŶĚ͘^Ƶ͕ΗŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶtĞďĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕ΗŝŶ
&ŝƌƐƚ &^ tŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ŽŶ ^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ sĞƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚͲĂƐĞĚ ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕
ϮϬϬϰ͕Ɖ͘ϳϬ͘
΀ϴϴ΁ ͘ 'ŽƵůĚ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η: ĐŚĞĐŬĞƌ͗  ƐƚĂƚŝĐ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ƚŽŽů ĨŽƌ ^Y>ͬ: ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕Η ŝŶ
ϮϲƚŚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϲϵϳͲϲϵϴ͘
΀ϴϵ΁ t͘'͘:͘,ĂůĨŽŶĚĂŶĚ͘KƌƐŽ͕ΗDE^/͗ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂŶĚŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐĨŽƌEƵƚƌĂůŝǌŝŶŐ^Y>Ͳ
ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ΗŝŶϯƌĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/^tŽƌŬƐŚŽƉŽŶǇŶĂŵŝĐŶĂůǇƐŝƐ͕DK͕h^͕
ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϳϰͲϭϴϯ͘
΀ϵϬ΁ '͘ ƵĞŚƌĞƌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗhƐŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƐĞ ƚƌĞĞ ǀĂůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ^Y> ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η ŝŶ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ^ŽĨƚǁĂƌĞŶŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚDŝĚĚůĞǁĂƌĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϬϲͲϭϭϯ͘
΀ϵϭ΁ ͘ ^Ƶ ĂŶĚ '͘ tĂƐƐĞƌŵĂŶŶ͕ ΗdŚĞ ĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ŝŶ ǁĞď
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕Η ŝŶ ϯϯƌĚ ŶŶƵĂů ^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ŽŶ WƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŽĨ WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵŝŶŐ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƐ͕
ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϳϮͲϯϴϮ͘
΀ϵϮ΁ <͘ ŵŝƌƚĂŚŵĂƐĞďŝ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ŽĨ ^Y> ŝŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞ ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ͕Η ŝŶ ϲƚŚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌŶĞƚ dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ ^ĞĐƵƌĞĚ dƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ͕ >ŽŶĚŽŶ͕
h<͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϭͲϴ͘
΀ϵϯ΁ ͘^ƵůĂŝŵĂŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘Η^Y>ŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚZ&/͕Η:ŽƵƌŶĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǀŝƌŽůŽŐǇ͕ǀŽů͘ϰ͕
ƉƉ͘ϯϰϳͲϯϱϲ͕ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϵϰ΁ Y͘ ŚĂŶŐ ĂŶĚ y͘ tĂŶŐ͕ Η^Y> /ŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂĐŬͲŶĚ ŽĨ Z&/ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ͕Η ŝŶ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶŽŵƉƵƚĞƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬĂŶĚDƵůƚŝŵĞĚŝĂdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕ϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘
ϭͲϰ͘
΀ϵϱ΁ ͘<͘<ǇĂǁ͕ΗŝŐŝƚĂů&ŽƌĞŶƐŝĐƐŝŶƐŵĂůůĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ͗Z&/ƚĂŐŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ΗDĂƐƚĞƌƐ͕ĞƐŝŐŶ
ĂŶĚƌĞĂƚŝǀĞdĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕hdhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ͕ƵĐŬůĂŶĚ͕ϮϬϭϭ͘
΀ϵϲ΁ ͘ &ůŽĞƌŬĞŵĞŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ D͘ >ĂŵƉĞ͕ ΗZ&/ ŵŝĚĚůĞǁĂƌĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ͗ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚZ&/ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ͕Η ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ϮϬϬϱ ũŽŝŶƚ
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ^ŵĂƌƚ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŵďŝĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ͗ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚͲĂǁĂƌĞ
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ͗ƵƐĂŐĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕'ƌĞŶŽďůĞ͕&ƌĂŶĐĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͘
΀ϵϳ΁ ^͘&͘tĂŵďĂĂŶĚ,͘ŽĞĐŬ͕ΗŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨůŽǁŝŶĂƌĞƚĂŝůƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƵƐŝŶŐ
Z&/ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞWŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕Η :ŽƵƌŶĂů ŽĨ dŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚƉƉůŝĞĚůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ͕ǀŽů͘ϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϵϮͲϭϬϱ͕ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϵϴ΁ ͘ ͘ ZĂŶĂƐŝŶŐŚĞ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ Ă hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ Z&/ ^ĞŶƐŝŶŐ
EĞƚǁŽƌŬ͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ ^ĞŶƐŽƌƐ͕ ^ĞŶƐŽƌ EĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ĂŶĚ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ WƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ
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ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ͕ϮϬϬϱ͘WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐŽĨ ƚŚĞϮϬϬϱ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶ͕ϮϬϬϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϳͲ
ϭϮ͘
΀ϵϵ΁ t͘tĞŝǆŝŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ ΗŽŵƉůĞǆǀĞŶƚWƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŝŶW^ĞŶƐŽƌEĞƚǁŽƌŬDŝĚĚůĞǁĂƌĞ ĨŽƌ
ŽƚŚZ&/ĂŶĚt^E͕Η ŝŶϭϭƚŚ / /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵŽŶKďũĞĐƚKƌŝĞŶƚĞĚZĞĂůͲ
dŝŵĞŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϲϱͲϭϲϵ͘
΀ϭϬϬ΁ &͘dŚŝĞƐƐĞĂŶĚ͘ŽŶĚĞĂ͕ΗZ&/ĚĂƚĂƐŚĂƌŝŶŐŝŶƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƐ͗tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
WŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ͍͕Η/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůũŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ͕ǀŽů͘ϳ͕ƉƉ͘ϮϭͲϰϯ͕ϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϭϬϭ΁ ^͘ Z͘ :ĞĨĨĞƌǇ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗĚĂƉƚŝǀĞ ĐůĞĂŶŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ Z&/ ĚĂƚĂ ƐƚƌĞĂŵƐ͕Η ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ
WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ϯϮŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ sĞƌǇ ůĂƌŐĞ ĚĂƚĂ ďĂƐĞƐ͕ ^ĞŽƵů͕
<ŽƌĞĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϭϬϮ΁ Z͘ĞƌĂŬŚƐŚĂŶ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗZ&/ĚĂƚĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ͗ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ͕ΗŝŶ/
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶZ&/͕͕'ƌĂƉĞǀŝŶĞ͕dyϮϬϬϳ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϳϱͲϭϴϮ͘
΀ϭϬϯ΁ ͘ :ƵĞůƐ͕ ΗZ&/ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ͗ Ă ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƐƵƌǀĞǇ͕Η ^ĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ͕/:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽŶ͕ǀŽů͘Ϯϰ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϴϭͲϯϵϰ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϭϬϰ΁ ^͘WŝƌĂŵƵƚŚƵ͕ΗZ&/ŵƵƚƵĂůĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƚŽĐŽůƐ͕ΗĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕ǀŽů͘
ϱϬ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϴϳʹϯϵϯ͕ϮϬϭϬ͘
΀ϭϬϱ΁ D͘ :Ž͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗDŽďŝůĞ Z&/ ƚĂŐ ĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚĂŐ
ĚĞƚĞĐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ͕Η/^ĞŶƐŽƌƐ:ŽƵƌŶĂů͕ǀŽů͘ϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϭϮͲϭϭϵ͕ϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϭϬϲ΁ d͘ :ŝĞ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η Z&/ ƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ Ƶŝůƚ ŝŶ WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚDĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ &ŝĞůĚƐ͕Η ŝŶ
dŚŝƌĚ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ,ǇďƌŝĚ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ͕
ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϭϭϴͲϭϭϮϬ͘
΀ϭϬϳ΁ ^͘ ŶĚƌŽƵƚƐĞůůŝƐͲdŚĞŽƚŽŬŝƐ ĂŶĚ ͘ ^ƉŝŶĞůůŝƐ͕ Η ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ŽĨ ƉĞĞƌͲƚŽͲƉĞĞƌ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ͕ΗDŽŵƉƵƚ͘^Ƶƌǀ͕͘ǀŽů͘ϯϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϯϱͲϯϳϭ͕ϮϬϬϰ͘
΀ϭϬϴ΁ Z͘ d͘ &ŝĞůĚŝŶŐ͕ ΗƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĂů ƐƚǇůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ŽĨ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚͲďĂƐĞĚ ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ
ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ͕Η W,͕ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ͕ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĂůŝĨŽƌŶŝĂ͕
/ƌǀŝŶĞ͕/ƌǀŝŶĞ͕ϮϬϬϬ͘
΀ϭϬϵ΁ ͘ <ĂƌǇŐŝĐŵŶŝƐ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗZ&/ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͗  dĂǆŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ ZŝƐŬ͕Η ŝŶ WƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ &ŝƌƐƚ
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽŶŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚEĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ͕ŚŝŶĂ͕ϮϬϬϲ͕ƉƉ͘ϭͲϴ͘
΀ϭϭϬ΁ :͘ ďĂǁĂũǇ͕ ΗŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐ Z&/ dĂŐZĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ůŽŶŝŶŐƚƚĂĐŬ͕Η ŝŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ŽŶ dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ZĂĚŝŽ &ƌĞƋƵĞŶĐǇ /ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ :ĞũƵ
/ƐůĂŶĚ͕<ŽƌĞĂ͕ϮϬϬϳ͘
΀ϭϭϭ΁ D͘ZŝĞďĂĐŬ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ ΗZ&/DĂůǁĂƌĞ͗dƌƵƚŚǀƐ͘DǇƚŚ͕Η /^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚWƌŝǀĂĐǇ͕ǀŽů͘ϰ͕
ƉƉ͘ϳϬͲϳϮ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϭϭϮ΁ D͘ZŝĞďĂĐŬ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘Η/ƐǇŽƵƌĐĂƚŝŶĨĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌǀŝƌƵƐ͍͕ΗŝŶ&ŽƵƌƚŚŶŶƵĂů/
/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ WĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞ ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ WŝƐĂ͕ /ƚĂůǇ͕
ϮϬϬϲ͕Ɖ͘ϭϬ͘
΀ϭϭϯ΁ D͘ZŝĞďĂĐŬ͕ĞƚĂů͕͘ΗdŚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨZ&/^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕Η /WĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϱ͕
ƉƉ͘ϲϮͲϲϵ͕ϮϬϬϲ͘
΀ϭϭϰ΁ y͘ŚĂŶŐĂŶĚ'͘ĂĐŝƵ͕Η>ŽǁŽƐƚDŝŶŝŵĂůDƵƚƵĂůƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶWƌŽƚŽĐŽůĨŽƌZ&/͕ΗŝŶ
/ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ EĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ͕ ^ĞŶƐŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶƚƌŽů͕ ,ĂŝŶĂŶ͕ ŚŝŶĂ͕
ϮϬϬϴ͕ƉƉ͘ϲϮϬͲϲϮϰ͘
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΀ϭϭϱ΁ ͘W͘WĨůĞĞŐĞƌĂŶĚ^͘>͘WĨůĞĞŐĞƌ͕^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶĐŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ϯĞĚ͗͘WƌĞŶƚŝĐĞ,ĂůůWƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů͕
ϮϬϬϯ͘
΀ϭϭϲ΁ <͘ <ŽƐĐŚĞƌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗW Z&/ ƚĂŐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ͗ ƉĂƐƐƉŽƌƚ ĐĂƌĚƐ͕
ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ĚƌŝǀĞƌƐ ůŝĐĞŶƐĞƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ͕Η ŝŶ ϭϲƚŚ D ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŽŶ ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇϮϬϬϵ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϯͲϰϮ͘
΀ϭϭϳ΁ D͘ >ĂŶŐŚĞŝŶƌŝĐŚ͕ Η ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ŽĨ Z&/ ƉƌŝǀĂĐǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ͕Η WĞƌƐŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ hďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐ
ŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϭϯ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϭϯͲϰϮϭ͕ϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϭϭϴ΁ <͘ KƐĂŬĂ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗŶ ĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ^ĞĐƵƌĞ Z&/ ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ DĞƚŚŽĚ ǁŝƚŚ KǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ
dƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ͕Η ŝŶZ&/^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ W͘ <ŝƚƐŽƐ ĂŶĚ z͘ ŚĂŶŐ͕ ĚƐ͕͘ ĞĚh^͗ ^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌ͕ ϮϬϬϵ͕ ƉƉ͘
ϭϰϳͲϭϳϲ͘
΀ϭϭϵ΁ ͘ KŵĞƌ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ ΗDƵƚƵĂů ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽƚŽĐŽůƐ ĨŽƌ Z&/ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ͕Η /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨƵƚŽŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵƉƵƚŝŶŐ͕ǀŽů͘ϱ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϰϴͲϯϲϱ͕ϮϬϬϴ͘
΀ϭϮϬ΁ Y͘ zĂŶ͕ Ğƚ Ăů͕͘ Η ŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ^ƚƵĚǇ ĨŽƌ Z&/ DĂůǁĂƌĞƐ ŽŶ DŽďŝůĞ ĞǀŝĐĞƐ͕Η
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚƚŚĞZ&/^ĞĐƐŝĂ͕dĂŝƉĞŝ;dĂŝǁĂŶͿ͕ϮϬϬϵ͘
΀ϭϮϭ΁ <͘ ^ƵŶŝƚŚĂ ĂŶĚD͘ ^ƌŝĚĞǀŝ͕ ΗƵƚŽŵĂƚĞĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ĨŽƌ ^Y> /ŶũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕Η
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